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From angry torch-swinging Parisians attacking the Bastille and Russian workers 
rising up against the Tsar to outraged Chinese peasants exacting revenge on their 
landlords and Cuban guerrillas battling Batista’s army, revolutions without violence have 
in the past been near inconceivable. But when unarmed Iranians after an extended 
popular struggle forced Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the last king of Iran, to flee Tehran on 
January 16, 1979, they had gifted the world a new and seemingly paradoxical 
phenomenon: a nonviolent revolution. Far from a historical oddity, such revolutions have 
since occurred on almost every continent. Over the past thirty years the function of 
guerrilla tactics, military coups, and civil war has increasingly been replaced by 
demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. How can social scientists account for this 
“evolution of revolution” that have so altered the appearance of the phenomenon that by 
Arendt’s definition events in places like Iran, the Philippines, Chile, Poland, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine may not even qualify as 
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revolutions? Yet, the popular overthrows of authoritarian regimes in each and every one 
of those countries were nothing less than revolutionary.  
The dissertation seeks to understand this recent development in the nature of 
revolutions by historically examining the phenomenon’s signal case, the Iranian 
Revolution. The core question asked is: what are the structural and historical forces that 
caused the Iranian Revolution to be the world’s first nonviolent revolution? The central 
argument is that both the emergence and success of the nonviolent Iranian Revolution can 
be explained by its internationalization. In other words, the Iranian Revolution turned out 
to be successfully nonviolent because, unlike previous revolutions, it was a global affair 
in which the revolutionaries intentionally and strategically sought to bring the world into 
their struggle against the state. Indirectly, the aim of this study is to generate the genesis 
of a theoretical framework that can explain more broadly the emergence and success of 
nonviolent revolutions in the late 1970s and beyond.   
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1. THE EVOLUTION OF REVOLUTION 
 
“Only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is 
used to constitute an altogether different form of government… can we speak of 
revolution” (Arendt 1963:28) 
 
 From angry torch-wielding Parisians attacking the Bastille and Russian workers 
rising up against the Tsar to outraged Chinese peasants exacting revenge on their 
landlords and Cuban guerrillas battling Batista‟s army, revolutions without violence have 
in the past been near inconceivable. But when unarmed Iranians after an extended 
popular struggle forced Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the last king of Iran, to flee Tehran on 
January 16, 1979, they gifted the world a new and seemingly paradoxical phenomenon: a 
nonviolent revolution. Far from a historical oddity, such revolutions have since occurred 
on almost every continent. As one prominent scholar points out “beginning with the 
Iranian Revolution of 1978-79… a growing number of nonviolent or at least unarmed 
popular insurgencies have arisen against authoritarian states” (Goodwin 2001:294-5).
1
  
Over the past thirty years the function of guerrilla tactics, military coups, and civil 
war has increasingly been replaced by demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. How can 
social scientists account for this “evolution of revolution” that has so altered the 
appearance of the phenomenon that by Arendt‟s definition events in places like Iran, the 
Philippines, Chile, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine 
may not even qualify as revolutions? Yet, as popular movements managed to overthrow 
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authoritarian regimes in each and every one of those countries their outcomes were 
nothing less than revolutionary.  
 The dissertation seeks to understand this recent development in the nature of 
revolutions by historically examining the phenomenon‟s signal case, the Iranian 
Revolution. The core question asked is: what are the structural and historical forces that 
caused the Iranian Revolution to be the world‟s first nonviolent revolution? The central 
argument is that both the emergence and success of the nonviolent Iranian Revolution can 
be explained by its internationalization. In other words, the Iranian Revolution turned out 
to be nonviolent and successful because, unlike previous revolutions, it was a global 
affair in which the revolutionaries intentionally and strategically sought to bring the 
world into their struggle against the state. Indirectly, the aim of this study is to generate a 
theoretical framework that can be applied more broadly to explain the emergence and 
success of nonviolent revolutions in the late 1970s and beyond.   
 But how recent is the surfacing of nonviolent revolutions? Did they really emerge 
only in the last three decades as Goodwin and others have suggested, or can we find them 
further back in history? Foran (2005) has pointed out that Guatemalan revolutionaries 
used nonviolent tactics as early as the 1950s, and Goldstone (2003) adroitly notes that 
most revolutions in history became violent only after they had already defeated the state. 
My contention is not that the use of nonviolent methods of struggle in revolutionary 
movements is new to the last three decades. Rather, I suggest that the novelty lies in the 
fact that contemporary revolutionaries have deliberately opted for nonviolent methods, 
and have calculatingly eschewed the use of violence. What explains this strategic choice 
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and under what structural conditions is it made? These are some of the questions I hope 
to answer in the pages to come. 
 Why do we need another theory of revolutions to explain what appears to be a 
slight shift in little more than the tactics employed by contemporary revolutionaries? 
After all, social scientist have at least since the 1920s found revolutions intriguing 
enough to study them systematically, and have in the process generated a substantial 
number of theories to help explain both their varying causes and outcomes.
2
 Could these 
theories not also be helpful in explaining this transformation of revolutionary methods? I 
contend that the answer to the last question must necessarily be in the negative, and that a 
new analytical framework is required because nonviolent revolutions cannot be properly 
understood unless they are considered qualitatively different from past revolutions. The 
shift is neither slight nor marginal. Conceptually, it is not adequate to approach the two 
components – “nonviolent” and “revolution” – as mutually exclusive and coincidentally 
coupled.  
Instead, the term “nonviolent revolution” represents one idea that cannot be 
reduced to the sum of its parts. By virtue of being one new notion rather than the 
combination of two old ones, a fresh theoretical approach is needed if the concept is to be 
correctly understood.  Furthermore, the impact of nonviolent revolutions has been 
monumental: They have helped establish one of the world‟s few Islamic Republics, 
contributed to the end of a Cold War and the demise of socialism as a political system, 
and aided in the reform of the planet‟s only constitutionally racist nation. Yet, we 
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 In Chapter 2 I review some of the most influential contributions made to the study of revolutions. 
4 
 
understand very little about the causes and dynamics of nonviolent revolutions. The 
dissertation therefore seeks to remedy this shortcoming by filling a hole in the revolution 
literature.        
 
What is a Nonviolent Revolution? 
 
Despite a burgeoning body of literature surrounding what I refer to as nonviolent 
revolutions, few scholars have referred to the phenomenon by that name. Zunes (1994) 
and Schock (2005) speak of “unarmed insurrections,” Goodwin (2001) of “unarmed 
popular insurgencies,” and Foran opts for “non-violent and/or democratic routes to 
power.” Goldstone (2003) has problematized the assumption that revolutions by 
definition are violent events, and Roberts and Garton Ash (2009) recently published an 
ambitious edited volume that covers nineteen different cases of “civil resistance.”
3
 Others 
have begun to analyze “color revolutions” and “electoral revolutions,” specifically 
focusing on the post-communist revolutions in the former Soviet sphere of influence, 
such as the Bulldozer Revolution of Serbia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
4
 In fact, Nepstad (forthcoming) will become the first 
scholar to publish a book-length study of “nonviolent revolutions” explicitly. Unlike most 
of the existing research on color and electoral revolutions, this study examines a 
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 In his conclusion, Garton Ash (2009) addresses the term “non-violent revolution,” (375), but the volume 
as a whole is not dedicated to the concept. 
4
 See for example the special issue of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, especially Binnendijk and 
Marovic (2006), Bunce and Wolchik (2006), Goldstone (2009), Hale (2006), Kuzio (2006), and Marples 
(2006). Also see McFaul (2005), Van Inwegen (2006) and Auer (2009). 
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deliberately nonviolent challenge against an authoritarian state, and thus seeks to make a 
novel contribution to our understanding of revolutions and nonviolent social change.   
The reluctance to identify these truly revolutionary events as revolutions has been 
noted by Garton Ash (2009). Because nonviolent revolutions tend to look quite different 
from their violent predecessors, he argues, “observers generally feel the need to qualify 
these new-style, non-violent transfers of power over states with an adjective: self-
limiting, evolutionary, carnation, velvet, singing, rose, orange, negotiated, electoral, 
peaceful, or even non-revolutionary revolution” (Garton Ash 2009:376). Like Garton 
Ash, I can only speculate as to the sources of this avoidance to refer to nonviolent 
revolutions as revolutions. In an effort to clearly identify the phenomenon many of the 
aforementioned scholars have sought to explain, I propose the following definition of the 
concept.  
For the purpose of this study, a nonviolent revolution is defined as a 
transformation of the political and/or social order of society, carried out through mass 
mobilization that relies overwhelmingly on the noninstitutionalized use of strikes, 
demonstrations, boycotts, and similar nonviolent methods, while deliberately eschewing 
violence. To increase the clarity of this definition it is necessary to examine it more 
closely. First, I do not distinguish between social and political nonviolent revolutions. 
Defining revolutions as one of the two types has been standard practice in most 
revolution research, but I do not consider this distinction analytically helpful, primarily 
because it is unclear how much social change is required for a revolution to be more than 
just a political revolution. For now, I have therefore chosen to ignore the social/political 
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dimension in my definition. Second, because I seek to understand why nonviolent 
revolutions not only occur, but also succeed, my definition dictates that only triumphant 
cases be considered revolutions. Third, for an overthrow to be considered a revolution it 
must have substantial support and be carried out through a popular mass movement.
5
 
In addition to these criteria, the nonviolent aspect of the definition should be 
discussed. First, it is assumed that no revolution is completely nonviolent. Therefore, 
opposition violence could occur without that necessarily disqualifying a case from being 
considered a nonviolent revolution. The key is whether or not such violence can explain 
the movement‟s success and whether it is part of its revolutionary strategy. In the case of 
Iran, opposition violence did occur, but few scholars have given such expressions of 
frustration any meaningful role in explaining the success of the revolution.
6
 More 
importantly, the available evidence strongly suggests that neither Khomeini nor any other 
revolutionary leader endorsed such violence. Second, my definition is only concerned 
with the opposition‟s strategies, that is, the revolutionaries‟ reliance on nonviolent 
methods. A state‟s resort to brute force is expected when its very existence is threatened, 
and the presence of government-sponsored violence is therefore irrelevant to the 
definition presented above.      
 
 
                                                 
5
 This is in part what disqualifies Portugal‟s Revolution of the Carnations from being a nonviolent 
revolution, in spite of its lack of violence. The Portuguese case, I suggest, is better understood as a 
nonviolent military coup. For a discussion of the Revolution of the Carnation, please see Maxwell (2009).   
6
 See Chapter 6.  
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Theorizing Nonviolent Revolutions 
 
 The theory developed in this dissertation identifies two distinct but interconnected 
factors that made both the emergence and success of a nonviolent revolution against the 
shah possible.
7
  While it may not be necessary to altogether reinvent the wheel of 
revolution theory, some significant and basic modifications of how we approach 
revolutions are needed. For example, and unlike most students of revolution, I do not aim 
to identify the proximate causes that led to state crisis in Iran. An important assumption 
of this study is that such causes are constantly present and boiling under the surface in 
any authoritarian society, and that a wide array of triggers can generate sufficient moral 
outrage for a suppressed people to rise up against its government if the structural context 
permits such action. What is therefore crucial is to identify those contextual conditions 
that made a nonviolent challenge against the Iranian state viable. To accomplish this I 
first place heavy emphasis on the international context in which the Iranian Revolution 
occurred. Second, and in contrast to most existing analytical frameworks, ample 
explanatory space will be afforded to the concept of revolutionary strategy in order to 
understand how the structural context was exploited by activists. The consideration of 
both structure and agency/strategy is crucial to a sophisticated understanding of the 
dynamics of nonviolent revolutions.  
 
                                                 
7
 Shah is the Farsi word for king. 
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The International Context 
 
 Are revolutions national or international events? Even though scholars have 
emphasized the role played by the international context in bringing about state 
breakdown, they have traditionally considered the actual struggle between the state and 
its challengers to be a domestic affair. Central to my argument is the idea that 
contemporary revolutions, and nonviolent ones in particular, are decidedly international 
processes. By this I do not simply mean that the international context helps bring about a 
revolutionary situation in a given country, although this is true, but also that the 
revolution itself is a global spectacle that assumes importance for audiences throughout 
the globe, even those with no direct connection to the nation undergoing a revolution. As 
I will show in the next section, this internationalization of revolutions is at least in part 
deliberately accomplished by many contemporary revolutionaries, but it is also the result 
of certain structural relationships between different types of nations and other, more 
general, globalization processes. Particularly important is the world community‟s 
growing concern with human rights.     
The emergence of nonviolent revolutions in the late 20
th
 century is no 
coincidence. Rather, I suggest there is a correlation between this development and the 
simultaneous advancement of a global human rights regime (Donnelly 1986; Ratner & 
Abrams 2001; Hunt 2007). The progress of human rights is essential to the emergence of 
nonviolent revolutions for a few reasons. First, the universal and basic nature of human 
rights makes them difficult to oppose in principle for any state or individual that claims to 
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be democratic or liberal-minded. Second, the United Nation‟s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights formalized what were previously little more than abstract enlightenment 
ideals. Now states that have signed the UN declaration are expected to respect and protect 
human rights within their territories. Failure to do so frequently result in denouncements 
from other governments, and depending on the human rights offending regime‟s 
relationship with other nations such condemnations could potentially have detrimental 
consequences. Finally, human rights are important in a theory of nonviolent revolutions 
because of the inherent compatibility of the two ideas. Since a nonviolent revolution can 
be conceptualized as a human right – “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression” and “everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association” (United Nations 1948: Sections 19 & 20) – we can expect that governments 
bound by the UN declaration will have a difficult time dealing with these types of 
challenges. One could even go a step further and argue that in the era of globalization, 
governments are considerably more vulnerable to internal nonviolent attacks than to 
violent ones. Because the repression of the former is significantly more difficult to justify 
to the world community it constitutes a more serious challenge for a state to handle.  
I argue that amicable international relations contributed to the creation of a 
nonviolent revolutionary movement in Iran that subsequently broke down the state. This 
“soft” view of the international context is drastically different from how theorists of 
revolutions have traditionally approached the topic. Following Skocpol‟s (1979) lead 
most researchers have accepted the idea that military and economic competition between 
nations contribute to state breakdown which in turn may allow a revolution to occur 
10 
 
(Calvert 1996; Halliday 1999; 2001; Snyder 2001; Walt 2001). Turning the equation on 
its head, I posit that revolutionary movements cause state breakdown to occur, and not 
the other way around. I thus side with Goldstone (2003) who suggests that the 
“Skocpolian” perspective on the role of foreign states and actors may be overly 
simplistic: 
International pressures, for example, are not sufficiently described in terms of 
international military or economic competition. Increasingly, direct foreign 
intervention and support – or withdrawal of that support – are common [emphasis 
added]. In Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, the pattern of initial U.S. 
support for dictators, followed by reduction or withdrawal of that support, 
contributed to the outbreak of revolutionary conflicts. (Goldstone 2003:74)  
 
In line with Goldstone‟s point, I contend that amicable, high-profile relations between a 
democratic nation and an autocratic regime based on mutual economic and political-
strategic interests place a “burden of friendship” on both nations that eventually traps 
them in a Weberian-style “iron cage of liberalism” (ICL).  
The concept of the ICL, the central explanatory factor offered in this dissertation, 
is meant to capture the inherent contradiction that governments, whether democratic or 
autocratic, find themselves in when rhetorically embracing liberal values while 
simultaneously either repressing the expression of such values, or, in the case of a 
democratic nation, support a regime that violates liberal rights. The presence of an ICL, 
when combined with efficient news reporting, presents nonviolent revolutionaries with a 
structural context highly favorable to a nonviolent challenge as it makes it difficult for an 




Weber (1978; 1992; 1999) famously proposed that bureaucratic structures, which 
are intended to simplify interactions, over time develop into restrictive “iron cages.” 
Inevitably the bureaucracy assumes a life of its own at which point its rules limit the 
range of possible actions. In other words, after initially having a positive effect, the 
bureaucratic structure becomes so complex that it traps us all in its internal logic. 
Similarly, I argue that the relationship between the U.S. and Iran, which initially 
benefited both countries, eventually became an iron cage when it forced both 
governments to play by the liberal rules on which the relationship was supposedly based. 
This was especially problematic for the shah, who due to the ICL was compelled to 
exercise restraint in the face of nonviolent protests, a difficult balancing act for any leader 
whose rule is based on repression and sanctions.               
One key argument is thus that friendly relations between certain types of states 
can be detrimental to a repressive regime‟s ability to withstand a nonviolent challenge. 
When a dictatorship finds itself in a high-profile relationship with a self-identified 
democracy, and either explicitly or implicitly embraces its ally‟s liberal values, the 
autocratic regime is eventually forced to choose between revealing its undemocratic 
character to the world, and thus risk losing the support of its allies, or to practice restraint 
when dealing with nonviolent protestors. It is this dilemma, I argue, that constitutes an 
iron cage of liberalism. Whatever the dictatorial regime opts to do, it is severely 
weakened by the choice. However, not all dictatorships end up trapped in an ICL. What 
factors explain why the shah‟s government was when other autocratic regimes have 
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avoided a similar destiny? In the following chapters I seek to find the answer to that 
puzzle. 
The idea that international third parties can have a significant effect on domestic 
power struggles is not new. For example, scholars of nonviolent action have since long 
recognized this important element of social change and have given third parties a central 
place in their analyses (Helvey 2004; Roberts & Garton Ash 2009; Schock 2005; Sharp 
1973; 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008). From a related perspective, social movement 
researchers have begun to speak of transnational activism, but this theoretical approach is 
different from what I propose in the sense that it examines movements whose concerns 
are global in nature, such as the environmental movement or the World Social Forum 
(Barrett & Kurzman 2004; Chabot & Willemduyvendak 2002; Foran 2008; Halliday 
2008; Tarrow 2005). An internationalized movement, on the other hand, is concerned 
with national issues but tries to drag the world community into its struggle in order to put 
pressure on the opponent.    
When it comes to the study of revolution, few scholars have seriously considered 
the potential import of amicable international relations. The most flexible perspectives on 
the role of the international context are perhaps provided by Foran (2005), who speak of 
“world-systemic openings,” and DeFronzo‟s (2007) notion of a “permissive world 
context.” Unfortunately, the broadness of these conceptualizations of the international 
context‟s impact on revolutionary struggles also make them less than optimally helpful. 
The notion of an ICL, on the other hand, identifies a specific dimension of friendly 
international relations between nations that may have revolutionary consequences in an 
13 
 
autocratic country by increasing the effectiveness of nonviolent methods of struggle. This 
dissertation constitutes, as far as I know, the first analysis of revolutionary social change 





Although social structures like the ICL are important, simply having structural 
conditions in place does not guarantee the outbreak or success of a revolution, a 
realization that has caused recent contributors to think of revolutions as “revolutionary 
social movements,” and to consequently apply social movement theory to their analyses.
8
 
I concur with this theoretical shift and therefore amend my structural theory with 
considerations of movement strategy. In short, the ICL is not in itself a sufficient source 
of revolutionary success as shrewd revolutionaries must exploit the structural openings it 
provides by employing effective strategies to further internationalize their struggle. I will 
argue that ICLs are particularly exploitable through nonviolent methods.  
The role of strategy has generally been overlooked in the scholarship on 
revolutions, and I hope this study will constitute a significant contribution to this 
conceptual gap in our thinking about contentious politics. Only by combining structure 
and strategy, I believe, can we make sense of the emergence and success of nonviolent 
revolutions. For the purposes of this dissertation, strategy is defined as “structurally 
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 and shares the center stage of the theoretical model with the notion of 
the ICL. As I will show, Iran‟s nonviolent revolutionaries not only exploited the ICL by 
carefully selecting strategies that resonated with liberal values and human rights 
concerns, but also helped bring the ICL about through their pre-revolutionary tactics of 
international propaganda. 
The idea that structures, such as the ICL, provide actors with strategic choices is 
hardly groundbreaking. However, I propose that the relationship between structure and 
strategy is iterative, so that strategic decisions made by revolutionaries contribute to the 
creation of structural openings such as the ICL. This line of reasoning, although rarely 
explored, has at least been invoked by previous scholarship. As one scholar explains 
without further elaboration, “skilful strategy by the proponents of change can over time 
create new structures of opportunity” (Garton Ash 2009:388). In the case of Iran, students 
and exiles living abroad spent at least the 15-20 years leading up to the revolution 
engaged in an on-going propaganda campaign designed to inform the world about the 
human rights conditions in their home country. As Chapter 5 will show, their hard work 
was eventually rewarded when the international mass media and human rights 
organizations began to examine critically what had by then become one of the United 
States‟ most important allies. Their findings, that the shah‟s government was one of the 
world‟s most terrifying violators of human rights, in combination with the election of 
Jimmy Carter, “the human rights president,” created a structural opening in the shape of 
an ICL that made a nonviolent challenge highly effective. Thus, while seemingly a 
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structural opening, the ICL was in fact partly “created” by the propaganda efforts of the 
abroad-based opposition, thus suggesting an iterative relationship between structure and 
strategy.  
I intend to broaden the way we normally think of strategy by making the Iranian 
use of religious symbols and ceremonies a part of this structural-strategic theory of 
revolutions (Moaddel 1992; 1993; Burns 1996). The role of ideology in revolutions has 
been a historical point of contention.
10
 By approaching the Islamic dimension of the 
Iranian Revolution as most relevant from a strategic perspective, I seek to expand the 
way ideology is thought of in revolution theory. Religion played an essential 
revolutionary role by making nonviolent tactics attractive to the Iranian public. Yet, 
religion and ideology must be understood as manipulable constructs at the disposal of 
innovative leaders. Khomeini‟s revolutionary Islam, as Chapter 4 will show, was a rather 
radical interpretation of an old ideology. Consequently, Abrahamian (2009) has 
suggested that Khomeini had to frame Imam Hussein‟s willing martyrdom at Karbala in 
680 A.D. as a nonviolent act of sacrifice for the greater good, even though Hussein is 
traditionally depicted as having died fighting to his last breath, albeit against 
overwhelming odds. In short, the religious frames presented by Khomeini were not 
necessarily consistent with traditional Shi‟ism, but were rather altered for strategic 
reasons. By combining this emphasis on strategy with an appropriate focus of 
international structures, and by highlighting the iterative relationship between the two, I 
hope to craft a plausible theory of Iran‟s nonviolent revolution.  
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Method and Case Selection 
 
 Although the dissertation examines only one case, Iran‟s Islamic Revolution of 
1977-79, the method employed is that of comparative history. While this might seem 
paradoxical, my intention is for the findings of this project eventually to be part of a 
larger comparative study in which the Iranian case is the first. With that in mind, I ask the 
reader to remember that my aim is not to explain the causes of the Iranian Revolution per 
se, but simply to understand why the Iranian Revolution turned out to be nonviolent.
11
 As 
Skocpol (1979) once put it, some studies “present fresh evidence; others make arguments 
that urge the reader to see old problems in a new light. This work is decidedly of the 
latter sort” (xi). Thus I do not purport to be an Iran specialist as my aim is not to explain 
the historical specificities of the Iranian Revolution. Such a task is better suited for 
historians with much deeper knowledge of Iran than I allege to possess, and for those 
with the relevant language skills. Instead, my purpose is to identify those factors that 
caused the Iranian Revolution to assume a nonviolent character. As a comparativist my 
objective is to identify causal factors that may potentially be generalizable so as to apply 
to a wider array of cases.      
Comparative history has a solid track record within the study of revolutions and 
political sociology in general, and is highly suitable for macro-level studies such as this 
one (see Brubaker 1992; Charrad 2001; Foran 1993a; Goldstone 1982; 1991; 1998a; 
2003; Goodwin 2001; Mahoney & Reuschemeyer 2003; Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; 
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 For theoretical explanations of the causes of the Iranian Revolution, see for example Abrahamian (1982), 
Arjomand (1988), Foran (1993a), Keddie (1983b; 2003), Kurzman (2004), Milani (1988), Moaddel (1993), 
Parsa (1988; 1989; 2000), and Skocpol (1982).   
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1994; Tilly 1984; 1986). As Skocpol (1979:36) explains, comparative historical analysis 
(CHA) is particularly helpful when one strives to develop “explanations of macro-
historical phenomena of which there are inherently only a few cases.” Although 
nonviolent revolutions are not as rare, or “most unusual,” as some will have us believe 
(Guilmartin 1998), they are still rare enough to warrant the use of comparative history.  
 Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) have pointed out that comparative-historical 
methods of inquiry used to be the dominant, and for quite some time the only, available 
strategy available to social scientist. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, they 
note that CHA focuses specifically on causes. Unlike some other methods now at the 
disposal of social scientists, comparative-historical work explicitly attempts to explain, 
not interpret, phenomena. With the heavy emphasis on causes, CHA seems an 
appropriate method for a study that examines the causes and dynamics of nonviolent 
revolutions, as the method‟s “overriding intent is to develop, test, and refine causal, 
explanatory hypotheses about events or structures integral to macro-units such as nation-
states” (Skocpol 1979:36). Similarly, CHA has been described as “doubly engaged social 
science,” that is, the type of scholarship that not only examines empirical evidence, but 
simultaneously engages in theory-building (Skocpol 2003:409). It is my hope that this 
study will constitute an example of such doubly engaged research.  
 The data for this project consists mainly of secondary sources, although a few 
primary ones were also examined. The sources were selected with the help of an original 
master bibliography that I developed in the proposal stage of this project and include 
contributions from historians, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, 
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psychologists, journalists, politicians, and other area specialists. Once relevant sources 
had been identified and collected, a process made relatively easy by the sophistication of 
the University of Texas library system, they were systematically read. While immersing 
myself in the Iranian Revolution and Iranian history more broadly, I took copious notes 
with the help of Dragon Naturally Speaking, a voice recognition program. Throughout 
the research stage of the process the bibliography was amended when sources initially not 
included were identified in the course of my reading. This addition of sources is perhaps 
best likened to the type of snowball sampling sometimes utilized by researchers 
employing ethnographic and survey methods.  
When further reading was found to only marginally add to the data already 
encountered, the research process moved into the analysis stage. Here I used Atlas, a 
qualitative software, to apply approximately 200 different codes code my notes. Once the 
coding is completed, Atlas allows the researcher to sort his or her notes on the basis of 
the codes attached to each quote and makes cross referencing possible. Put succinctly, 
with the help of Atlas I was able to generate lists of all quotes in which relevant 
individual codes appeared together, such as “nonviolent action” and “armed forces.” This 
function in Atlas proved immensely helpful in the writing stage as I was able simply to 
request the software to provide me with all notes relevant to a given concept. Rather than 
being forced to go back to the books, chapters, and articles used as secondary sources, I 
could work almost exclusively with my own notes, a fact that significantly contributed to 
a more systematic writing process than would otherwise have been possible.         
19 
 
 A few words should be said about the case selection and periodization of the 
project. Iran was chosen as an appropriate case by virtue of having been identified in the 
literature as the world‟s first nonviolent revolution.
12
 As a signal case, the Iranian 
Revolution is particularly suitable since the revolutionaries did not have the benefit of 
having witnessed similar revolutions elsewhere. This fact makes “method diffusion” a 
non-factor and contributes to the “purity” of the Iranian case. Although selecting on the 
dependent variable is demonized in many other methodological traditions, comparative 
and historical sociology not only consider the practice permissible, but at many times 
unavoidable and even desirable. Working by definition with only a limited number of 
cases, random selection is not beneficial for theory-construction in comparative history. 
Instead, careful case selection may allow the researcher to more directly identify key 
causal factors.  Furthermore, much has been written on the Iranian Revolution in English, 
which somewhat reduces the problem of language skill limitation. 
 Finally, on the issue of periodization, my dissertation limits the time period under 
investigation to approximately the 90 years leading up to the Iranian Revolution and 
considers the Tobacco Movement of 1891 to be the earliest theoretically relevant event. I 
have opted to use this periodization for two reasons. First, the Tobacco Movement has 
been identified in the literature as the advent of large-scale popular opposition to the 
Iranian state. Second, the event was explicitly targeting not only the Iranian government, 
but also the plight of foreign influence (Abrahamian 1982; 2009; Foran 1993a). As the 
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20 
 
aim of the study is to understand a particular instance of popular opposition to the state, 
and because my theoretical framework emphasizes the international context and 
movement strategy as the main causal factors of nonviolent revolutions, the Tobacco 
movement seems like a natural starting point. Of course, as with all comparative-
historical projects, other scholars might have opted for a different periodization, but I 
feel, based on the aim and proposed framework of this dissertation, that the starting point 




 Following this brief introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the relevant academic 
literatures on revolutions, social movements, and nonviolent action in order to ground the 
project firmly in the existing scholarship. As the phenomenon under examination – 
nonviolent revolutions – can be conceived of as a hybrid of revolutions and nonviolent 
social movements, the three literatures identified are all likely to contain insights crucial 
to the study at hand. Furthermore, engagement with the existing scholarship is 
particularly important in studies that seek to contribute theoretically to ongoing academic 
debates. 
Chapter 3 begins to analyze the effects of the U.S.-Iranian relationship by 
examining its impact on various opposition groups. The chapter seeks to understand why 
the types of revolutionaries that had been dominant players in previous revolutions 
throughout the world were unable to secure leadership positions in the Iranian 
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Revolution. I argue that the closeness of U.S.-Iranian relations made it unnecessary for 
the shah to seek domestic allies, which transformed all other political actors into little 
more than competitors. Furthermore, by labeling many of them “collectivist 
organizations,” i.e. communists, the shah was able to repress such groups successfully 
and ruthlessly in the structural context of the Cold War. Interestingly however, some 
groups benefited from the shah‟s friendship with Washington, as Iranian students gained 
ready access to American universities as a result of the close ties between the Iranian and 
American governments. As we shall see, once in the U.S. the students combined their 
academic ventures with lobbying activities aimed at turning the world against the shah 
and his government. 
In Chapter 4, I examine Khomeini‟s strategic use of religious symbols and 
narratives to frame the opposition and its tactics. I argue that by drawing on Iranian and 
Shi‟i traditions, Khomeini was able to motivate his followers to embrace nonviolent 
methods in the face of armed repression. The chapter also examines the process through 
which the Shi‟i clergy and the traditional merchant class became revolutionarily inclined 
as a result of the shah‟s Westernization program and eventually assumed leadership of 
the movement. Finally, I analyze the organizational capacities provided by Iran‟s mosque 
network, a pre-existing structure that provided the revolutionary movement with 
infrastructural strength. 
Chapter 5 continues the exploration of the international context initiated in 
Chapter 3 by tracing the development of the U.S.-Iranian relationship over the near 40 
years leading up to the revolution. The chapter shows that as the shah‟s status was 
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transformed from client to ally, liberal-democratic expectations on him increased and 
eventually trapped him in what I am calling an iron cage of liberalism. The chapter also 
examines the role the abroad-based opposition, especially students, played in 
problematizing the shah‟s close relationship with Washington. By reaching out to human 
rights groups and the international mass media the students managed to drag the world, 
and the United States in particular, into the conflict. 
Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on the actual revolution and how the opposition 
exploited the ICL by utilizing nonviolent tactics that were difficult for the shah to 
counter. I posit that the opposition intentionally made their revolution an international 
event in order to prevent both U.S. and Iranian military interventions. The chapter thus 
emphasizes the role revolutionary strategy played in the Iranian Revolution. Against the 
backdrop of the ICL, nonviolent tactics became nearly impossible for the shah to repress 
and made it problematic for Carter to extend the type of support the king had gotten used 
to in his dealing with previous presidents.  
 From a bird‟s-eye perspective, Chapters 3 and 5 deal mainly with the international 
context while chapters 4 and 6 emphasize the role of revolutionary strategy. Nonetheless, 
each chapter contains elements of both structural and strategic explanations. This must 
necessarily be the case as one of the basic assumptions of this study is that structure and 




2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: REVOLUTIONS, MOVEMENTS, AND NONVIOLENT 
ACTION 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the theoretical framework advocated by this 
dissertation mainly emphasizes the effect amicable international relations can have on 
authoritarian governments and the manner in which shrewd revolutionaries exploit the 
resulting opportunities for mobilization. This study constitutes one of the first attempts to 
analyze the causes and dynamics of nonviolent revolutions, and consequently there is not 
a substantial literature on the topic to benefit from. However, scholars have studied 
revolutions, social movements, and nonviolent action, and by drawing from relevant 
contributions in each of these fields it is possible for me to ground my study in previous 
research.  
These three literatures are appropriate since my dissertation can be defined as a 
study of a particular nonviolent revolutionary movement. As such, contributions by 
scholars in the three fields should be able to inform my own theoretical thinking. This 
chapter therefore examines the three literatures in search of helpful conceptualizations 
and with the intent of identifying significant gaps that my study may be able to fill. I 
begin with a survey of four generations of revolution research (Goldstone 2001)
13
. Next, I 
examine three of the most influential approaches to social movement research. Finally, 
the more limited literature on nonviolent action will be discussed.  
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At least ever since Karl Marx asserted that the communist revolution was a 
historical inevitability, social scientist have been fascinated by the topic of revolutions. 
As with any other academic venture, the study has evolved and progressed through 
various phases. While it is not possible for me to review all of the scholarship that has 
been produced under the heading of revolutions, this section will provide a relatively 
brief overview of where that scholarship stands today. 
Of particular significance is that nonviolent revolutions have received virtually no 
attention from revolution researchers. Although much progress has been made in the field 
as a whole, most scholars have failed to recognize the emergence of nonviolent 
revolutions. Nonetheless, from their general theories of revolutions one can often extract 
helpful insights, and when that is the case I will highlight those insights throughout the 
chapter. 
 At the few occasions when revolution scholars note the fact that some recent 
revolutions have been surprisingly nonviolent (Goldstone 2001; 2003; Foran 2005, 
Goodwin 2001; Goodwin & Green 2008), they make little effort to explain this variation 
in the nature of revolutions. The problem, I suspect, is that a limited familiarity with the 
scholarly literature on nonviolent action has made it difficult for scholars to even speak in 
the language of nonviolent social change. Often the best theoretical insights emerge from 
the cross-fertilization of relatively independent research strands. This is the contribution I 
hope my dissertation will make. By amending the revolution literature with insights from 
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nonviolent action researchers, I expect to generate a theoretical framework that can begin 
to explain the emergence of nonviolent revolutions. 
In organizing this section, I follow Goldstone‟s (1982; 2001) division of the 
literature into four distinct generations of revolution theory.
14
 The first generation of 
scholars focused mainly on the different stages through which they believed all 
revolutions were required to progress. Second generation scholarship emphasized 
systemic and social psychological explanations, while third generation studies are 
characterized by a focus on structural causes and the importance of the state as an 
autonomous actor. Finally, fourth generation scholars have sought to include factors such 
as culture, ideology, gender, and agency into their causal frameworks.  
  
First Generation Scholarship 
 
 The earliest systematic studies of revolution have been categorized as the work of 
“natural historians” (Skocpol 1979:33; Goldstone 1982:189). These scholars, represented 
mainly by Lyford Edwards (1927), George Pettee (1938), and Crane Brinton (1938), 
attempted to outline the distinct steps of the revolutionary processes in a few selected 
cases. Brinton‟s (1938) treatise of four revolutions identifies twelve stages through which 
revolutions occur. While many of the insights offered by the natural historians have 
turned out to be descriptively accurate and have inspired later scholars, the theories 
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themseves tell us little about the causes of revolutions. The concern for causes has since 
become the dominant preoccupation of revolution researchers, beginning with those of 
the second generation.  
 
Second Generation Scholarship 
 
Although sociologists such as Herbert Blumer (1939) and Neil Smelser (1962) 
discussed revolutions in their respective treatments of collective action, Moshiri (1991) 
identifies the mid-1960s and the early 1970 as the beginning of systematic sociological 
examinations of revolutions (11-12). Goldstone (1982) has correspondingly identified 
scholars of this era as second generation theorists. The theme uniting this generation of 
scholars is their advocacy of generally mono-causal explanations that focus on such 
broad concepts as development, modernization, or frustration.  
An excellent example of second generation scholarship is Chalmer Johnson‟s 
(1964; 1966) value/systems approach. Johnson, strongly influenced by the structural 
functional school of sociology pioneered by Talcott Parsons in the 1950s, focused on 
social systems. For Johnson, revolutions were the result of a systemic disequilibrium. 
“Revolutions,” he therefore claims, are 
Antisocial, testifying to the existence of extraordinary dissatisfaction among 
people with a particular form of society. They do not occur randomly, and they 
need not occur at all. Revolution can be rationally contemplated only in a society 
that is undergoing radical structural change and that is in need of still further 
change. (Johnson 1966:59-60) 
 
 The “extraordinary dissatisfaction” Johnson mentions is caused by the 
introduction of new values into the social system. These novel values, which can be 
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either endogenously or exogenously inspired, may upset the balance between social 
institutions and can in rare circumstance lead to revolutions. Since the social system can 
only be maintained as long as its members adhere to the salient values of that system, the 
presence of new values may cause systemic disequilibrium and in extreme cases, 
revolution might follow. However, the disequilibrated social system that is the 
consequence of abandoned or questioned values is merely the first step on the path to 
revolution.  
 “Power deflation,” the second component of Johnson‟s theory, occurs when elites 
in an attempt to salvage the system resort to violence. Power deflation in turn leads to 
“loss of authority,” which ensues if elites continue to rely on brute force. The last step on 
the path to revolution is an “accelerator.” This term appears to be an emergency solution 
in Johnson‟s system as it can be constituted by almost anything that would bring about 
the revolution. In general the accelerator can be thought of as either a sudden insight in 
the collective mind of the members of the system, or a major political event that weakens 
the people‟s perception of the system‟s strength (Johnson 1966).  
Another second generation theory of revolution was offered by Huntington 
(1968). According to Huntington, revolutions are most likely to occur in societies that 
have experienced economic progress, but where political development lags economic 
development. This type of political underdevelopment becomes a social strain when 





 Pointing to modernization processes as the most 
useful explanation of revolutionary causes, Huntington thus suggests that revolutions can 
be traced to political and institutional roots.  
In Gurr‟s (1970) theory of “relative deprivation,” the psychological and 
institutional/political causes of revolution identified by Johnson and Huntington 
respectively are combined in a powerful explanation.
16
 “Relative deprivation,” Gurr 
(1970) explains,  
is defined as a perceived discrepancy between men‟s value expectations and their 
value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to 
which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods 
and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the 
social means available to them. (13). 
 
In other words, relative deprivation theory focuses on individuals‟ perceptions of their 
own material existence. The dissonance between the value expectations and value 
capabilities leads individuals to experience discontent. The development of discontent “is 
the primary causal sequence in political violence,” and can lead to “the politicization of 
that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and 
actors,” for example the outbreak of a revolution (Gurr 1970:12-13).   
 Gurr‟s theory of political violence relies on psychological explanations of 
collective action. If enough people become frustrated and discontent due to relative 
deprivation, a revolution is likely to occur. Gurr‟s approach to revolutions is informative, 
but has been found insufficient to fully explain political violence. Furthermore, for the 
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 Gurr appears to be intellectually indebted to Davies (1962) and his notion of a “reversed J-curve.” Both 
Davies and Gurr, in turn, borrowed heavily from the insights of Tocqueville (1955). 
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purposes of this essay, his framework focuses specifically on political violence, which is 
problematic for a study of nonviolent revolutions.  
While second generation theories of revolutions have been found insufficient to 
explain revolutionary outbreaks, several useful insights can be benefitted from. For 
example, Johnson‟s focus on values is relevant to the Iranian Revolution as much of 
Khomeini‟s revolutionary rhetoric emphasized the fact that the shah had abandoned the 
tradition value system on which Iranian society was based. In a sense then this is a 
reversal of Johnson‟s prediction as Iranian‟s were not motivated by new values, but rather 
by the reintroduction of old one.  
From Huntington we can adapt the emphasis on modernization. As I will show in 
Chapter 4, the main source of discontent among the Shi‟i clergy and the merchant class 
was the shah‟s twin policies of industrialization and secularization, a development that 
can be described simply as modernization. However, the process of modernization did 
not have revolutionary effects in Iran for the reasons Huntington predicts, but rather 
because it challenged the existing status quo and alienated the only two autonomous 
social classes in Iranian society. Nonetheless, it would be foolish to assert that the shah‟s 
modernization program was not a partial cause of discontent in Iran.   
Finally, Gurr‟s frustration-aggression scheme can also be applied to the Iranian 
Revolution, but not quite in the manner Gurr would recommend. Iranians were frustrated 
by the shah‟s regime, but probably not for relative deprivation reasons. Nonetheless, the 
social psychological scheme proposed by Gurr might explain why Iranian‟s took to the 
30 
 
streets in such large numbers. Still, Gurr‟s theory is probably the least helpful of the three 
reviewed in this section, partly because of its heavy emphasis on violence.  
Taken together, second generation scholarship is helpful because it emphasizes 
the individual‟s motivation for participating in revolutions – human beings, these scholars 
seem to suggest, respond to discontent by challenging the state. As we shall see, third 
generation scholars tried to keep human agency out of their theories by emphasizing 
structure over agency. While the international structural context is central to my own 
analytical framework, it seems prudent to follow the lead of second generation theorists 
and leave enough room for human action in a theory of revolutions. Still, as Skocpol 
(1979) points out, discontent, while important, can never be the sufficient and necessary 
condition for revolution to occur.  
 
Third Generation Scholarship  
 
Third generation revolution scholarship is characterized by its Marxist tendencies, 
such as the emphasis on social structures and class relations. In From Mobilization to 
Revolution, Tilly (1978) contends that revolutions cannot occur regardless of how 
frustrated the population is unless the ability to organize is present.
17
 The link between 
movements and revolutions here occurs for the first time, and it is a link that has been 
revived by more contemporary scholars of revolutions (Goldstone, 2001; Goodwin 2001; 
Foran 2005). In order to explain the causes of revolutions Tilly utilizes two models, the 
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polity model and the mobilization model. The polity model describes the relationships 
between groups vying for power. The components of this model include the government 
(“an organization which controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within the 
population”), contenders (actors interested in gaining access to the government, divided 
into members and challengers), polity (the arena in which the government and the 
contenders compete for power), and coalition (“a tendency of a set of contenders and/or 
governments to coordinate their collective action”). Members (insiders) and challengers 
(outsiders) do what they can to influence the government, sometimes by forming 
coalitions with other contenders (Tilly 1978:52-53). 
The mobilization model on the other hand describes the way in which “interest” is 
turned into “collective action” (Tilly 1978:54-55). Groups of members and contenders 
mobilize according to their interests, which sometimes lead to a “revolutionary situation” 
in which the polity is occupied by “multiple sovereignties,” a situation in which no single 
group can make an uncontested claim on the government (Tilly 1978:190-3). Tilly then 
proceeds to establish three “proximate causes of revolutionary situations:” 
1. The appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive 
alternative claims to the control over the government which is currently exerted 
by the members of the polity; 
2. Commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population; 
3. Incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the government to suppress the 
alternative coalition and/or the commitment to its claims. (Tilly 1978:200) 
 
Revolutions, then, are the results of mass mobilization and an ensuing power struggle.  
Skocpol (1979) wrote what must be the most cited scholarly work on revolutions. 
Her treatment of the “great revolutions” of France, Russia, and China attempts to widen 
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our understanding of revolutions by shifting the focus of attention towards global 
processes, and by “bringing the state back in.” To Skocpol, the state is not an arena as 
perceived by Tilly in his polity model, but instead an autonomous actor with its own 
motivations. Furthermore, states do not exist in a vacuum, but are rather engaged in a 
competitive relationship with other states.  
 Skocpol (1979) identifies her own view of revolution as “a structural perspective” 
(14-15). It is not frustrated individuals, she argues, who bring about revolutions, but 
rather structural relationships between and within states. By omitting agency from her 
model, Skocpol hopes to provide a more robust theory of revolution.
18
 She identifies 
three necessary conditions that must be present for social revolutions to occur, namely 
international pressure, tension between elites and the state (usually the monarchy), and 
peasant rebellions. Together these three components create a state crisis that is likely to 
bring about revolution.  
 Skocpol‟s work is arguably the most influential contribution to the study of 
revolution that has emerged onto the scene since Marx‟s writings on the topic. However, 
her theory has been heavily criticized for various reasons.
19
 For example, by omitting 
such factors as agency and ideology from the narrative, critics have argued, her theory 
becomes overly deterministic. Other dissenters may complain that her theory only applies 
to the three cases covered in the study (France, Russia, and China) and has little 
relevance for studies of later revolutions. This line of criticism is however rather futile as 
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Skocpol makes that very argument in the conclusion of her book. Being a careful 
comparative-historical sociologist she points out that her theory cannot be generalized 
beyond the cases addressed in the book. While most contemporary scholars disagree with 
Skocpol in one way or another, almost all of them have found her structural approach to 
offer at least partial answers and useful starting points. Recent studies have attempted to 
combine structural explanations of revolutionary causes by adding consideration for 
agency, culture, and ideology to the theoretical mix.  
 I have here focused on the two most famous and, arguably, most influential 
revolution theorists of the third generations. Nonetheless, several other important 
contributions based on structural arguments have been made, including those of Moore 
(1966), Eisenstadt (1978), and Wickham-Crowley (1992). One of the most impressive 
third generation contributions was made by Goldstone (1991), whose 
“demographic/structural model of state breakdown” provided revolution scholars with a 
novel and highly useful perspective (27). Goldstone brings our attention to the role 
played by demographic changes in the revolution process by pointing to the mobilization-
mitigating effects waves of population increase may have on a society.   
 Third generation scholarship has been very influential in my own thinking about 
revolutions. Skocpol was among the first to emphasize the role of the international 
context, and although I disagree with her focus on hostile international relations, her 
impact on me can hardly be overstated. At the same time, Skocpol‟s strict adherence to a 
“nonvoluntarist” view of revolutions is problematic. True, popular discontent is not a 
sufficient cause of revolution, but is there really no place for human agency in 
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revolutionary theory? Does ideology not matter the least bit? On these points it seems 
useful to be more nuanced, and perhaps incorporate some of the insights from other third 
generation scholars, such as Tilly. By combining Skocpol‟s notion of an autonomous 
state with Tilly‟s idea that revolutions are in fact power struggles between different social 
groups, we may get closer to an accurate description of what a revolution is.       
 
Fourth Generation Scholarship 
 
In recent years, scholars such as Colburn (1994), Emirbayer (Emirbayer & 
Goodwin, 1996) Foran (1993a; 1996; 1999; 2005), Goodwin (1994; 2001; 2003), Katz 
(1997), Keddie (1995), Moghadam (1997), and Selbin (1997, 1999, 2009) have taken the 
study of revolutions a step further. In what Goldstone (2001) refers to as the burgeoning 
fourth generation, scholars have paid closer attention to “revolutionary leadership, 
ideology, and identification, along with structural factors such as international pressure 
and elite conflicts” (139). Heeding Tilly‟s (1978) call to view revolutions as intimately 
connected with social movements, Goldstone (2001) has suggested that we also examine 
the revolutionary effects of such dimensions as networks, ideology, leadership, and 
gender (152-160).  
Goodwin‟s (2001) examination of twelve revolutionary movements on three 
continents is one the most important recent contributions to the study of revolution. 
Goodwin incorporates considerations of ideology and movement mobilizing into what is 
a highly structural theory. It is the nature of the state, Goodwin asserts, that causes 
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revolutionary movements to emerge. Specifically, he argues that regimes characterized as 
repressive and infrastructurally weak are likely to incubate revolutionary movements. 
Goodwin calls his model “state-centered” since a government contributes to the 
“creation” of its enemies by virtue of its characteristics. Goodwin‟s work has been hailed 
as an essential contribution to the field, and, rather uniquely, he dedicates a significant 
portion of his study on the nonviolent revolutions of Eastern Europe in 1989.  
Among other things, Goodwin‟s model has been praised for its parsimony. In 
contrast, Foran‟s (2005) broad study of third world revolutions offers a more multi-
faceted hypothesis. Foran identifies five factors that, when occurring simultaneously, 
result in social revolutions. However, Foran also suggests that when one or several of the 
five components – dependent development, specific characteristics of the state, political 
cultures of opposition, economic downturn, world-systemic openings – are missing from 
the equation, a different outcome is observed, such as a political revolution or an 
attempted one. Using Boolean algebra and fuzzy set logic, Foran offers the student of 
revolution an interesting and potentially useful perspective. However, like most 
revolution scholars Foran pays little attention to the nonviolent nature of several of his 
cases. 
Another interesting and important contribution of the fourth generation has been 
offered by Eric Selbin (1997), who has encouraged others to bring agency back in. 
Exciting shifts like these suggests that the study of revolution is still a lively enterprise. 
However, as Goldstone (2001) has explained, only by combining structural explanations 
with analyses of culture, ideology, and agency can we hope to advance the study of 
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revolutions, and I consider my own theoretical model of the sources of nonviolent 
revolution to be an example of fourth generation scholarship. I have benefited 
significantly from the insights of especially Goodwin and Foran. My notion of the iron 
cage of liberalism was influenced by Goodwin‟s state centered approach, although my 
emphasis on the state has more to do with its relation to other states. Similarly, Foran‟s 
conceptualization of “political cultures of opposition” has helped me understand the link 
between Khomeini‟s revolutionary version of Shi‟i Islam and the commitment to 
nonviolent tactics.   
In summary, my theoretical model of nonviolent revolutions is inspired by 
insights from scholars of the second, third, and fourth generations. By combining 
elements of social psychology, modernization, structural conditions, as well as culture 
and agency, we may be able to understand the sudden emergence of nonviolent 
revolutions in the late 20
th
 century. However, for a more accurate understanding of 
nonviolent revolutionary movements it is necessary to also incorporate insights from the 





 The social movement literature does of course have much in common with the 
literature on revolution. Indicative of this statement is the fact that many of the same 
scholars appear as significant contributors in both fields. However, while both 
phenomena are social processes that can be classified as collective behavior/action, 
relatively little has been said about the link between the two. I contend that especially in 
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the case of nonviolent revolutions, this link between movement and revolution is crucial. 
In this section I survey some of the most important contributions made to the study of 
social movements. The review examines in chronological order three approaches to social 
movement scholarship: resource mobilization theory, the political process model, and 
frame alignment processes. I also briefly discuss more recent developments in social 
movement research. 
 Although Blumer (1939) and Smelser (1962) offered theories about social 
movements, their explanations were more general in nature as they attempted to explain 
collective behavior as a whole. Blumer and Smelser viewed social movements as 
irrational phenomena that could be explained psychologically by identifying the social 
strain that caused popular unrest.
20
 Later scholars have (perhaps prematurely) largely 
dismissed this claim by noting that strains in society are always present, and since we do 
not always observe social movements as a result of such strains, social psychology cannot 
be the sufficient cause why movements emerge. 
 
Resource Mobilization Theory 
 
 John McCarthy and Meyer Zald (1973; 1977) argue that it is not moral outrage or 
any other emotional response to frustration that is responsible for the emergence of a 
social movement, but rather intentional and rational efforts to build a movement. A 
movement, they assert can only sustain itself if it is able to generate enough resources, 
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both human and material, to survive the external pressures it most likely will face. 
McCarthy and Zald‟s approach to social movements is perhaps most clearly distinguished 
from earlier work by their emphasis on the rational character of social movements. They 
suggest that actors make deliberate choices in the development of a movement and do not 
rely on the emotional responses of movement participants.  
 The resource mobilization perspective takes a very pragmatic and entrepreneurial 
approach to social movements. A social movement is defined as “a set of opinions and 
beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the 
social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (McCarthy & Zald 1977:1217-8). 
Unlike some more structurally inclined sociologists, McCarthy and Zald view agency as 
essential to a movement‟s success. Only by generating enough support and resources can 
the movement hope to make its “opinions and beliefs” salient to the larger population. 
Ingenuity and vision thus becomes important qualities for movement organizers to 
possess.  
While McCarthy and Zald‟s focus on the importance of resource mobilization is 
helpful for the study at hand, their theory does not explain why and how movements 
originate. In an attempt to address that question, Doug McAdam formulated his political 
process explanation of social movements, an explanation that appears to be heavily 
influenced by Tilly‟s polity model. It is to McAdam and the political process model we 




The Political Process Model 
 
 McAdam (1982) proposes a view of social movements that seeks to tear down the 
wall that he argues has wrongly distinguished social movements from other political 
processes.
21
 This inaccurate distinction, McAdam claims, is based on a pluralist 
understanding of power in democratic societies, which assumes that all members of 
society has, at least potentially, equal access to power. Social movements, which 
oftentimes operate outside the bounds of traditional politics, are thus seen as deviant 
displays of political action. However, if the pluralist model of power is abandoned we can 
clearly see that a social movement is simply another actor on the political scene of any 
given society. Once this realization has been reached, McAdam seems to suggest, 
movements are no longer seen as irrational outpourings of emotions in response to social 
strain. Rather, and this resonates well with McCarthy and Zald, social movements are 
rational, political processes with well articulated goals and plans of operation. 
 As later collaborations have shown (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988), 
McAdam does not disagree with the resource mobilization model advanced by McCarthy 
and Zald. Nevertheless, he notes that the mobilization of resources (he refers to it as 
“indigenous organizational strength”) is not sufficient for a social movement to emerge. 
While the mobilization of people and their material resources is an important component 
of movement emergence, McAdam (1982) shows that “expanding political 
opportunities,” as well as “cognitive liberation” must occur. The term “expanding 
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political opportunities” refers to structural changes within the state and the elites, which 
allows for movements to gain ground. An example of this might be the friction between 
ruling groups over certain policies or political decisions. Cognitive liberation, on the 
other hand, is the component of movement emergence that addresses the fact that there 
must be a psychological shift in the potential movement members‟ perception of reality. 
A sudden epiphany needs to occur at which time the individual realizes that the desired 
change is achievable.    
    Interestingly, McAdam‟s model includes economic (indigenous organizational 
strength), structural (expanding political opportunities), and psychological (cognitive 
liberation) elements. What is missing, according to scholars like David Snow, is the 
cultural component of social movements.
22
 To address this inefficiency we therefore  first 
turn to Snow‟s concept of ideological frames, after which I will offer a very brief 
summary of some of the more contemporary research on social movements. 
 
Frame Alignment Processes 
 
Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) have showed that a social 
movement organization relies on its ability to frame issues when attempting to attract 
new members. Snow‟s objective is to link social psychological factors and structural 
elements together in order to construct a more coherent theory of social movement 
mobilization, and they do so by introducing the concept of frame alignment. “By frame 
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alignment, we refer to the linkage of individual and SMO interpretative orientations, such 
that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals and 
ideology are congruent and complimentary” (Snow et al. 1986:464). In other words, 
Snow is concerned with the perceptual relationship between the movement organization 
and the individual member, and considers overlapping understandings of the goals and 
ideologies of the organization and its members crucial to the expansion of the movement 
organization, as well as to its basic survival. 
 In developing their argument, Snow and colleagues (1986) introduce four 
different frame alignment processes. “Frame bridging,” the most common and important 
of the four processes of frame alignment, refers to “the linkage of two or more congruent 
but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (467). Here 
individuals (or organizations) are made aware of an organization that shares the concerns 
of the individual or the outside organization. The other three processes, “frame 
amplification,” “frame extension,” and “frame transformation,” reflect similar processes 
in which the ideologies and goals of an SMO are aligned in ways that allows the 
organization to attract new constituents. Theories of framing become important in 
explaining nonviolent revolutions as the might help shed light on why nonviolence was 
chosen over violence. Mansoor Moaddel‟s (1992) notion of “ideology as episodic 
discourse” in the Iranian Revolution seems to be very closely related to the idea of frame 






More recently, scholars of social movements have paid closer attention to such 
issues as culture, ideology, emotion, identity, and gender (Jasper, 1997; Melucci, 1996; 
Erickson-Nepstad, 2004; Taylor, 1996; Young, 2002). Michael Young‟s (2007) emphasis 
on the role of individual‟s moral and religious motivations in social movements is 
especially pertinent to the study of nonviolent revolutions. While this recent 
diversification brings many new and interesting topics and explanations to the scene, it 
might be too early to accurately assess the lasting relevance of some of these 
contributions. Nonetheless, many of these dimensions will be taken into consideration in 
the study at hand.  
 The social movement literature proves helpful to my study for a few reasons. 
First, since the Iranian Revolution assumed the appearance of massive social movement it 
is important to understand how it was possible for leaders to mobilize hundreds of 
thousands of people, and in some instances millions. While revolution scholars are 
largely silent on the question of mobilization, the social movement literature is highly 
useful. Resource mobilization theory can help explain how the existing mosque network 
and other structures mitigated some of the problems normally faced by movement 
organizers. For example, mosques and other religious meeting places provided activists 
with places in which they could gather relatively safely. Also, a resource mobilization 
perspective on the Iranian Revolution might shed light on how bazaar merchants helped 
sustain the movement by providing striking workers with money.  
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Similarly, the iron cage of liberalism is a specific type of political opportunity and 
thus draws significantly from McAdam‟s writings. No matter how well organized the 
opposition may have been, it was the structural opening in the shape of an ICL that made 
the nonviolent revolution possible Finally, frame analysis helps us understand how 
Khomeini was able to portray nonviolent resistance to the shah as a religious duty.    
 In short, the movement literature is essential to this study as it compliments 
revolution theory. My entire framework is based on the idea that nonviolent revolutions, 
including the Iranian one, are in fact nonviolent revolutionary movements. By grounding 
myself in both the relevant revolution and movement literatures the theoretical 
framework presented in this dissertation should be significantly improved. 
     
Nonviolent Action 
 
 While there is no shortage of scholarly literature on the topics of social 
movements and revolutions, the same cannot be said of nonviolent action. Although a 
number of studies have attempted to explain the mechanisms of nonviolent social change, 
virtually no researcher has examined the factors causing nonviolent action. The most 
common preoccupation of scholars of nonviolent action have until now been to explain 
success and failure of nonviolent campaigns by closely evaluating the tactics and 
strategies employed by nonviolent movements.
23
 In this study I would therefore like to go 
one step further by discovering why some revolutions not only succeed nonviolently, but 
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why they turned to be nonviolent in the first place. We already know a substantial amount 
of what is required for nonviolent action to be successful, but we know almost nothing 
about why such action emerges in the first place.  
The existing nonviolent action literature can be meaningfully divided into two 
different bodies of literature, practical nonviolence and nonviolent action theory. The first 
consists of mostly non-academic sources. Here one would place writings by nonviolent 
activists, philosophers, and movement leaders. The second body contains the research on 
nonviolent action conducted by scholars, mainly represented by empirical case studies. In 





 The obvious starting point here is the writings by and about Mohandas Gandhi (L. 
Fischer 1950; Gandhi 1957; 2002; Iyer 1993; Jack 1956; Kurtz 2006; Payne 1969; 
Prabhu & Rao 1967). The great Mahatma of India began his nonviolent activist career in 
South Africa as a young, very shy, lawyer. Few would have guessed that the timid 
youngster would eventually lead India, and in some sense the rest of the colonized world, 
to national freedom. It would however be a mistake to assume that nonviolence was born 
with Gandhi. In his writings, Gandhi (1957; 2002) repeatedly emphasizes the influence of 
other sources on his conception of nonviolence, citing the Sermon on the Mount, Thoreau 
(2002/1849), Tolstoy (1984/1894), and Ruskin (1912). Gandhi‟s writings provide us with 
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some theoretical knowledge about nonviolent action, but Gandhi was primarily a political 
and spiritual leader. His writings about nonviolence are therefore mainly practical pieces 
of advice, but can also be viewed as theoretically informative from a scholarly 
perspective. As we will see in the next section, other writers have taken it upon 
themselves to organize Gandhi‟s writings into theoretical frameworks.
24
 
 While Gandhi was the first and perhaps most important nonviolent activist to 
write on the topic of nonviolent action, his path has been treaded by such proponents of 
nonviolence as Martin Luther King, Jr., the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, Vaclav Havel, 
Oscar Romero, Aung San Suu Kyi, Desmond Tutu, and many others. These individual 
tend to boast a moral commitment to nonviolence, and their type of nonviolence is 
referred to in the literature as “principled nonviolence.” The idea here is that nonviolence 
is practiced because of its inherent moral worth, and that the outcome of the struggle, 
while important, is of secondary concern. Together these activists and their chroniclers 
have produced a significant body of literature on the practical aspects of nonviolent 
action (Beer, 1999; Dennis, Golden, & Wright, 2000; Hanh, 1987; Havel, 1990; King, 
1968; 1991; Tutu, 1999). The contributions of these leaders and writers should not be 
taken lightly as the literature on practical nonviolence provides us with many insights that 
would easily be overlooked by more scholarly examinations of nonviolent action. Yet, 
from a nonviolent movement perspective its academic counterpart is still more 
significant. 
                                                 
24
 Among the most important contributors here are Bondurant (1965) and Sharp (1973; 2005). 
46 
 
Nonviolent Action Theory 
 
 While certainly not the most well-examined of social phenomena, nonviolent 
action has received some attention from researchers. Sharp (1973; 2005) is the earliest 
and best known contributor to nonviolent action theory. Taking a pragmatic stance, Sharp 
argues that nonviolent action is effective not because it is morally superior to violence, 
but because it is compatible with the way power works in the late 20
th
 century and 
beyond. Power, he suggests, should not be thought of as something a dictator can “take” 
from his subjects, but rather as a gift that must be “given” by the people. If a population 
collectively decides to withhold cooperation with its government and manages to so 
successfully, there may be little a regime can do to reassert itself and regain power.
25
  
According to Sharp, any given society consists of pillars of support upon which 
the regime depends. If mass action can convince members of those pillars to withdraw 
their cooperation with the regime, that regime will experience significant difficulties. The 
way to accomplish this rupture is through carefully devised strategic plans. By planning a 
nonviolent campaign that weakens several pillars of support (civil society, labor unions, 
churches) a repressive regime can be brought down. Large numbers of movement 
participants is a necessary component, but the most important factor is the carefully 
devised plan. Ideally such a plan should contain many different methods of nonviolent 
resistance from all three categories of tactics in Sharp‟s typology of 198 different 
nonviolent tactics. 
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 The project begun by Sharp has been carried on by Ackerman (Ackerman & 
Kruegler 1994; Ackerman & Duvall 2000). Taking an extremely policy oriented and 
much less scholarly approach to strategic nonviolent conflict, Ackerman and his co-
authors places a heavy, and perhaps unhealthy, emphasis on strategic considerations. 
According to this perspective, nonviolent action can work under virtually any conditions, 
as long as a carefully devised strategy has been formulated. Ackerman and Kruegler‟s 
(1994) identification of 12 principles of nonviolent conflicts that are present in all of the 
cases they investigate serve as a good illustration of the mindset behind many strategy-
oriented studies of nonviolent action. 
 While strategic conceptions and analyses of nonviolent action are very helpful 
and an important contribution to the study of nonviolence as a political and social 
phenomenon, it is apparent to sociologists that something is lacking from this point of 
view. What is missing from the strategic conceptions of Sharp, Ackerman and Kruegler, 
and many others, is therefore a greater focus on social structures. It is hardly the case that 
nonviolent action works equally well everywhere, as examples in China and Burma, to 
mention a few, clearly suggest. To argue that strategic shortcomings are the most 
important reason why these campaigns failed is naïve at best.  
 Some scholars of strategic nonviolent conflict have however noted that social 
structures play an important role for the outcome of nonviolent movements. As the most 
sophisticated of such scholars, Zunes and Kurtz (1999) state in their introduction that 
nonviolent action is indeed a strategic choice made by activists, but the decision to opt for 
nonviolence is a result of the social context in which the activists find themselves. 
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Similarly, but less acutely, Schock (2005) notes that while the development of a 
nonviolent strategy is essential to the successful outcome of a movement, such a 
movement will only come about under certain favorable conditions. However, those 
conditions are fairly broad, and it is clear that Schock considers strategy and agency more 
crucial to the success of nonviolent movement than favorable social structures. 
 To sum up, most scholars of nonviolent actions advocate a strategic approach to 
conducting nonviolent movements. Nonviolent action is a game that is governed by the 
same principle as wars and more violent types of movements. To achieve the desired 
goals, minute preparations are necessary. Much of the literature has focused on what 
strategies various movements used to achieve success, with much less focus on the 
actions of their opponents, and, more importantly, the role played by the international 
community. While the importance of social structures is under-theorized, the assumption 
appears to be that good strategy will shape the social structures in way favorable to the 
movement. 
Many researchers of nonviolent action rely on the use of case studies for their 
theory building. This is true both for Sharp and his disciples, as well as for scholars who 
are more sympathetic to the principled aspect of nonviolent action. Joan Bondurant 
(1965) and Johan Galtung (1965) may constitute rare exceptions to this rule as their work 
in more structural and theoretical in nature. Scholars that have made significant 
contributions to the study of nonviolent action include Helvey (2004) Kurtz (1994), 
Martin (2003), Oppenheimer (1965), Ritter (2008), Ritter and Pieper (2008), Schell 
49 
 
(2003), Weber (2001), and Zunes (1997; 1999a; 1999b; Zunes, Kurtz, & Asher 1999), 
most of whom rely on comparative case studies. 
By combining the nonviolent action literature with the analytical frameworks 
developed by revolution and movement scholars, I hope to be able to construct a 
plausible theory of nonviolent revolutions that may explain why the Iranian Revolution 
turned out to be nonviolent. The most important contribution of the nonviolent action 
literature is indeed its focus on strategy. In Chapters 5 and 6 I will deal extensively with 
the issue of revolutionary strategy, although the concept remains important throughout 
the entire dissertation. 
 As the literature above is meant to indicate, ample writings have been produced 
on the topics of revolution, social movements, and nonviolent action. However, the three 
sets of literature have been kept relatively separated from one another. In this dissertation 
I seek to combine them in order to begin the construction a well-informed and 
empirically grounded theory of nonviolent revolutions.  
 Perhaps the most sophisticated attempt at a systematic examination of nonviolent 
revolution has been offered by Zunes (1994). In a timely and well formulated article, 
Zunes points out that revolutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s tend to be 
significantly more nonviolent in nature than their predecessors. Seeking to explain this 
shift, Zunes identifies three causes behind this development: 
1. The dramatically-increased costs from counter-insurgency warfare 
2. An increased recognition that unarmed methods are more effective 
3. A growing concern over the impact of militarism on post-revolutionary 
society which harms efforts at unity, democracy, independence, and 




While I do not believe that this list is neither sufficient nor exhaustive, it does provide 
students of nonviolent revolutions with an excellent starting point. One aim of the 




3. A UNIQUE REVOLUTION: EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF THE “EXPECTED” 
REVOLUTIONARIES  
 
Although its reliance on nonviolent methods was arguably the Iranian 
Revolution‟s most important legacy passed on to future revolutionaries, it was by no 
means what made the revolution unique in the minds of its contemporary commentators. 
The Iranian Revolution was the world‟s first, and so far only, revolution in which religion 
played a dominant role both in the process and the outcome of the revolutionary process. 
In all other cases of revolutions, the victors have been categorized on the basis of their 
political, not religious, convictions. Furthermore, previous and subsequent revolutions 
have almost exclusively been spearheaded by politicians, guerrilla fighters, and students. 
Although these groups participated in the revolutionary process in Iran, none of them 
were able to lead the revolution, nor did they have the ability to assume meaningful roles 
in the post-revolutionary reconstruction of Iranian society. The focus of this chapter is 
therefore theoretically different from that of the other three chapters. Instead of framing 
the chapter‟s puzzle in terms of explaining the presence of a certain outcome, this chapter 
seeks to understand the absence of an expected outcome, namely why those groups who 
in other revolutions had emerged as leaders and victors of their movements failed to do 
so in Iran. In short, why wasn‟t the Iranian Revolution a secular revolution like all other 
in history?         
The chapter will examine the fate of the three potentially revolutionary groups – 
the political opposition, the guerrillas, and the abroad-based student movement – that 
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issued their own challenges against the shah‟s regime but eventually had to cede 
leadership to the ulama, the Shi´i clergy, under Khomeini‟s stewardship. One of these 
groups, the guerrillas, advocated violent tactics against the regimes, while the other two 
preferred institutionalized channels. For each of the unsuccessful groups analyzed I will 
ask two central and interrelated questions: 1) what prevented the group from seizing 
leadership of the revolutionary movement, and 2) why did the group refrain from using 
violence against the state?
26
 
 In line with the theme of this dissertation, I argue that examining the international 
context is essential to discovering the answers to both questions. Of course, an emphasis 
on the international context surrounding revolutions is not a novel contribution of this 
essay. At least ever since Skocpol (1979) advised her peers of the importance of military 
rivalry and economic competition between powerful states, scholars of revolutions have 
been sensitive to the role played by the global environment.
27
 But while the international 
context has gained plentiful attention following Skocpol‟s call to action, most scholars 
have not ventured far from her emphasis on international hostility. Breaking with this 
tradition, I contend that the crucial international element of the Iranian Revolutions was 
the nation‟s amicable relations with a superpower, the United States of America. Hence, I 
argue that the reason violence never became a viable option in Iran, as opposed to in 
many other parts of the Third World, can be found in the dynamics of its relationships 
with the U.S. Similarly, the fact that none of the groups listed above were able to assume 
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leadership of the movement can also, at least in part, be explained by American 
involvement in Iranian politics. 
 Here it is important to point out that the emphasis on American engagement 
should not be confused with a U.S.-centric theory of revolutions. Rather, it is the 
particular role played by the U.S., a role that has since been played by others, that is 
central to this theoretical perspective. In other words, the American actions that 
contributed to the dynamics of the revolutionary processes are not American per se, but 
are rather associated with the role of powerful patron ally.
28
 This patron-client 
relationship between the U.S. and Iran will be analyzed in depth in Chapter 5. Here the 
focus will be on the consequences that relationship had on the three types of opposition 
groups, beginning with Iran‟s political opposition.  
 
The Political Opposition 
    
 Although it is difficult to establish exactly when a political opposition came into 
existence in Iranian politics, for our purposes the genesis of such a movement will be 
coupled with the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. That movement, which sought to 
introduce into the Iranian polity a constitution of the kind that at the time was associated 
with the more developed nations of the West, has received significant and detailed 
attention.
29
 In short, the movement, which was a continuation of the 1891 Tobacco 
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 sought to limit the executive powers of the Qajar shahs and curb the pseudo-
imperialist policies of the British and the Russians. 
 The Constitutional Revolution was the second challenge to the Iranian monarchy 
in less than twenty years. The Tobacco Rebellion a decade and a half earlier had fought a 
concession given by the monarchy to a British merchant which would have given him 
and his company a monopoly on the production and trade of Iranian tobacco both on the 
Iranian and international markets. Members of the ulama (the Shi´i clergy) and the 
bazaaris (the traditional Iranian merchants and shopkeepers) joined together to 
successfully fight the concession. The coalition‟s victory further fueled its imagination 
and fifteen years later Iranians once again stood up to uncurbed monarchical power and 
foreign intrusions. This time, however, the battle was more ideological and less in 
response to any particular royal policy. 
 “The Constitutional Revolution,” one of the foremost historians of Iran writes, 
“was a movement of the bazaar. Its rank-and-file came from the guilds, its financial 
backing from the merchants, its moral support from the religious authorities, and its 
theorising from a few westernized intellectuals” (Abrahamian 1985a:128). These 
“westernized intellectuals” had been educated at European schools and had returned to 
Iran inspired by the perceived political freedoms of the West. The epicenter of this 
fascination for Western politics was the constitution. Nikkie Keddie, perhaps the only 
Western historian of Iran whose reputation equals that of Abrahamian explains the 
rationale of the movement: 
                                                 
30
 The religious opposition and the Tobacco Rebellion will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 3. 
55 
 
The intent of the constitution was to set up a true constitutional monarchy in 
which Majles
31
 approval was required on all important matters, including foreign 
loans and treaties, and in which ministers would be responsible to the Majles. 
Equality before the law and personal rights and freedoms, subject to a few limits, 
were also guaranteed, despite the protests of some ulama that members of 
minority religions should not have equal status with those of the state religion, 
Islam. (Keddie 2003:68) 
 
While “personal rights and freedoms” were an important part of the constitutional 
effort, few commentators doubt that the true intention of the movement was indeed to 
limit the power of the monarchy and to restrict foreign access to Iranian markets. The 
Constitutional Revolution was a movement of the clergy-backed merchants, who were 
growing increasingly antagonized by the monarchy‟s preferential treatment of foreign 
investors. As one scholar succinctly puts it, “the Constitutional Revolution… was 
preoccupied with two interrelated goals: the destruction of internal dictatorship and the 
establishment of a truly sovereign country” (Siavoshi 1994:110). 
Although the constitution strove to fill a real and practical purpose, its 
introduction into Iranian politics was also based on less tangible factors. Among Iranian 
intellectuals constitutions had come to be seen as the common denominator of successful 
Western states, an observation which led these intellectuals to exaggerate the role of 
constitutions. This heightened reverence for constitutions was reinforced when Japan, the 
only Asian country with a constitution, defeated Russia, the only Western power without 
one, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 with the result that in Iran “treatises 
explaining constitutions and their virtues began to circulate, and news of Japanese 
victories was happily and rapidly spread” (Keddie 1983:586). 
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Initially an apparent success, the Constitutional Revolution ultimately failed to 
accomplish most of its stated objectives. Nonviolent tactics, such as demonstrations, 
religious processions, and general strikes, had forced the monarchy to concede to the 
opposition certain concessions, but with the assistance of its British and Russian 
supporters, the Qajars, following a brief civil war, finally defeated the constitutionalists 
and shut down the recently created parliament in 1911 (Abrahamian 1982; Afary 1994; 
Foran 1994). These outcomes have caused Amuzegar (1991) to note that the movement 
“was not a revolution in the true sense, because the prevailing monarchic system and the 
incumbent dynasty remained intact. Political change was limited to power sharing 
between the shah and a new national consultative assembly” (17). Reiterating the same 
point other scholars have explained that “even during the so-called Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906-1911 reformers never spoke of revolution. It was years later that 
Iranian historians, influenced by Western, Turkish, and Russian scholarship, began 
referring to that movement as a revolution” (Milani 1988:19).  
Revolutionary or not, Iran‟s Constitutional Revolution served an important 
function in Iran‟s political development as it helped normalize the notion of political 
opposition. The constitution itself remained largely symbolic for the next 70 years and 
was only sporadically used by opposition politicians to advocate that constitutional 
monarchy replace the current order, but the concrete creation of the Majles, however, 
gave the political opposition a life of its own.  In other words, the establishment of a 
parliament transformed the concept of opposition politics from dream to reality. Despite 
the fact that the actual potency of the Majles was quite limited, with real power still 
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residing with the king, the establishment of a parliamentary system served to legitimize 
political activity. 
While the Constitutional Revolution proved unable to bring about constitutional 
rule, it did indeed have lasting effects on the Iranian state. The Qajar dynasty never 
recovered from the blows the movement had dealt it, and ten years after the monarchy‟s 
defeat of the opposition it was overthrown in a 1921 military coup led by a young 
military officer by the name of Reza Khan. Khan began his climb to power by simply 
removing the institution of the monarchy, allowing opposition politicians to rule in its 
place, while Khan himself served as commander of the military. In 1925 Reza Khan, 
replacing his surname with the more noble-sounding Pahlavi, convinced political leaders 
to crown him king of Iran, thus establishing the Pahlavi dynasty with himself, Reza Shah, 
as its first and penultimate ruler (Abrahamian 1982; Keddie 1983).
32
  
Opposition politicians, along with other influential social groups, initially greeted 
the nationalist Reza Shah as a liberator shattering the nation‟s historic bonds to 
Russia/the Soviet Union and Great Britain. However, “Reza Shah gradually lost his initial 
civilian support, and, failing to secure social foundations for his institutions, ruled 
without the assistance of an organized political party” (Abrahamian 1982:149). Instead of 
relying on the support of a political party, Reza Shah based his rule on three pillars of 
support: the army, a vast and modern bureaucracy, and “extensive court patronage” 
(Abrahamian 1982:149). Forfeiting the support of the politicians, and, perhaps in an even 
greater political blunder, that of the ulama, Reza Shah‟s rule became tenuous and only 
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lasted for sixteen years. In 1941, in the midst of World War II, the Allies, concerned with 
the king‟s affinity for Hitler and Nazi Germany, forced him to abdicate in favor of his 
son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. During his short stint in power however, Reza Shah was 
able to continue the suppression of the secular opposition initiated by the Qajars. For 
example, Matin-asgari (2002) reports, “the Communist Party was crushed with the 
passing of a 1931 law that declared membership in „collectivist‟ organizations punishable 
by three to ten years imprisonment” (22-3), and although the law was certainly written 
with the communists in mind, other inconvenient social elements could also be branded 
as “collectivist.” Not surprisingly then, as Reza Shah exited the stage the communists 
returned to the same with more vigor than any other political group. 
 
Political Opposition in the Era of Mohammad Reza Shah 
 
 During his time in power Reza Shah had managed to successfully suppress the 
opposition‟s activities. The more moderate political climate that had been fought for 
during the days of the Constitutional Revolution, and which to a limited degree had been 
achieved, vanished in the 1930s. Laws prohibiting Iranians from gathering politically had 
been effectively enforced but “the crowd returned with a vengeance after August 1941, 
when the Allied invasion crushed Reza Shah‟s army, forced him to abdicate in favour of 
his son, and freed the public of his absolutism” (Abrahamian 1985a:125). One of the 
political groups that most successfully reemerged from its forced political hiatus was the 
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communists, who in Iran formally organized as the Tudeh (masses) Party.
33
 Milani 
(1988) describes the genesis of the Tudeh: 
In 1941, some friends and supporters of the deceased Taqi Arani, a German-
educated Iranian Marxist who with fifty-two colleagues had been jailed by Reza 
Shah in the thirties, were freed from jail. With the encouragement and logistical 
support by the Russians, they subsequently formed the Tudeh party. Partly 
through the assistance of the Soviet Union and its troops which were still in Iran, 
the Tudeh quickly expanded its sphere of influence, especially in the areas close 
to Russian borders, and became the most organized and disciplined party of the 
period. (71) 
 
With Soviet support the Tudeh soon established itself as a “Communist Party with an 
effective machinery for mass mobilization” (Arjomand, 1988: 71-72), its constituency 
mainly being made up of workers, students, and members of the intelligentsia.
34
  
The strength of the Tudeh party was an important factor in making the first twelve 
years of Mohammad Reza Shah‟s rule a contentious time for the young king. As 
Abrahamian (1985a) has noted, the dozen years leading up the CIA-sponsored coup in 
1953 was characterized by street politics.
35
 Although the Tudeh did cause the shah some 
early headaches, its ascendance into Iranian politics eventually benefited the shah as 
Tudeh support of nationalist leader Mossadeq raised American concerns of an Iranian 
communist threat. As in many other parts of the world, Iran‟s dictatorial leader would 
benefit from the perceived menace of communist influence. In the 1940s the crowd 
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became an instrument of power in Iranian politics “and although many tried to mobilise 
the masses and use the streets as a weapon, only two organizations had notable success” 
(Abrahamian 1985a:126). The Tudeh was one of those organizations, the other being the 
National Front to which we will soon turn our attention.  
Contrary to many other communist parties at the time, the Tudeh did not advocate 
the use of violence. Rather, as Siavoshi (1994) points out, they emphasized the use of 
demonstrations and strikes, and continued to do so up until and through the revolution of 
1977-79. Besides upholding the Iranian tradition of nonviolent challenges to the state it 
will become clear below that this choice of tactics significantly affected how the 
opposition transformed itself in the 1960s, when government repression and opposition 
frustration with nonviolent tactics resulted in the establishment of guerrilla groups. The 
state‟s relatively liberal stance towards the Tudeh came to an abrupt end in 1949. 
Following an assassination attempt the year prior, the government outlawed the party 
which was thus forced into temporary clandestinity, from where it continued its activities. 
No longer able to freely operate in the open, the Tudeh made common cause with the 
other major opposition group of the time, the National Front.  
 The National Front, somewhat ironically established in 1949, the same year that 
the Tudeh was forced underground, was not a political party, but rather an umbrella 
organization consisting of several nationalist-liberal political parties, “including the Iran 
Party, the Iranian People‟s Party, the Party of the Nation of Iran, and the Toiler‟s Party” 
(Moaddel 1994:53), and together with the Tudeh were “the principal challengers” to the 
monarchy (Stempel 1981:39). The coalition‟s leader was Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, a 
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Majles veteran who was elected prime minister by parliament in 1951.
36
 Once in power, 
Mossadeq entered into negotiations with the British government over the role of the 
AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) in the production of Iranian oil. By virtue of an old 
agreement, the AIOC (which soon after its Iranian crisis became BP) had enjoyed a long-
standing monopoly on Iranian oil under very favorable conditions. The Iranian state‟s 
share in the oil profits had overwhelmingly been usurped by the royal family and other 
members of the elite with virtually none of it benefiting the Iranian people. When the 
British refused to renegotiate the agreement Mossadeq decided, to the dismay of the 
monarchy and some Iranian aristocrats, to nationalize the oil industry (Siavoshi 1994). 
 Mossadeq‟s firm stance outraged the British. In an attempt to impose their will on 
the hostile prime minister they instigated an “international boycott and military blockade, 
which was widely observed by the world‟s oil economies” (Foran 1993a:228). While 
these actions were successful in the sense that they kept Iranian oil in the ground and 
prevented Iran from profiting from its own resources, the boycott was unable to force 
Mossadeq‟s hand for one simple reason: Iranian oil, while lining the pockets of the ruling 
elite, had not been a crucial contributor to the Iranian economy due to corruption and 
patrimonialism. Faced with this reality the British sought American support. As an ally of 
the British one might expect U.S. officials to be supportive of the British request. 
However, in addition to being a U.S. ally on the global stage, Great Britain was a rival on 
the Iranian one. The British monopoly on Iranian oil was an obstacle to U.S. expansion 
on the petro-market which explains why “during the initial stages of negotiations with the 
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British, Iranian demands had been backed by the American ambassador, Henry Grady, 
and by other American officials” (Moaddel 1994:43). Initial American support was 
nonetheless soon eradicated when the same officials realized that “a genuine 
nationalization of [Iranian] oil would set an example for other oil-rich countries such as 
Saudi Arabia to challenge American oil companies” (Siavoshi 1994:128) in those 
countries. Once American policymakers had enjoyed this epiphany, U.S. and British 
interests became firmly aligned.  
The shah had at several occasions attempted to remove the constitutionally 
elected Mossadeq from his position as head of the government. In both 1952 and 1953 
the shah fired Mossadeq, only to be forced under humiliating circumstance to retract his 
initial decision and reappoint his nemesis. What could possibly have forced the shah to 
completely reverse his own decision, not just once but twice, with both the U.S. and 
Great Britain in his corner? Just as in 1891 and 1906 it was the outrage of the Iranian 
masses, this time in the shape of enormous pro-Mossadeq demonstrations, that forced the 
monarch to capitulate (Keddie 2003:126-8).
37
 The irony of these predominantly 
nonviolent protests that ultimately signified opposition to foreign claims in Iran (it was 
indeed the struggle against imperialism that Mossadeq had come to symbolize) was that 
the political climate that allowed for such expressions of disapproval had been 
established under pressure from the very nations against which expressions of discontent 
were now being applied. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States had rather 
aggressively imposed an agenda of liberalization and democratization on the young shah, 
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and to a significant extent it was the imposition of that agenda that had permitted the 
return of previously banned opposition groups to the political stage (Moaddel 1994:141-
2).
38
 This scenario of Western-imposed liberalization would repeat itself both under 
Kennedy and Carter, but only became detrimental to the shah‟s regime during the latter‟s 
stint in the White House, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.   
The massive protests that protected Mossadeq did however come at a price. The 
one organization that could mobilize demonstrations of the requisite size was the most 
polarizing organization in all of Iran, namely the Tudeh.
39
 Notwithstanding the reality of 
being an illegal organization, the “Tudeh resumed relatively open activity especially 
during Mosaddegh‟s tenure as prime minister” and by 1953 it was the most influential 
political party in Iran (Parsa 1989:40). While initially helpful to Mossadeq‟s ambitions, 
the Tudeh eventually became a political burden for the prime minister. By relying on 
communist support Mossadeq in due course became associated with Marxism, despite the 
fact that he never embraced such ideas. “In fact,” Keddie (2003) explains, Mossadeq 
“was an anti-imperialist nationalist who intended to keep Iran from being controlled by 
any foreign country or company” (125) and he “remained committed to the ideology of 
national-liberalism” throughout his political career (Moaddel 1994:49). In reality, 
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however, that did not matter. Mossadeq‟s close political proximity to the communist 
Tudeh left a political stain he was unable to remove.
 40
 
Mossadeq‟s Tudeh support turned out to be the straw that broke the camel‟s back 
as far as American officials were concerned. Access to Iranian natural resources was 
indeed important motivation for action, as was the example nationalized Iranian oil 
would set for the rest of the region. However, “more important than oil in determining the 
U.S. foreign policy agenda was the perceived communist threat” (Siavoshi 1994:128) that 
had followed as a logical consequence of the end of World War II and the prospect of a 
Cold War with the Soviet Union. Due to his Tudeh support “Mossadeq was pictured 
increasingly but inaccurately as a dangerous fanatic, likely to deliver Iran to the Soviets” 
(Keddie 2003:125) in British and American political discourse. Because of its oil reserves 
and strategic location such a development was unacceptable to the U.S. and its British 
ally. As Siavoshi eloquently puts it, “the apparent rapprochement between the Tudeh 
Party and the nationalist government, from the point of view of the Cold Warriors, was 
enough proof for the soundness of their analysis” (Siavoshi 1994:129).  
The Americans were not the only ones viewing Mossadeq‟s communist ties with a 
disapproving gaze. Even within his own National Front coalition the prime minister‟s 
modus operandi attracted suspicion. Certainly, there were those in the Iranian political 
elite who were unimpressed with Marxist ideas, but to a significant extent the fractions 
within the Front were caused by jealousy and unfulfilled personal aspirations. Some of 
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the higher-ranking officials of the parties constituting the National Front “had leadership 
ambitions far greater than the opportunities afforded them” and “they demanded more 
expansive roles in appointing officials and formulating policies” (Siavoshi 1994:126). 
These leaders disapproved of the fact that Mossadeq had achieved significant political 
capital by transforming himself into a populist leader that relied more on the support of 
Tudeh-organized masses than he did on his political collaborators.
41
 
To make matters worse for Mossadeq, his support among the Tudeh was fading 
fast in mid-1953. Bill (1988a) explains the fragile nature of the Mossadeq-Tudeh 
alliance:  
Although the Tudeh party for a time supported Musaddiq in an effective alliance 
of convenience, its leaders broke sharply with him, and its press consistently 
portrayed him as a feudal landlord and a stooge of the United States. Throughout 
his premiership, Musaddiq was under Tudeh pressure. (68) 
 
Resembling the shah‟s relationship with the United States in the late 1970s, Mossadeq‟s 
reliance on the Tudeh-organized masses came to represent a severe political vulnerability. 
By putting his political destiny in the hands of one specific group, Mossadeq, like the 
shah 25 years later, forfeited the support of other potential allies. Furthermore, he was 
caught between a rock and a hard place as the American and British complained about his 
communist connections while those connections accused him of serving the imperialist 
cause. In the event that the Tudeh and its supporters would be unwilling to protect him 
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against his enemies, Mossadeq would find himself desperately isolated. Such an event 
occurred in August of 1953. 
 By October 1952 the British had fully incorporated the U.S. into its conflict with 
Iran‟s nationalist government. “Consequently, U.S. policy toward Iran became hostile 
and it cooperated with Britain in imposing a worldwide boycott of the Iranian oil” 
(Amjad, 1989: 60). While the idea of a coup must have been on the minds of American 
and British officials for some time, August 10, 1953 marks the beginning of the concrete 
efforts to firmly reinstate the shah on the Iranian throne. That day, “CIA Director Allen 
Dulles, American ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson and the shah‟s twin sister Ashraf 
met at a Swiss resort, while Brigadier General Norman Schwarzkopf conferred with the 
shah at his summer palace on the Caspian” (Foran 1993a:296). The shah had recently left 
Iran “on vacation” as the political climate had begun to worsen, and he considered his 
own political future uncertain. With solid U.S. support his concerns decreased 
dramatically. 
 The coup itself was engineered in part by Kermit Roosevelt, a high ranking CIA 
officer who later was rewarded for his service with the vice presidency of Gulf Oil. After 
a first, failed coup on August 15 and 16, Mossadeq  
was removed from office through the joint efforts of high-ranking Iranian officers 
and a fraction of the clergy, along with well-paid thugs, all of whom were 
financed, equipped, and supported by the United States government. The initiative 
of the United States was crucial because the Shah‟s departure and the arrest of 
some of the officers involved in the first, abortive coup d‟état had weakened and 




Three hundred lives were lost in the coup that secured the shah‟s return. The next few 
days were characterized by “passive resistance in the bazaar and provinces,” which 
resulted in hundreds of arrests under the existing conditions of martial law (Foran 
1993a:298). While this obviously amounts to substantial resistance to the government‟s 
course of action we might wonder where the masses that in the past had protected 
Mossadeq from the shah were on this fateful day. Some scholars have suggested that the 
timing of the coup might account for a significant portion of its success. Siavoshi, for 
example, states that “although a major part of the [nationalist] movement‟s social base 
willingly made certain economic sacrifices, the prolongation of the economic crisis and 
uncertainty dampened their enthusiasm and decreased active support for [Mossadeq‟s] 
government” (Siavoshi 1994:129). Furthermore, the masses had been forewarned that the 
military and U.S.-sponsored mobs would resort to violence during the coup. This may 
explain why many of them experienced “uncertainty” about once again expressing 
solidarity with the prime minister “when the army and the mob, which was mobilized by 




If the masses were absent from the streets during the coup by choice, they 
remained absent from them in the era following the coup due to increased restrictions and 
repression. In the wake of being “rescued” by his American and British allies, the shah 
felt obliged to show his saviors that he would never again allow the opposition to take 
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advantage of his liberal disposition. Consequently Mossadeq was arrested and sentenced 
to a term in prison which was to be followed by house arrest in his home town. Naturally 
this marked the end of the former prime minister‟s political career. Unfortunately, the 
elimination of Mossadeq‟s person was only a marginal representation of the state 
repression that followed the 1953 coup. Beginning with the National Front, the years 
following the coup saw the parties of the coalition “disbanded and their publications 
discontinued. Members of the Front were either [sic] killed, imprisoned, exiled, or co-
opted” (Moaddel 1994:53-4). Furthermore, the suppression of these parties was so severe 
that leaders were unable to communicate both with party members and each other.
43
  
Despite attempts to resurrect the coalition, perhaps most notably at a May 1961 
rally in Tehran that attracted 80,000 people, the National Front was unable to recover 
from the blows it had been dealt in 1953 and at the time of the revolution of 1977-9, the 
organization‟s importance was negligible. By that time the National Front had become an 
organization of the capitalist class and its interests, and therefore lacked the mass popular 
support it had enjoyed in the early 1950s. Consequently it was unable to mobilize 
sufficient support to establish itself as a revolutionary force. Instead it was obliged to fall 
in line with Khomeini‟s forces (Moaddel 1994; Parsa 1989).  
Notwithstanding the dire consequences the 1953 coup had for the National Front, 
the Tudeh was dealt with even more ruthlessly. Following the coup the shah realized that 
the most efficient way to secure the U.S. support he would remain dependent upon for the 
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rest of his reign would be to solidify his anti-communist credentials. Furthermore, the 
shah was determined to never again allow his liberal leanings get the best of him and thus 
provide opposition groups with political opportunities from which to attack him. As a 
result of these realizations, the immediate post-coup period became decidedly anti-Tudeh 
as more than 3,000 rank-and-file members of the party were arrested. Many of them were 
murdered in prison and about 200 received life in prison sentences. Abrahamian has 
suggested that in the four years following the coup Tudeh leaders were “systematically 
eliminated,” forty of its party officials executed, and another 14 tortured to death 
(Abrahamian 1982:280; Bill 1988a; Moaddel 1994). In addition to this brutal treatment, 
the Tudeh suffered another blow in 1954 when a massive conspiracy within the armed 
forces involving 600 Tudeh members was uncovered. “The government brought over 450 
of these individuals to trial, and the leaders were sentenced either to death or to life 
imprisonment” (Bill 1988a:100).  
Under circumstances such as these it is hardly surprising that the Tudeh was 
unable to survive, especially after 1957 when the shah with significant CIA assistance 
created his own secret police. This new security force, SAVAK,
44
 had anti-communism 
listed as one of its main objectives. Faced with this reality the Tudeh survived almost 
exclusively as a political formation in exile, setting up camps in the Soviet Union, East 
Germany, and other Soviet satellites sympathetic to its cause (Abrahamian 1985a; Amjad 
1989; Behrooz 2000; Foran 1994). Somewhat surprisingly the Russians did not come to 
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the Tudeh‟s aid in its hour of crisis. While officially criticizing U.S. involvement in the 
coup, Moscow eventually established an economically profitable relationship with the 
shah‟s regime and allowed such considerations to overshadow those of ideological 
expansionism (Herrmann 1990). Accordingly, “as Soviet policy toward Iran became 
conciliatory, the pro-Soviet Tudeh party lost much of its appeal to Iranian leftist 
oppositionists” (Keddie 2003:219). Abandoned by its principal supporter and ally, the 
Tudeh was not a decisive force in Iranian politics in the late 1970s. Although mildly 
influential among the workers, its main constituents, the Tudeh was unable to compete 
with the growing appeal of Khomeini‟s populist Islamic rhetoric. Thus, its importance in 
the movement that overthrew the shah was marginal. 
This section has analyzed the rise and fall of the political opposition against the 
shah. While political opposition groups emerged around the time of the Constitutional 
Revolution they did not gather momentum until after Reza Shah‟s abdication. This 
development is perhaps best explained by resorting to the notion of political opportunities 
as formulated by McAdam  and others (McAdam 1982; Tilly 1995). In the era 
immediately following the Constitutional Revolution the Qajar monarchy was able to 
contain the opposition parties only with British and Russian help. Reza Shah, on the other 
hand, managed to accomplish such efforts by himself, thanks mainly to his massive 
expansion of the armed forces.
45
 Thus, up until 1941 few political openings presented 
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themselves in the political system that would have allowed opposition parties to obtain 
significant roles in Iranian politics. However, when Mohammad Reza Shah ascended to 
the throne following his father‟s forced abdication, he did so with the blessing and 
goodwill of the allied nations. The Allies imposed on the young shah the “virtues” of 
Western politics and expected him to liberalize the political climate in Iran. Consequently 
opposition groups seized the opportunity to, for the first time in Iranian history, become a 
force to be reckoned with.
46
  
The oil nationalization movement ultimately represented the golden opportunity 
for the opposition to turn Iran into a democratic country. Many scholars have noted that it 
is unlikely that the shah would have been able to regain power without foreign support, 
and that the nation‟s history would have looked very different had American and British 
officials not intervened (Siavoshi 1994; Sick 1985; Stempel 1981). Although historical 
“what-ifs” are seldom helpful, this particular one suggests that political opportunity 
windows in Iran have historically been both opened and closed by foreign agents. In the 
1940s and 1950s it was American/British influences and activities that allowed for an 
opposition movement to emerge by imposing liberalization on the shah. Likewise it was 
those same nations that combined to suppress the movement when oil nationalization 
threatened their economic and political interests. This scenario repeated itself in the late 
1970s, albeit with a very different outcome. 
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The question of why the political opposition was unable to assume control of the 
revolutionary movement can thus best be explained in reference to international 
involvement in Iranian politics. The close relationship between Iran and the U.S. made 
Iranian opposition groups highly vulnerable to allegations of communist tendencies. As 
noted above, Mossadeq only came to represent a significant threat to American interests 
when his close collaboration with the Tudeh attracted Western attention. U.S. support for 
the shah, in part guaranteed by the regime‟s successful efforts to portray its political 
enemies as leftists, allowed the shah to ruthlessly suppress opposition parties in the 1950s 
and early 1960s. By 1963, those parties had suffered such tremendous losses that they 
proved unable to recuperate in any meaningful way. Individual politicians, such as Medhi 
Bazargan and Shapour Bakhtiar, did maintain sufficient political capital to play key roles 
in the revolutionary period, but their parties did not share in that destiny. The key point 
here is that the amicable relationship between the U.S. and Iran from 1953 on spelled 
disaster for the political opposition, as that relationship served to contract the political 
space. The U.S. had opened up that space for the opposition in the early 1940s, but then 
closed it again in 1953. President Kennedy once again cracked a small opening in the 
early 1960s, but the door was soon closed shut, only to be opened one final time by 
President Carter in 1976-77.  
Evidence of the important role played by U.S. policy can be found in the fact that 
Iranians only managed to challenge the shah‟s rule in the early 1950s, 1963, and then 
finally in 1977-79, with all episodes of meaningful opposition corresponding with periods 
of U.S. political pressure on the shah. In short then, the political opposition was unable to 
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appropriate revolutionary leadership because U.S. support of the shah had guaranteed 
their demise by the time of the revolution. Interestingly enough, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, it can be argued that the revolution only became Islamic because these more 
moderate challengers to the crown had been repressed. If the Tudeh and the National 
Front had still been political forces to be reckoned with in 1978, it seems less likely that 
Khomeini would have been able to turn Iran into his Islamic Republic.       
The second question asked at the beginning of the chapter, why violent tactics 
were rejected, is in the case of the political opposition less complicated to answer. 
Throughout the 20
th
 centuries, political parties in Iran, whether they be liberal nationlist 
or communist in orientation, sought to reform the system through institutionalized 
measures. Having achieved a constition in the century‟s first decade, politicians remained 
faithful to the idea that the shah‟s autocratic rule could be transformed into a constitional 
monarchy. Few opposition politicians ever advocated revolution until the last few months 
of 1978, and they remained hopeful that reform, not revolution, would be the outcome of 
their resistance. Working from within a nominally democratic system, opposition 
politicians continued to work for institutionalized political change. Thus it is hardly 
surprising that groups such as the liberal National Front did not advocate violent tactics, 
something that would have been both counterintuitive and counterproductive given its 
aims. More surprisingly though, scholars have asserted that the Tudeh too preferred 
nonviolent methods of struggle, which is somewhat of a historical oddity as far as 
communist parties are concerned (Abrahamian 1982; 1984; Foran 1994). Although the 
historical record seems to suggest that the Tudeh, like most other Iranians parties, 
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continued to believe that change could be achieved through legal reform, it is noteworthy 
that nonviolent tactics has been considered Iran‟s “traditional methods of resistance” 
(Abrahamian 1985b:151-2).
47
 In short, the political opposition opted for nonviolent 
methods of struggle because they believed Iran‟s pseudo-democratic political system 
could be changed from within through political reform, an estimation that ultimately 
proved naïve, but might have been a possibility had it not been for the near unconditional 






With the political opposition in shambles, the decade between the conclusion of 
the oil nationalization movement in 1953 and the brutal suppression of the 1963 
Muharram uprising represents a time of relative, albeit dictatorial, order in Iranian 
history. The 1963 Muharram uprising was a response to the shah‟s pro-American policies 
and his “White Revolution,”
49
 which significantly weakened the power of the ulama. 
Ayatollah Khomeini was instrumental in anti-regime activities and in many ways this 
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tumultuous period was his political coming out party.
50
 I will return to a more detailed 
discussion of the White Revolution and the resulting 1963 uprising in Chapter 4.        
 The massacres of 1963 had an enormous impact on the nature of the Iranian 
opposition. From the early 1940s the opposition had been dominated by secular 
constitutionalists who believed that the shah could be reasoned with and that nonviolent 
and political methods of struggle constituted the most appropriate paths to social change. 
The events of June 1963 would drastically change the opposition‟s attitude toward the 
shah (Matin-asgari 2002). As Abrahamian 1985b) has noted,  
The Shah‟s determination to use massive force, the army‟s willingness to shoot 
down thousands of unarmed demonstrators, and SAVAK‟s eagerness to root out 
the underground networks of the Tudeh party and the National Front, all 
combined to compel the opposition, especially its younger members, to question 
the traditional methods of resistance - election boycotts, general strikes, and street 
demonstrations. (151-2)  
 
The death toll inflicted on the opposition caused some of the leading young 
members of the Liberation Movement, one of the newer parties of the National Front 
coalition, to abruptly break with its leadership.
51
 Following the June 5 massacre, several 
of those young members formed a discussion group with the objective of discovering 
new ways of fighting the shah‟s regime. The product of this intellectual effort was the 
creation of the Mojahedin guerrillas. Thus, as the old opposition was forced to face its 
destruction with many of its leaders receiving long prison terms, a new opposition came 
into existence. Unlike their predecessors, the new opposition groups had little affinity for 
nonviolent methods of struggle (Daneshvar 1996).  
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In fact, one of the main complaints of the students who broke with the traditional 
opposition concerned the latter‟s unwillingness to challenge the state with physical force. 
Inspired as they were by events in places like Algeria and Cuba, the students assumed 
that the same tactics that had been used in other parts of the world could also be applied 
in Iran (Abrahamian 1989; Bakhash 1990). It can thus be argued that  the guerrillas 
emerged as a direct consequence of the shah‟s brutal attempts to prevent opposition to his 
rule: as nonviolent opposition was banned, violence, in the minds of the younger 
oppositionists, appeared to be the last resort. With the nonviolent impotency of the 
established opposition made painfully apparent to its younger, more radical members, the 
idea of violent challenges in the form of a guerrilla movement emerged as the logical 
next step of the opposition‟s development.
52
 
Although committed to their creed of “armed struggle, more armed struggle, and 
yet more armed struggle” (Abrahamian 1989:98), the guerrillas were never able to mount 
a significant challenge to the regime. Exact numbers are impossible to present due to the 
fact that the guerrilla fighters operated in small and autonomous cells in order to remain 
undetected by the security forces. Commentators agree however, that the guerrilla 
movement was indeed very small. Foran (1993a) has estimated their numbers at “a few 
hundred” (337) while Stempel (1981) suggests that “at least 400 to 600 individuals” 
participated in guerrilla activities between 1966 and the time of the revolution (52). 
Another indicator of the guerrilla movement‟s inability to attract members can be 
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deduced from its death tolls. When Abrahamian contends that the Muslim Mojahedin‟s 
(one of four main guerrilla groups) losses of 83 guerrillas in eight years constitute a 
“heavy toll” on the organization it suggest that the group did not have a very large 
membership and was therefore vulnerable to relatively small losses (Abrahamian 
1989:142).  
Despite its limited numbers the guerrillas managed to become a nuisance for the 
government.
53
 They carried out political assassinations,
54
 attacks on military and police 
posts (such as the 1971 raid on a gendarmerie outpost near the village of Siakhal), as well 
as more general acts of sabotage.
55
 For example, in 1972 the guerrillas attempted to 
disrupt the shah‟s 2,500
th
 anniversary of the Iranian monarchy in the town of Persepolis 
by placing explosive at the power plant providing the festivities with electricity 
(Abrahamian 1989; Keddie 2003). While failing to execute that particular act of sabotage, 
elsewhere the guerrillas managed to keep the state somewhat occupied. Nonetheless, by 
the mid 1970s the movement had suffered such extensive losses that its leaders decided to 
suspend most of its activities (Abrahamian 1982; Milani 1988). By late 1976 the guerrilla 
leaders were forced to abandon their violent struggle, not only because “losses from such 
tactics outweighed gains, given the heavy toll in lives,” but also due to “the lack of mass 
struggles triggered by their acts” (Keddie 2003:220). Although the various guerrilla 
organizations survived, their importance, which from their inceptions had already been 
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limited, decreased significantly and the part they played in the revolution was marginal 
and unexpected. 
Why did the Iranian guerrillas fail to seriously challenge the state and make 
violence the creed of the revolution? Why were they unable to mobilize a movement 
similar to those in Algeria and Cuba, the “role models” of Iranian guerrilla fighters? I 
argue that the movement‟s failure can be explained by its lack of support from expected 
allies, such as the rural population, the communist party, and the Soviet Union, and by 
the ferocity of government repression. 
Guerrilla groups around the world have traditionally relied on support from rural 
populations in their struggle against repressive governments (Wickham-Crowley 1992). 
Not only can villagers and peasants supply guerrilla fighters with food and other 
necessities, but they also serve as the main pipeline for new recruits.
56
 Unfortunately for 
the guerrillas, the Iranian countryside provided them with very little of either. The 
guerrillas themselves came to this realization in a report written by one of the 
organizations‟ working committees. Despite “heavy documentation of rural poverty, the 
group concluded that the so-called land reform had diminished the „revolutionary 
potential‟ of the Iranian peasantry, and therefore the future revolution was more likely to 
start in the cities than in the countryside” (Abrahamian, 1989:126). As a direct 
consequence of this report, the central leadership of the organization “dissolved the Rural 
Team on the grounds that the armed struggle in Iran would begin in the cities rather than 
in the countryside” (Abrahamian, 1989:127). 
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It is doubtful whether the shah‟s land reforms explains the lack of “revolutionary 
potential” in the countryside, as researchers have argued that such measures hardly 
improved the lot of the average Iranian peasant (Amjad 1989; Foran 1993a). For 
example, Foran has suggested that “the main political consequence of the land reform 
was the effective replacement of the all-powerful landlord in the villages by the obtrusive 
state” (Foran 1993a:322). Thus, landless farmers remained landless and many of them 
were forced to migrate to the rapidly growing cities. Such a development might have 
aided the guerrillas since they now envisioned their movement to commence in the cities. 
Their argument was logical: Impoverished and dispossessed peasants arrive in the cities 
where they have to live in the slums as squatters and thus become easy targets for the 
guerrillas‟ recruitment efforts. However, “while the rural migrants were alienated from 
the government… they found their natural allies among the mollahs,” and not among the 
guerrilla leaders (Nima 1983:48).
57
 The result of this dynamic was that the guerrillas 
were unable to mobilize a large following both in the countryside and in the cities. 
Another natural domestic political ally of any left-leaning guerrilla group is a 
country‟s communist party. However, the Tudeh withheld its support of the guerrillas for 
two main reasons. First, in the mid-1960s when the guerrilla movement began, the Tudeh 
was an organization in shambles and had been so for about a decade. The repression it 
had suffered at the hands of the SAVAK had left the Tudeh impotent and a political non-
factor. Even if it had indeed decided to support the guerrilla fighters it is therefore unclear 
what that support might have looked like. The Tudeh had, as mentioned above, itself 
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been cut off by the Russians when Moscow and Tehran established mutually beneficial 
trade relations (Amjad 1989; Foran 1993a; Keddie 2003; Matin-asgari 2002). The second 
reason for withheld Tudeh support of the guerrillas was its disagreement over 
revolutionary strategy. Rather uniquely, the Tudeh was a nonviolent communist party and 
as such disagreed with the guerrilla movement‟s violent tactics. However, this second 
reason amounts to a rather moot point since the Tudeh was incapable of supporting the 
guerrillas even if it had concurred with their choice of methods. The Tudeh‟s overall 
weakness resulted in a scenario in which the guerrilla movement lacked political allies. In 
a way, the process of political repression had come full circle: the guerrillas had emerged 
in response to government repression of the political parties, and although benefitting 
from the political vacuum created by the removal of institutionalized parties, that very 
progression of events eventually left the guerrillas without allies. In short, the process 
that had given birth to the guerrillas also helped suffocate them (Abrahamian 1982; 
1985b). 
In contrast to many other guerrilla movements struggling against U.S.-supported 
dictators around the world at the time, and in addition to the lack of internal backing, the 
Iranian freedom fighters failed to secure meaningful Soviet support.
58
 This is somewhat 
surprising since the guerrillas explicitly, at the height of the Cold War, sought to end a 
U.S.-sponsored regime that, on top of ideological concerns, resided in a resource-rich 
country sharing a long border with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, one of the two main 
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guerrilla groups, the Feda´iyan, was explicitly pro-Soviet and sought to establish a social 
order mirroring those in Eastern Europe (Amuzegar 1991). Notwithstanding these facts, 
Moscow remained an opponent of Iranian guerrilla activities. In the early 1960s, the 
Soviets made it clear to the Tudeh that they “were against guerrilla action in Iran, due to a 
lack of objective revolutionary circumstances, and that if the Tudeh wanted to pursue the 
idea, it would have to be with backing other than theirs” (Behrooz 1999:85). Contrary to 
the Western perception of priority being placed on communist ideology in Soviet policy, 
Moscow based its decisions on whom to fund mainly on a movement‟s level of “anti-
imperialism and geostrategic utility” (Herrman 1990:68).  
In the case of Iran, the shah‟s regime had not been of “geostrategic utility” for the 
Soviet Union following the coup of 1953, and Moscow explicitly disapproved of the 
shah‟s close relationship with the United States, not to mention its involvement in the 
coup. However, in September 1962, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, the shah 
proclaimed that he would not allow any country to place missiles on Iranian soil, and the 
following year Iran and the Soviet Union signed an agreement of economic exchange, 
which included a deal for the Soviets to build a steel mill and other heavy industry 
factories in Iran (Matin-asgari 2002:61; Amjad 1989:87). These developments were 
reassuring to the Soviets and exemplify the shah‟s, at times, shrewd foreign policy 
instincts. Following these events “relations improved and a de facto bargain was struck: 
the U.S.S.R. accepted the shah‟s rule and American hegemony in Iran, while receiving a 
number of economic agreements of its own and a stable monarchy on its borders” (Foran 
1993a:347). In other words, Moscow prioritized a stable and economically beneficial 
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neighbor to its south, even if this left the Americans with political and ideological 
hegemony. The Soviets therefore remained comparatively passive and refrained from 
intervening in Iranian politics, although its relationship with the shah fluctuated with 
time. While this arrangement benefited both the shah and the Soviet Union, it was a 
severe blow to the prospects of a successful guerrilla movement, and in stark contrast to 
Soviet backing of guerrillas in other parts of the world.  
The guerrillas eventually received some support from an unlikely ally, namely the 
militant ulama. Because of their atheist ideology, the Marxist Feda´iyan guerrillas were 
not popular among the clergy. On the other hand, the Islamist Mojahedin was found to be 
more acceptable, and in the early 1970s some of Khomeini‟s proxies in Iran decided to 
help fund the organization. It should not be assumed however that this decision was an 
explicit approval of, or a clerical long-term commitment to, guerrilla tactics or objectives. 
Rather, as Rafsanjani, one of Khomeini‟s principal lieutenants, later explained, the 
opposition was so severely outnumbered by the regime, that the Khomeini faction 
“considered any form of struggle against SAVAK a blessing” (Bakhash 1999:44).  
Khomeini himself did not approve of the guerrillas‟ activities. Meeting with some 
of the Mojahedin‟s leaders while in exile in Najaf
59
 in 1972 and 1974, Khomeini 
reprimanded them and refused to give his support, instead arguing prophetically “that the 
regime would fall not when the masses took up arms but when the whole clerical stratum 
joined the opposition” (Abrahamian 1989:150). After these meetings the Mujahedin 
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found it increasingly difficult to receive the ulama‟s blessings for their struggle against 
the regime.  
As if lack of support from its potential allies was not enough of a handicap, the 
guerrillas found themselves facing an incredibly repressive state committed to their 
destruction. Amjad (1989) has suggested that out of all the factors that eventually 
contributed to the failure of the guerrillas, none was more elementary than the “brutal 
repression by the regime” (107). The one factor that could have mitigated the shah‟s 
harsh treatment of the guerrillas was U.S. disapproval, but their struggle against the 
regime  
coincided with a period in Iran‟s relationship with the United States when the 
shah had reason to believe that a crackdown on opposition elements would be 
welcome in Washington and that his methods would be regarded with a 
considerable measure of tolerance. (Sick 1985:23) 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the guerrilla organizations identified with Marxist ideas and 
violent tactics made it still easier for the shah to justify their extermination.
60
 Abrahamian 
has pointed out that “the Mojahedin has in fact never once used the terms socialist, 
communist, [or] Marxist… to describe itself” (Abrahamian 1989:2), but this appeared to 
have mattered little as long as the they subscribed to classic guerrilla tactics and rhetoric, 
thus becoming guilty of communist charges by association. Also, the guerrillas‟ 
commitment to violent overthrow of the state provided the shah with all the justification 
he would ever need to root them out. At the rare occasions when American newspapers 
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did report on the guerrillas‟ struggle with the regime, they referred to them as “Marxist 
and Islamic-Marxist terrorists,” which naturally meant that during Nixon‟s administration 
the shah did not face any American objections to his brutal treatment of his enemies 
(Dorman & Farhang 1987:143). 
 In the face of these difficulties and the significant losses suffered, both the 
Mojahedin and the Feda´iyan realized that further violent opposition to the regime at this 
particular point in time would be futile. “By 1976,” Amjad (1989) suggests “more than 
90 percent of the founders and the original members of both organizations were executed 
or in prison” (107). Perhaps even more troubling, the guerrillas had failed to mobilize the 
masses and the potential for a violent revolution in the near future was not considered a 
realistic possibility. Therefore, in 1977, the guerrillas agreed to temporarily lay down 
their weapons and let other, more moderate factions of the opposition movement take 
over the revolutionary leadership. Jimmy Carter had recently won the presidency, a 
development that secular opposition leaders such as Bazargan and Sanjabi understood 
how to exploit (Stempel 1981). Carter‟s commitment to human rights, they reasoned, 




 By voluntarily going underground the guerrillas bought themselves time to 
regroup. However, the price they paid was relinquishing any chance of revolutionary 
leadership in the movement that would begin within the following year. Although not in 
possession of a leadership role, the guerrillas participated in the revolution in several 
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ways. First, many of its members participated in the movement‟s nonviolent activities, 
such as strikes and demonstrations (Abrahamian 1989). Others, acting perhaps at their 
own initiative, tried to incite violence and provoke riots during the marches (Ansari 2003; 
Wilber 1981). More commonly though, the guerrillas “were formally linked to the 
revolutionary movement as a nascent security wing,” policing marches and taking over 
certain government responsibilities toward the end of the revolution (Stempel 1981:85-6). 
Finally, the guerrillas did engage in violent attacks on the police and the military during 
the revolution, especially in its final three days (M. Fischer 2003; Seliktar 2000; Stempel 
1981). These attacks were however rather limited, since “between 1971 and 1978, over 
300 police, military, and government employees and approximately 10 foreigners were 
gunned down in the streets” (Stempel 1981:17). Although 35 state officials per year 
might sounds like a rather high figure, it should be kept in mind that the army alone was 
comprised of 400,000 troops. At that rate it would have taken the guerrillas over 10,000 
years to defeat the government forces.  
While a vast majority of scholars have emphasized the nonviolent nature of the 
Iranian Revolution it is true that the struggle was brought to conclusion through an armed 
exchange, which I will address in Chapter 6. However, that incident occurred after the 
revolution had already triumphed, and more than anything served a cathartic purpose for 
those who had longed for violent revenge against the regime. This “weekend war” had 
very limited consequences for the outcome of the revolution, and thus it would be a 
mistake to give the violent opposition credit for the success of the revolution, a mistake 
that no serious scholar of the Iranian Revolution has yet made. This point is reinforced by 
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Parsa who plainly minimizes the role of the guerrillas by asserting that such groups might 
have played an important role “had the course of the revolutionary conflict lasted longer 
and required an armed struggle to overthrow the monarchy [emphasis added]” (Parsa 
1989:184). The Iranian Revolution did not require an armed struggle, and since the 
guerrillas played a limited role in defeating the shah they were treated to a very limited 
piece of the victors‟ pie in the revolution‟s aftermath.  
Although unable to assume leadership of the revolutionary movement, it can be 
argued that the Iranian guerrillas still played a more influential role than the traditional 
opposition did. Using violent methods, the guerrillas at the very least made their presence 
known to both friends and foes, and even celebrated a few minor victories. Nonetheless, I 
contend that the real influence asserted by the guerrillas cannot be measured in the 
number of government agents killed or demonstration marshaled. Instead, their most 
important contribution was the lessons they allowed others to learn from their 
achievements and mistakes. By simply challenging a superior opponent and forcing that 
opponent to engage them over a period of several years, the guerrilla movement was able 
“to suggest the vulnerability of the regime” (Foran 1993a:374). In other words, the 
guerillas‟ “challenge did not result in a popular revolution led by the devoted Marxist 
vanguard, but the regime had not managed to uproot the guerrillas either,” which 
contributed to the emergence of “a culture of resistance to dictatorship” (Behrooz 
1999:94). Afshar (1985a) goes a step further in assigning credit to the guerrillas as he 
argues that Khomeini, “benefiting from the climate of resistance created by the urban 
guerrillas, [led] the crowd in a series of massive demonstrations [that] toppled the Shah” 
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(2). While it has then been suggested that the guerrillas made manifest the shah‟s 
vulnerabilities, I argue that they actually did the opposite: rather than revealing the shah‟s 
weaknesses they highlighted his strengths: The guerrilla movement allowed Khomeini to 
come to the realization that violent tactics against the shah would be pointless and only 
serve to strengthen U.S. support for the latter.
62
 Learning from the guerrillas‟ failed 
strategies, Khomeini instead returned to those methods best known to Iranians: strikes 
and demonstrations.  
To summarize, the guerrilla movement was unable to assume leadership of the 
revolutionary movement and make violent struggle the predominant method in the 
Iranian Revolution. The principal reason for this failure has been identified as lack of 
support from potential allies and harsh repression from the state. Ironically, just as the 
destruction of the moderate opposition led to the emergence of the guerrillas, the defeat 
of the guerrillas left the field open for the religious opposition. Given a monopoly on 
opposition activities, the ulama loyal to Khomeini eventually became the dominant force 
of the anti-shah movement. Some scholars have relied heavily on the resource 
mobilization paradigm as sketched out by McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977), suggesting 
that the guerrillas failed because “they did not possess the financial resources, network of 
organization, or charismatic leadership that the clerical opposition enjoyed” (Siavoshi 
1990:41-2), but such a characterization of the problem fails to take into account the 
geopolitical context in which the guerrillas struggle took place.  
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The combination of a Soviet Union content with its economic and strategic 
relationship with Iran, and a United States of America that under the Nixon doctrine 
provided the shah with any non-nuclear weapons he desired made for an impossible 
situation for the guerrillas. Just like in the case of the political opposition, the guerrillas‟ 
failure can largely be explained through the significant influence over Iranian policy 
wielded by the United States. U.S. approval of ruthless repression of the “communist” 
guerrillas helped the shah deal effectively and swiftly with his armed opponents. 
Although the United States had provided the shah with military aid at least ever since 
Eisenhower‟s stint in the White House, such aid increased under Johnson and culminated 
in the Nixon doctrine that provided the shah with near unlimited access to American 
arms. Armed to its teeth, his military consequently had little trouble defeating the 
guerrilla soldiers, who were eventually forced into hiding after making it painfully clear 
to other potential challengers that the shah‟s rule could not be ended by the use of 
violence. Therefore, Khomeini‟s followers drew inspiration from another outspoken 
opponent of the regime to which we now turn our attention. 
 
The Student Movement 
 
 One final opposition group that actively resisted the shah‟s repressive regime was 
the Iranian students, particularly those studying abroad in Europe and the United States. 
The students were, in a fashion similar to the other two groups discussed above, affected 
by U.S.-Iranian relations. However, unlike the opposition politicians and the guerrillas, 
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the students benefitted from America‟s involvement with Iran, which helps explain why 
the students played the arguably most important role of the three groups. This section 
analyzes the abroad-based student movement, its contributions to the revolutionary 
movement, its choice of methods, and finally its inability to commandeer leadership of 
the opposition‟s activities.    
Students have throughout history been notorious revolutionaries and Iranian 
students are no exception. Although the 1960s and 1970 represent the most significant 
period of Iranian student resistance, the nation‟s tradition of student opposition can be 
traced back even further. In the late 1920s, leftist Iranians studying in Germany engaged 
in “demonstrations and propaganda” against Reza Shah‟s government, apparently causing 
the king enough international embarrassment for him to reconsider the entire practice of 
sending students abroad for higher education (Matin-asgari 2002:21). In fact, these 
protests served “as another impetus for the establishment of the University of Tehran in 
1934” (Matin-asgari 2002:23). The student movement against Reza Shah was ultimately 
unsuccessful in achieving most of its objectives, but these early activities helped set a 
precedent for future generations to build upon.  
 In 1953, in the aftermath of the August coup, Vice-President Richard Nixon made 
an official visit to Iran. He was “greeted” by an enormous student-organized 
demonstration that condemned U.S. involvement in the activities that had led to 
Mossadeq‟s downfall. As Iranian security forces were unable to control the students they 
resorted to firing into the crowds, killing three students in the process. This incident, 
occurring on November 1, became known as “the day of students,” and was annually 
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commemorated by Iranian students all over the world until the end of the shah‟s regime 
in 1979 (Amjad, 1989: 109-10). 
 The 1953 demonstrations were unlike most of the major student activities in the 
1960s and 1970s. As we have seen, the 1953 coup marked the end of a relatively liberal 
period in post-war Iranian history under the leadership of an insecure ruler. After the 
coup, the shah tightened his control of the Iranian polity, thus causing mass gatherings to 
become increasingly rare. Naturally, this diminished the potency of their movement since 
students overwhelmingly relied on mass action in their assaults on the state. The shah‟s 
new attitude toward dissent could have spelled the end of student activism, and to some 
extent it did. Following the coup and the shah‟s consolidation of power, university 
students in Iran became a largely inconsequential opposition group, but the tradition of 
student dissent survived abroad.  
 While the climate of repression explains the decline of domestic student activity, 
it does not elucidate why student opposition abroad increased dramatically in the coming 
decades. Our ability to solve this puzzle requires us to recognize the infrastructural 
pressures the booming Iranian economy placed on the rest of society, including the 
educational system. Beeman (1983) has argued that “with a burgeoning need for 
expertise at the postgraduate level and inadequate training programs to produce that 
expertise, and an insatiable public demand for undergraduate education, the only solution 
for Iran was to export its student population for training abroad” (208). Fortunately for 
Iran, both European and American colleges were more than willing to admit Iranian 
students to their programs. In the American case this attitude was partly a consequence of 
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the fact that many small colleges were struggling economically and therefore gladly 
welcomed foreign students, but it was also a result of the excellent relations that had been 
established between the U.S. and Iranian governments in the aftermath of the coup 
(Beeman 1983). As a result, the Iranian student population in the U.S. grew from 6,000 in 
the early 1960s to 54,340 in 1978. Iranians also made up sizable student populations in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, Austria, and 
Belgium. At the eve of the revolution Iran had more students studying abroad than any 
other nation, and its citizens constituted the largest international student population in the 
United States (Matin-asgari 2002:57; 131; Milani 1988:113-4).
63
      
 The revolutionary role of the abroad-based Iranian students has been significantly 
underestimated by scholars and frequently left out of discussions of resistance to the 
shah. Nonetheless, a few insightful researchers have placed students in the centers of 
their studies. For example, Matin-asgari, perhaps the most important chronicler of the 
Iranian student movement, has suggested that “university students (including 
seminarians) provided the main social base of opposition to the shah‟s regime during the 
two pre-revolutionary decades” (Matin-asgari 2002:4). This point is echoed by Menashri 
(1990), who while seemingly downplaying the students‟ role has noted that in the period 
from 1963 to 1976, when the opposition was unable to muster a meaningful challenge to 
the shah inside Iran, “its most conspicuous manifestations were among Iranian students 
abroad – an embarrassment, but certainly no danger to the shah” (18). While largely 
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sympathetic, Menashri‟s evaluation of the student movement is incomplete, as students 
played an immensely important part in the pre-revolutionary period as they helped direct 
the world‟s attention to Iran and the shah‟s human rights record. 
 Student activities abroad arguably became an element of the opposition 
movement when three separate organizations joined together in Paris in January, 1962, to 
create the Confederation of Iranian Students/National Union (CISNU). The three 
organizations merging were the Iranian Students‟ Association in the United States 
(ISAUS), the Confederation of Iranian Students in Europe (CIS) and the Organization of 
Tehran University Students (OTUS). The ISAUS had started as a disguised CIA project 
but eventually achieved “independence” in 1960 when opposition-minded students 
gained control of the organization. At CISNU‟s inaugural 1962 meeting only the ISAUS 
and CIS were represented, as OTUS due to repression was unable to send delegates. 
Strengthened by their new union, students in the U.S. and Europe increased their 
lobbying activities against the regime in Tehran and soon received the support and 
appreciation of Khomeini (Matin-asgari 2002).
64
 
 The new student organization was almost immediately called into action. On 
January 21, just days after CISNU‟s Paris meeting, the shah approved of a military attack 
on unarmed students demonstrating on the campus of Tehran University. The soldiers 
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applied such brutal force that the chancellor of the university resigned in protest of the 
regime‟s actions. In his letter of resignation Dr. Ahmad Farhad complained that he had  
never seen or heard so much cruelty, sadism, atrocity, and vandalism on the part 
of the government forces. Some of the girls in the classrooms were criminally 
attacked by the soldiers. When we inspected the university buildings we were 
faced with the same situation as if an army of barbarians had invaded an enemy 
territory” (Bill 1988a:146-7).  
 
CISNU‟s response was near instantaneous as it issued the following statement: 
The Confederation of Iranian Students, representing 13,000 students in Europe 
and 6,000 students in United States, hereby informs government authorities of its 
demands, letting them know that unless we receive a response by Friday, 26 
January, we shall employ every means available abroad to show the Free World 
the true face of those in charge in Iran [emphasis added]. (Matin-asgari 2002:57) 
 
In the eyes of the shah‟s regime the last part of the statement might have appeared an 
empty threat. However, over the next decade and a half the students undermined the 
Iranian state by doing exactly what they had promised to do, and by doing so they helped 
bring about a structural context that would prove favorable to Khomeini and his 
collaborators. 
 The students‟ strategy was as simple as it was effective. By taking any 
opportunity to protest against the shah and his regime, the students were able to attract 
the attention of the international media, human rights organizations, and even foreign 
politicians. The strategy of advertising the shah‟s human rights abuses eventually caused 
several human rights organizations and news outlets to publish scathing criticisms of the 
Iranian leadership, criticisms that, in due course, made the shah‟s relationship with his 
key ally tenuous at best and, I argue, impossible at worst. 
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 The earliest student demonstration against the shah outside of Iran occurred in the 
U.S. in 1959. The shah himself suspected that the demonstration was a CIA-coordinated 
response to his decision two years earlier to sign an agreement with the ENI (the Italian 
state oil company) at the expense of several American companies (Bill 1988a). Whether 
the shah‟s suspicions were indeed well-founded we may never know, but what is clear is 
that the 1959 demonstration was not to be an isolated occurrence. In January 1962, in 
response to the massacre at Tehran University, approximately 500 students protested 
against Prime Minister Amini as he visited London, and in the following months those 
scenes were repeated in Bonn. In April of that same year the shah made an official visit to 
the United States. As he arrived to New York he was met by ISAUS demonstrators and 
thus forced to leave the airport via a back exit. The demonstrations then continued 
outside the Waldorf Astoria where the shah was staying. In connection to these activities 
the students published an open letter to President Kennedy in which they criticized the 
shah and his human rights record. When the shah traveled to Washington to meet with the 
president the protesters were on hand to greet him there as well. In May 1967, the shah 
visited Cologne unaware of the fact that local Iranian students had already distributed 
over 100,000 leaflets all over Germany. Consequently the shah was met by protesters in 
Aachen, Bonn, Dusseldorf, and Munich. In August of the same year, ISAUS members, 
wearing face masks in order to avoid identification by the SAVAK, clashed with the 
police as the shah once again visited the United States (Matin-asgari 2002). 
 These and many other similar expressions of student dissent would probably have 
had a very minor impact on Iranian history had they not been accompanied by an 
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extensive and strategic propaganda campaign.
65
 Milani‟s (1988) excellent summary of 
the chain of events that resulted from the students‟ efforts (and those of other opposition 
elements living abroad) deserves to be quoted at length:  
The Shah was exceptionally sensitive to his image in the international community 
as a benevolent ruler. A vulnerable aspect of his regime was its ignominious 
human rights record. The exiled opposition to the Shah in Western Europe and 
North America in the sixties and the seventies, including the Confederation of 
Iranian Students, adroitly manipulated this weakness by contacting human rights 
organizations and providing them with exaggerated and sometimes fallacious 
information about the so-called political holocaust in Iran, a country alleged to 
have more than 100,000 political prisoners. The human rights organizations in 
turn denigrated the Shah: In 1972, a United Nations panel found Iran guilty of 
consistent violations of human rights; and, in 1975, Amnesty International 
conferred on Iran the notoriety of having the world's most terrifying human rights 
record. (180-1) 
 
While, as Milani proceeds to point out, Amnesty International and other human rights 
groups had little leverage within the Iranian regime, their criticisms amounted to a 
significant PR problem for the shah.
66
 It is also worth noting that the numbers reported by 
the students – 100,000 political prisoners – was most likely a gross misrepresentation of 
reality. Regardless of its exaggerations, the strategy had the desired effect as first 
Europe‟s mainstream press, represented by such publications as the Frankfurter 
Rundschau, Le Monde, and London‟s Times, The Economist, and The Guardian and its 
more popular press, exemplified by Germany‟s Der Spiegel and France‟s Le Nouvel 
Observateur, and later the American mainstream media began to report on the shah‟s 
human rights record (Matin-asgari 2002:122).
67
 Consequently, by the mid-1970s “a 
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 The European media outlets engaged the topic in the early 1970s while its American counterpart 
followed suit in the middle of the decade.   
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definite publicity breakthrough had occurred, with the international news media viewing 
Iran as having one of the world‟s most repressive governments. Years of adverse 
publicity by the CISNU was the most direct and important cause of this situation” 
(Matin-asgari 2002:148). 
 The shah‟s regime tried its best to combat the CISNU and even managed to have 
some of its U.S.-based leaders arrested. In the face of such repression, both in Iran and 
abroad, the CISNU determined that its best response was neither to curb its activities nor 
negotiate with the regime, but rather to step up its attacks on the shah. By continuing its 
strategy of involving the international community in its struggle, the students equipped 
themselves with a protective shield the Iranian government proved incapable of 
penetrating (Matin-asgari 2002:124). Thus, in addition to initiating the Iranian 
Revolution, the foreign-based students showed Khomeini and his collaborator a viable 
strategy of how to defeat the shah.        
 Unlike the secular opposition and the guerrilla movement, the Iranian students 
were not unsuccessful in the challenge they issued to the Iranian state. Still, their 
movement remained in the losers‟ camp once the revolution had been completed as their 
struggle for democracy and human rights came to naught under Khomeini‟s leadership of 
Iran. In a sense then, and in contrast to the other opposition groups covered in this 
chapter, the students were never defeated by the Pahlavi state, but rather consumed by 
Khomeini and the ulama. Interestingly enough, the students, unlike the secular opposition 
and the guerrillas, were rarely condemned as communists. The Iranian government 
experienced great difficulties in its attempts to vilify a nonviolent opposition that in 
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contrast to the domestic opposition and the covert guerrilla fighters was clearly visible to 
the shah‟s foreign allies and the international media. I therefore suggest that while the 
shah‟s close relationship with the U.S. was an impediment to the domestic opposition it 
was of great benefit to the students studying abroad, particularly to those living in the 
United States.   
 So why then were the students unable to take control of the revolutionary 
movement? At least two factors seem to provide plausible explanation. First, although 
mostly outside of the shah‟s repressive reach by virtue of residing in the U.S. and Europe, 
and thus protected from persecution, the students also had to deal with the negative 
aspects of distance. Physically separated from the struggle on the ground, the student 
leaders were largely unable to emerge as potential leaders of the revolutionary 
movement. Second, the abroad-based student groups, unlike the politicians, the guerrillas, 
and Khomeini‟s religious opposition, seem to have been more interested in criticizing the 
regime than in proposing an alternative solution. Without a marketable vision of what 
Iran might look like after the shah‟s government had been ousted, the students were 
unable to portray themselves as plausible leaders. In other words, the student movement 
was a protest movement in the purest sense, designed for disruption rather than creation. 
Devised as it was to oppose the shah, it appears to have concerned itself little with 
offering a viable option for the Iranian people. Perhaps seeing itself as a part of the larger 
movement, the students willingly left leadership considerations to others.
68
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 The other question outlined in the beginning of the chapter concerns the 
preference for nonviolent methods of struggle. While difficult to prove, it seems highly 
likely that Iranian students might have been influenced by the European and American 
political climates of the 1960s. The Civil Rights Movement, the student sit-ins in Berkely 
and on other American campuses, as well as the European events of 1968 must have 
made a powerful impression on the politically aware Iranian exchange students. With 
their American and European peers fighting battles not completely unlike their own, the 
diffusion of both ideas and strategies seem very plausible. The leap from concerns about 
civil rights in America to human rights in Iran cannot have been very difficult for shrewd 
Iranian students to make. Combined with their own cultural predisposition to nonviolent 
tactics, the Western infusion of liberal political goals must have made for a potent 
combination.     
The students remained an important element throughout the revolutionary period 
as they marched and struck as members of Khomeini‟s nonviolent army. Still, it must be 
emphasized that these were to a significant extent different students. Although many 
students residing abroad undoubtedly returned home in time for the revolution, many 
others did not. Furthermore, those who were students in the 1960s and early 1970s when 
the students laid the groundwork for the revolution‟s success were not necessarily 
students in 1978. Accordingly, many of the students who marched in favor of Khomeini 
were seminary students, training for a career within the ulama – an obvious contrast to 
the students who went abroad. The youngsters studying in Europe and the United States 
were not necessarily supporters of Khomeini‟s ideas as many of them preferred the 
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secular/liberal ideas presented to them by their American and European professors 
(Beeman 1983). Instead, those students supported Khomeini because of his resilience and 
uncompromising stance toward the shah. Little did they suspect that the propaganda 
victories they had achieved in the outside of Iran would soon be appropriated by 
Khomeini‟s religious opposition.   
 Although ultimately unsuccessful, the students played a tremendously important 
part in the revolution as they were the ones that transformed a domestic struggle into an 
international one. “Through vocal demonstrations and publicity campaigns, [the CISNU] 
was instrumental in drawing the attention of the international media, human rights 
organizations, political groups, and foreign governments to repression in Iran, thus 
restraining the government‟s otherwise arbitrary treatment of its political victims” 
(Matin-asgari 2002:1). The students‟ realization that the best way to engage the shah was 
by involving the world community in their cause would later be mimicked by Khomeini 
and his lieutenants. If the guerrillas showed Khomeini how to be obliterated by the shah, 
the students gave him insight into how to defeat his opponent. In addition to introducing 
the world to the shah they knew, it was this larger advancement in tactical developments 









 Scholars have for several decades considered the impact of the international 
context on revolutionary movements. However, following Skocpol‟s lead most 
researchers have concerned themselves with the negative impact international rivalry and 
completion has had on the state. Approaching the matter from a different angle, this 
chapter examined the impact of the international context, in this case the close 
relationship between the U.S. and Iran, on opposition groups. Although each one of the 
three groups was affected differently, a few generalizations can be made. The groups 
operating in Iran, the political opposition and the guerrillas, were negatively affected by 
the friendly relations between the shah and the United States. As long as the shah could 
portray these groups as radical, disruptive, and, of course, leftist, he faced little 
opposition from the U.S. in his brutal dealings with them. As will be explained in Chapter 
5, the international media did not begin to pay attention to the shah‟s repressive system 
until the 1970s, but by that time both the guerrillas and the established political parties 
were either already defeated or well on their way to becoming so. For the students, on the 
other hand, U.S.-Iranian cooperation allowed them to eventually constitute the largest 
student diaspora in the United States, and operating in the liberal climate of the 1960s, 
they were able to instigate a protest movement against the shah, aided by their brothers 
and sisters in Europe, that consequently came to signify the most serious threat to the 
shah‟s international image in the decade leading up to the revolution. Visible as they 
were to the shah‟s allies, and largely out of reach of his repressive machine, the students 
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managed to do what neither the political opposition nor the guerrillas managed to 
accomplish – attract the world‟s attention and rock the very foundation of the shah‟s 
power. 
 Although the students were more successful than the politicians and guerrillas 
when it came to challenging the Iranian state, none of the groups were able to assume 
leadership of the revolutionary movement. In the case of the political parties and the 
guerrillas, both of the groups had been brutally repressed – indirectly due to U.S. support 
of the shah‟s regime – by the time of the revolution and were thus incapable of 
mobilizing sufficient support. The abroad-based students on the other hand appear to 
have been uninterested in revolutionary leadership, content with raising the world‟s 
awareness of the shah‟s wrongdoings and then aligning themselves with Khomeini‟s 
movement. 
 Out of the three groups, only the guerrillas opted for violence out of a sense of 
desperation and despair. Thanks to U.S. support, the shah had been able to repress all 
institutionalized opposition activities following the 1953 coup, thus eliminating the 
political parties and thereby the opposition‟s preference for peaceful means of struggle. 
The guerrillas, emerging as a result of overwhelming state pacification of the traditional 
opposition were, again thanks to U.S. support, easily suppressed by an Iranian military 
with access to the most advanced weapons money could buy. In contrast, the students 
residing abroad, relatively safe from violent repression, opted for nonviolent action in 
hopes of attracting world attention. Just like the political opposition and the guerrillas‟ 
failures can be explained by U.S. involvement in Iranian politics, so can the students‟ 
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success. By embracing the nonviolent, liberal values of the West, the students managed to 
bring the shah‟s brutality to the world‟s attention, a development that proved crucial to 




4. A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION? KHOMEINI, THE ULAMA AND THE BAZAAR 
 
 The shah‟s strategy of severely repressing his domestic political opponents 
initially served him well, and by defeating both the political opposition and the guerrilla 
movement he was able to achieve a semblance of social order. Society‟s tranquility in the 
mid 1970s, however, was simply the calm before the storm. By forestalling the possibility 
of a serious challenge from the political opposition or a violent one from the guerrillas, 
the shah sought to further fortify his grasp on political power. Unfortunately for the king 
and his political ambitions, the destruction of his enemies had the unintended 
consequence of also benefiting the group that would eventually separate him from his 
throne, namely the radical ulama forces under Khomeini‟s stewardship.  
This chapter revolves around two central questions. How can we explain why 
nonviolent methods achieved hegemony in the Iranian Revolution? To do so it is 
essential to first trace the ascendance to leadership of the group that came to espouse 
nonviolent action and infuse it into the entire movement. Thus, the first part of this 
chapter will examine its other main question, namely, how did Khomeini and the ulama 
became the leaders of the Iranian Revolution? 
 As Kurzman (2004) has noted, some scholars have argued that the clergy was 
always the most likely revolutionary leaders in Iran, but a careful analysis of modern 
Iranian history tends to indicate that such assumptions are questionable. In contrast to the 
persuasions of ulama apologists and advocates, the Iranian clergy has always been a 
group concerned first and foremost with its own well-being. Consequently, as we shall 
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see, the clergy was highly rational in its political calculations, which made it starkly 
different from the more idealistic guerrillas. I intend to show that throughout the 20
th
 
century, and even slightly prior to that, the clergy‟s relationship to the state, first in the 
shape of the Qajar dynasty and later personified by the two Pahlavis, was in constant flux 
with the determinant factor being the collective best interest of the ulama itself.
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Consequently, the clerics only became revolutionary in response to specific 
circumstances, all of which were related to the group‟s shifting fortunes, and its 
relationship to the crown. When the monarchy‟s interests coincided with those of the 
ulama, the clerics assumed the role of loyal collaborators, but when the regime‟s policies 
threatened the clergy‟s position in society, it decisively turned oppositionist. This process 
unfolded most clearly in the early 1960s and culminated in the ulama-led revolution of 
1977-79. In short, the clergy only became revolutionary when it found itself with its back 
against the wall. 
 In addition to exploring the ulama‟s rise to power, this chapter also seeks to 
understand its and Khomeini‟s preference for nonviolent methods of struggle. In contrast 
to Chapter 3, which focused mainly on the U.S.-Iranian relationship‟s influence on the 
unsuccessful revolutionaries, this chapter will emphasize the cultural dimensions of the 
Iranian Revolution. I argue that not only was nonviolent action deeply and traditionally 
rooted in Iranian activism, but supplementing this cultural preference was Khomeini keen 
understanding of the dynamics of nonviolent social change. The combination of Iranian 
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culture‟s compatibility with nonviolent struggle and Khomeini‟s strategic awareness 
made for a potent mix that eventually facilitated the shah‟s overthrow.  
The chapter also briefly examines the role played by the ulama‟s revolutionary 
ally, the bazaaris. Although the links between the clerics and the merchants were 
historically strong, the relationship was never a guaranteed component of revolutionary 
success. Rather, the ulama and the bazaaris were self-interested groups that only made 
common cause when their dissatisfactions coincided. The cause of these converging 
discontents was the shah‟s policy of westernization and modernization, which to the 
ulama manifested itself in the shape of social secularization, and for the bazaaris took the 
form of economic industrialization. Thus, the monarch‟s attempts to modernize Iran, 
naïve as it might seem in hindsight, allowed the clergy and the merchants to join forces 
(Miklos 1983). Accordingly, an implicit argument of this chapter is that one possible 
cause of the revolution was the regime‟s desire to break with Iranian culture and 
tradition, a move that infuriated society‟s two most autonomous social groups and had 




The Birth of the Activist Clergy 
 
 The ulama‟s ascendance to the political stage can be dated back at least to the 
Tobacco Movement of 1891. This rather brief popular uprising was a response to the 
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monarchy‟s decision to grant a British entrepreneur, Major Gerald Talbot, a special 
concession that would give him and his company the monopoly on Iranian tobacco both 
on the Iranian and the international markets. The domestic tobacco traders and growers 
were obviously infuriated by the proposition, as were many other merchants who feared 
that similar concessions might be given to foreigners in their respective areas of 
commerce. What is less obvious is the source of the clergy‟s outrage. True, the ulama‟s 
welfare depended on donations from the wealthy bazaaris, many of whom were involved 
in the tobacco industry, but there were other, even more central reasons for the clerics to 
oppose the tobacco concession. In addition to the ills associated with foreign economic 
intrusions, “the cultural impact of Western penetration also started a trend toward the 
secularization of the society, and undermined the position of the Ulema and the Islamic 
culture” (Amjad, 1989: 37). These two related concerns, economic competition from 
foreigners and secularization of Iranian society, helped forge an alliance between the 
merchants and the clergy, a partnership that would be rekindled in the late 1970s. 
 Alarmed by the secularization of society, the ulama under Ayatollah Shirazi‟s (at 
the time the country‟s highest ranking religious figure) leadership mobilized large 
numbers of people in massive demonstrations and general strikes all over Iran. These 
tactics were coupled with a consumer boycott of tobacco that emanated from an alleged 
fatwa said to have been issued by Shirazi himself. The brief ordinance simply stated: “In 
the name of God, the Merciful and the Forgiving. As of now, the consumption of tobacco 
in any form is tantamount to war against the Imam of the Age” (Moaddel 1994:15). 
Keddie (2003) reports that Shirazi did indeed confirm the edict, which was observed 
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widely, “even by the shah‟s wives and by non-Muslims” (61), while Moaddel (1994) 
disputes the authenticity of the fatwa as “fabricated by a group of merchants” (15). 
Poulson (2005) reconciles the two positions by suggesting that Shirazi verified the fatwa 
despite knowing it was a forgery. Regardless of the decree‟s authenticity, it helped 
mobilize the Iranian masses to such an extent that both the Qajar state and the British 
eventually were forced to recognize that the tobacco concession would not be 
operational. Consequently, in early 1892 the government was forced to cancel the 
agreement in its entirety (M. Fischer 2003; Keddie 1983a; Moaddel 1994).
70
            
 In addition to marking the birth of the politically active ulama, the Tobacco 
Movement illustrates a few other key points of importance for this study. First, the 
movement constituted for Iranian politics a distinct break with the past – the age of 
popular politics had begun and the campaign against the concession had shown all 
Iranians, including the ulama, the merchants, and the state, that collective opposition to 
the monarchy was indeed possible. Secondly, the effectiveness of religious themes and 
nonviolent tactics, such as the traditional practice of basts, or sanctuary, and the use of 
fatwas, suggested to the clergy its own political leverage. Finally, the Tobacco Movement 
delivered to Iranian politics the potent ulama-bazaar alliance, which although 
inconsistent and at times dormant in the 20
th
 century, remained close to the surface 
(Abrahamian 1982; Foran 1993a). Put succinctly, the Tobacco Movement established 
what was to become a 20
th
 century tradition of mass-based opposition to the government, 
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Talbot‟s company to keep its monopoly on Iranian tobacco on the international market, but this course of 
action proved unfeasible.  
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and in its first major manifestation, nonviolent tactics had been established as a national 
preference. 
 As discussed in chapter two, the ulama and the bazaaris once again united in 
1906 to help lead the Constitutional Revolution, which to some extent can be seen as the 
continuation of the Tobacco Movement. Although ultimately unsuccessful in drastically 
altering the shape of Iranian politics, the Constitutional Revolution confirmed the 
revolutionary tendencies of the ulama. At the same time, the ulama played a more limited 
role in the Constitutional Revolution than it had in the Tobacco Movement, a fact that 
might help explain that movement‟s failure. Why did the clerics resist the urge to throw 
its full support behind the revolutionaries? The most convincing explanation might 
simply be that a large portion of the clergy was unmotivated to participate in the 
movement. Floor (1983) has captured the varying nature of the ulama‟s support of 
various movements as he contends that “if the Shi‟i ulama appeared to espouse a popular 
cause, there was more often a parallelism of interest than the ulama‟s advocating a cause 
for the same reasons as the other groups involved” (75). In other words, the ulama only 
supported popular movements when it sought to benefit from them. As Afary (1994) has 
shown, many members of the clergy grew suspicious of the decidedly secularist desire for 
a constitution as the movement progressed, and worried that if the constitutionalists were 
successful, the new social order might be detrimental to Islam and the interests of the 
ulama.
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 The validity of these concerns was “confirmed” when two leading clergymen 
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major land owning group, the ulama was less than excited by the prospect of losing its property to land-less 
peasants (Afary 1994). 
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and several lesser clerics fell victim to the constitutional radicalism that partially defined 
the latter stages of the Constitutional Revolution. Consequently the clergy became 
skeptical – and divided in its support – of the movement, which quite possible reduced its 
chances of success (Arjomand 1988). 
 A large faction of the ulama remained suspicious of the constitutional movement, 
which after the aborted revolution survived in the shape of the newly created parliament, 
the Majles. Similarly, the clergy sustained its quiet opposition to the Qajar monarchy and 
its close links to both British and Russian imperialists. The fact that Reza Khan, soon to 
be Reza Shah, was greeted by the ulama as a liberator of Iran and protector of the Shi‟i 
nation when he overthrew the Qajars in the early 1920s is therefore hardly surprising. 
Furthermore, the new king assumed a hostile stance toward his political rivals and 
succeeded in turning back the clock on the accomplishments of the constitutional 
movement. When faced with the choice between royal autocracy and secular 
constitutionalism the majority of the ulama gladly threw its support behind the former 
(Arjomand 1988). 
 For his part, Reza Shah went through the motions of appealing to the Shi‟i clergy 
in order to receive their support, and during his rise to power embraced the religious 
heritage of his nation. For example, in March, 1924, Reza Shah went to Qom to visit Iraqi 
Shi‟i leaders that had been expelled from that country‟s holy sites by the British to confer 
with them about the possibility of returning to Iraq. In May, he ordered his security forces 
to participate in religious ceremonies, and in December he went on a pilgrimage to the 
holy shrines in Najaf. While many members of the ulama were fooled into attaching 
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significance to royal acts such as these, the shah‟s gestures of religiosity were simply that 
– a charade designed to attract the clergy‟s support. The apparent success of this strategy 
is partly evidenced by the fact that at least two high-ranking religious leaders “publicly 
branded those who opposed Pahlavi‟s rule as enemies of Islam” (Arjomand 1988:81). 
 With the support of the ulama, Reza Shah was able to establish a powerful and 
repressive autocracy. However, by drastically increasing the size and reach of both the 
army and the bureaucracy he was able to sequentially decrease the importance of, and his 
own reliance on, the clergy. Once he had repressed his and the cleric‟s mutual enemies, 
the secular politicians and their supporters, the shah turned his attention to the ulama. 
Consequently, as Arjomand (1986) has noted, “under Reza Shah, the state deprived [the 
clergy] of all its judiciary functions, eliminated its prebendal, fiscal, and social privileges, 
and greatly reduced its control over education and over religious endowments” (391). 
Despite this rather comprehensive attack, Arjomand (1986) points out, the ulama did not 
muster a serious challenge against the state.  
Furthermore, and in addition to direct attacks on the social and economic status of 
the ulama, Reza Shah embarked on a Westernization project that included a campaign to 
unveil the women of Iran. This amounted to a grave insult to the clergy and a 
fundamental attack on the nation‟s religious tradition. Women were not the only ones 
facing new clothing norms as the king attempted to severely regulate the garbs of the 
clerics and went as far as to have the police forcibly and publicly remove their turbans. 
Reza Shah also allowed liquor to be legally sold in the holy city of Qom and prohibited 
the teaching of the Koran in Iranian schools. Articulating  his approach to the 
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development of Iran, Reza Shah declared upon returning from a visit to Atatürk‟s 
secularizing Turkey in 1934 that he would “eradicate religious superstition during his 
reign” (Arjomand 1988:82). These developments eventually culminated in the bloody 
repression of an ulama-organized protest meeting in Mashad in the summer of 1935 
(Abrahamian 1982; Arjomand 1988; Keddie 1983).  
Here we must return to the proposition offered above, stating that the ulama has 
historically opposed the state when its own interests have been threatened. It seems clear 
that the situation under Reza Shah represents a serious attack on the status of the clergy, 
and perhaps to the very existence of Iran as a Shi‟i Muslim country. We might therefore 
expect some sort of reaction from the ulama. Yet, beyond the 1935 protest meeting and a 
few instances of clergy-organized “passive resistance that occasionally broke out into 
active opposition” (Bakhash 1990:22), such a reaction seems to never have materialized. 
A plausible explanation of this situation appears to be Reza Shah‟s willingness to repress 
his opponents. Unlike his son in the 1970s, Reza Shah was not concerned with how he 
was perceived by the rest of the world. Perhaps more importantly, it is unclear if anyone 
even bothered to perceive him. Iran was not a major player on the world scene and of less 
interest to imperial forces since Reza Shah‟s approach to foreigners was less welcoming 
and more nationalist that that of his predecessors. As a result, the ulama found itself 
fairly isolated as all other opposition groups had been suppressed and its traditional allies, 
the bazaaris, were experiencing a time of relative growth in the absence of significant 
imperialist intrusions. At the time of the Iranian Revolution almost 50 years later, some 
of these conditions would be eerily similar: the political parties had been repressed and 
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no meaningful armed resistance existed. However, unlike in the 1930s, the bazaaris had 
now turned against the regime, and, perhaps more importantly, this time around the world 
was eagerly watching. 
By virtue of a powerful repressive machine, Reza Shah was able to unilaterally 
dominate the Iranian political scene for over a decade. However, his decision to repress 
every important political group in the country eventually backfired. When the Allies 
disapproved of his close relationship with Nazi Germany prior to and during World War 
II, no social group rushed to his side and in 1941 he was forced to abdicate in favor of his 
son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. 
  
Ulama Resistance in the Era of Mohammad Reza Shah  
 
Under the new shah the ulama‟s relationship with the state improved drastically 
for a few different reasons. First, the young king was an insecure and initially rather weak 
regent, and thus stood to benefit from the clergy‟s support, while this simultaneously 
allowed the ulama to exert significant influence, thus making for a mutually beneficial 
alliance. A second, and arguably more important reason for the shah-ulama alliance, was 
the rapid growth of secular and Marxist political parties in the 1940s and 1950s. The 
ulama was especially concerned with the potential of a communist takeover, the 
realization of which, due to the dogmatic atheism that characterized the movement, could 
have amounted to an existential threat for the clergy (Arjomand 1986). The shah‟s 
government banned the Tudeh in 1949, but the political vacuum created by the removal 
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of the communist party was quickly filled by the secularist National Front and its populist 
leader Mohammad Mossadeq, a combination that appeared to the ulama as only a slight 
improvement from the threat of communism. 
 The ulama‟s suspicion of the National Front was not simply the fruit of the 
clergy‟s collective paranoia. Rather the National Front had given the clergy concrete 
reason to oppose its agenda. One scholar has vividly captured the rather intense character 
of the ulama-National Front antagonism at the time of Mossadeq‟s rule:  
On one occasion, Mosaddegh‟s supporters had put a pair of glasses on a dog, 
taken it to the Majles, and named it “ayatollah.” They then toured the dog through 
the streets. Speaking later of that event, Khomeini said that he had predicted, 
“Mosadegh will be slapped; and it was not long before he was slapped; had he 
survived, he would have slapped Islam. (Parsa 1989:193)   
 
While insults did not win the secular politicians many clerical friends, the real source of 
concern for the ulama was what such insults symbolized: their anti-religious nature 
combined with Mossadeq‟s close links to the banned Tudeh party was enough to justify 
the clergy‟s analysis that the oil nationalization movement would eventually deliver Iran 
to communism and atheism. This in turn caused the ulama, perhaps more unified than at 
any other time in the 20
th
 century, to align itself with the shah and his Anglo-American 
supporters. Under the leadership of the country‟s preeminent cleric, Ayatollah 
Boroujerdi, and with the backing of royalist members of the Majles, the ulama organized 
demonstrations in Qom and sent representatives to Tehran to support the king. When the 
shah left the country for Rome on “vacation” after the first, aborted, coup on August 16, 
1953, Boroujerdi sent a telegram urging him to “return because Shiism and Islam need 
you. You are the Shiite King” (Parsa 1989:193). The brief telegram suggests where the 
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ulama‟s allegiances rested as it does not seem to have been concerned with the well-
being of the Iranian people, but rather with the well-being of the ulama. 
 
The Ulama and the White Revolution  
 
 The coup that ended the oil nationalization movement and a decade of at least 
nominal democracy in Iran was followed by a decade of stricter autocratic rule in which 
the ulama‟s position in society remained on solid grounds. The shah was strengthened by 
his return to the throne and vowed to never again let his adversaries take advantage of 
him. The coup was therefore consolidated by means of significant repression and 
persecution, mainly carried out by the SAVAK, that initially targeted only political 
groups. In time, however, the shah sought to limit the influence of the ulama, but rather 
than utilizing the same physically repressive means that he had employed against his 
political opponents, the shah opted to battle the clergy through his policies. 
 The king‟s return to power had been a direct consequence of some British, but 
especially major American intervention, and the shah was well aware of this fact. Hence 
forward he would therefore pay close attention to American advice and, with the 
exception of those periods in time when he seems to have enjoyed extraordinary 
confidence, labored hard to maintain a positive image in the eyes of American officials in 
both Iran and Washington. The shah‟s repression of his political opponents, which while 
severe stopped short of being altogether debilitating for the opposition, was generally met 
with approval by his American allies (Bill 1988a). Opposition elements, such as a revised 
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version of the National Front remained active in the Majles, but by now true power rested 
with the shah and those appointees that served at his pleasure. Thus the most urgent threat 
of the late 1950s and early 1960s came not from the political opposition or a relatively 
pacified clergy, but rather from the type of militant communists that had recently 
celebrated triumphs in other parts of the world. Of course, no such threat yet existed in 
Iran, but the shah and his American supporters, Kennedy in particular, were committed to 
preempt any possibility of such a threat. 
 The concern with a communist takeover was the most significant American-
Iranian unifier, and the tool designed to combat it was in large part an American creation. 
An American report authored by John W. Bowling advised the shah to take concrete 
measures toward creating an agricultural middle class in order to prevent the birth of a 
communist peasant movement in the countryside. Bowling highlighted fourteen policy 
recommendations for the shah‟s consideration, including the reduction of soaring military 
expenditures, steps toward assuming a less public pro-Western stance, making symbolic 
gestures against the international consortium that was profiting from Iranian oil, 
scapegoating of public officials in order to appear tough on corruption, and relaxation of 
political repression. The shah paid little attention to most of these suggestions. Although 
he decreased political repression in the early 1960s under pressure from President 
Kennedy, the king preferred to focus on another one of Bowling‟s recommendations, 
namely the implementation of a land reform program (Milani 1988). 
 Bowling‟s report was consistent with the early 1960s policies of the Kennedy 
administration which “considered land reform an effective deterrent against communist 
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expansion or an agrarian revolution of the Chinese type and a prerequisite for the success 
of any industrialization program” (Milani 1988:83). In light of events in China, Cuba, and 
Vietnam, the United States had been advocating similar programs of land reform for its 
Latin American allies, and to collaborating regimes throughout the developing world. In 
order to combat the potential of Iranian communism, the U.S. reasoned, economic 
development should be prioritized over military buildup, an area in which the shah had 
already made significant progress due to exorbitant arms purchases from both the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. The Kennedy administration was so keen on the idea of Iranian 
land reform that it offered the shah a $35 million loan “contingent on the implementation 
of land reform” (Parsa 1989:49). 
 The idea of a land reform program had been on the Iranian agenda long before it 
was realized through the shah‟s White Revolution.
72
 In fact, the shah‟s minister of 
agriculture, Dr. Hassan Arsanjani, organized the Congress of Rural and Cooperative 
Societies in Tehran in late 1962 where large numbers of peasants and farm workers 
expressed their support for him and his plan for land reform. Alarmed by Arsanjani‟s 
popularity among the peasants, the shah solicited the minister‟s resignation in order to be 
able to take personal credit for the land reform program that was to be a central piece of 
the White Revolution. The shah hoped that by presenting himself as a champion of the 
poor peasants he would not only prevent the emergence of a communist party in the 
countryside, but also widen his own popular support (Milani 1988). Populist appeals 
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aside, the actual intention of the land reform program was to not only prevent rural 
communism, but also to increase the shah‟s own landholdings. Consequently, the 
objective of the program was to prepare the way for capitalist agribusinesses that would 
mainly benefit the monarchy and its supporters (Amjad 1989). 
 For the peasants the land redistribution program had extraordinarily limited 
benefits. As Amjad (1989) explains, the land redistribution program had three phases, 
and “while the first stage of the land reform provided lands for some peasants, during the 
second and throughout the third stage the small holders lost their lands and became 
landless again” (84). The dominant position in the countryside that had previously been 
held by powerful landlords was now to be replaced by the Pahlavi state. For many of the 
re-dispossessed peasants their sole option was to migrate to the cities where they and 
their children almost twenty years later helped dethrone the man who had forced them off 
their land (Foran 1993a).   
 While perhaps more disadvantaged by the shah‟s land reform than any other 
social group, the impoverished peasants were not the only ones who disapproved of the 
king‟s measures, as the ulama found much of its endowed land redistributed. Although 
this constituted a serious, and in the eyes of the clergy even outrageous assault, the shah‟s 
White Revolution proved unacceptable to the clergy for additional reasons. First, owing 
to one of the six central points of the White Revolution the state was committed to 
combating rural illiteracy. This struggle against ignorance was waged through the 
mobilization of a literacy corps that descended on the country side, a state strategy that 
comprised a direct attack on the ulama‟s monopoly on rural education. In addition, the 
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state‟s involvement with the countryside included Health Corps, Extension and 
Development Corps, and other government organizations, most important of which was 
the implementation of rural courts. Such courts often replaced those ulama-controlled 
ones that operated according to Islamic law. This judicial challenge amounted to another 
severe setback for the clergy and was perceived as an attempt to limit its authority in the 
rural areas (Foran 1993a). The leading clerics‟ indignation can be easily detected in a 
1963 letter from Ayatollah Milani to Ayatollah Khomeini: 
The people must be told that the ruling body no longer insists that a judge must be 
a Muslim as it makes any debauched person or communist a judge [emphasis 
added]. The people must be told of how the path has been opened in Iran for 
agents and spies of Israel. (Floor 1983:90) 
 
In other words, the ulama feared that the shah‟s White Revolution would lead to another 
episode of secularization and thus a golden opportunity for the communists and other 
enemies of Islam to reemerge. 
  
The Muharram Uprising of 1963 
 
These clerical fears of secularization did not stem mainly from the shah‟s land 
redistribution program or even his modernization project that included the education of 
the rural population. The most threatening element of the White Revolution in the minds 
of the clergy, and the one point that allowed virtually all of Iran‟s religious officials to 
unite, was the shah‟s decision to bestow suffrage upon the women of Iran. The vote was 
granted to women in February 1963, a month after a referendum on the shah‟s White 
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Revolution had passed decidedly, despite several political parties imploring the 
population to boycott the vote. On March 21, around the Iranian New Year, the ulama led 
demonstrations in cities around Iran, especially in the holy city of Qom which hosts the 
country‟s main seminary. The following day, in response to the demonstrations, army 
commandos dressed up as civilians assaulted students at the Faiziyyeh seminary in Qom 
(Foran 1993a; Bakhash 1990).  
The radical faction of the clergy, led by the uncompromising Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, continued to voice its opposition to the state and its White Revolution. The 
tensions reached their peak at the time of the annual celebration of Imam Hussein‟s 
seventh century martyrdom on the tenth of Muharram (this particular year this date fell 
on June 5). On that day, Ayatollahs Khomeini and Qumi were arrested in the early 
morning, charged with the intent of leading disturbances. The arrests of the two senior 
clerics guaranteed the occurrence of the protests the government had anticipated as 
demonstrations took place in the cities of Tehran, Qom, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, Kashan, 
and Mashhad. These protests emanated in the bazaar areas and proved difficult for the 
government to control, as is evidenced by the fact that the security forces were unable to 
prevent the demonstrations from continuing the following day (Foran 1993a; Bakhash 
1990). However, at that point the shah and his cabinet had seen enough. The army was 
called in and according to one scholar, “the collision between the Shah‟s forces and the 
opposition was the bloodiest since the overthrow of Mossadegh ten years earlier” 
(Bakhash 1990:30). The rioting continued for a few more days and did not end until June 
120 
 
8 when martial law was proclaimed in several of the cities that had witnessed some of the 
most severe disturbances. 
 According to government sources the bloody confrontations cost twenty people 
their lives, although the opposition estimated the number to be “between five and fifteen 
thousand” killed (Baktiari 1996:45). An interesting disagreement between different 
historians and other area specialists concerns the question of who ordered the army‟s 
massacre. Some have argued that the shah himself allowed the military to attack the 
demonstrators (Amjad 1989; Bakhash 1990), while others have suggested that it was the 
prime minister, Asadollah Alam, who had to give General Uvaisi the orders to brutally 
repress the protests as the shah wavered (Foran 1993a). The uncovering of who gave the 
armed forces the green light might seem irrelevant, but it becomes interesting 15 years 
later as the shah refuses to use decisive force against protesters demanding his removal 
from power. If the shah did indeed order the military to use deadly force in 1963 it would 
suggest that he possessed the mentality necessary to consider such measures against his 
own people, but for some other reason refrained from doing so in 1977-79. If, on the 
other hand, he did hesitate, that would suggest that he was perhaps the more gentle and 
benevolent king that some scholars and apologists have claimed. Regardless of which 
interpretation is correct, the fact of the matter is that the government did indeed use 
deadly and decisive force and that the United States remained firm in its support of the 
shah despite, or perhaps because of, his government‟s willingness to massacre its 
citizens. James Bill has captured this American attitude personified by soon-to-be 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, who 
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approved of the shah‟s highly touted reform program and White Revolution. He 
approved even more of the shah‟s brutal treatment of demonstrators throughout 
Iran in June 1963. To LBJ, the shah was a defender of American interests – a 
“good guy” manning the barricades for America in the Persian Gulf region. (Bill 
1988a:156) 
 
American sentiments toward the 1963 uprising differed starkly from those 
surrounding the 1977-79 revolution. As we shall see in Chapter 5, these contrasting 
behaviors cannot be reduced to the nature of Johnson‟s, Nixon‟s, and Carter‟s 
presidencies. By then, something had been qualitatively transformed in the structural 
relationship between Iran and the United States, with the former no longer being a silent 
supporter of the latter. Instead, by the time of the revolution Iran was to a significant 
degree its own master, a country with considerable economic strengths. Such a nation‟s 
undemocratic and repressive actions against its own people could no longer be blindly 
approved by the United States, the world‟s beacon of human progress, and would cause 
severe publicity problems for both nations that will be discussed in the next chapter.   
 The 1963 Muharram uprising had several significant consequences for the future 
of Iranian politics. First, government repression of the uprising, and the harshening 
political climate that followed in its aftermath, constituted the end of institutional 
opposition to the shah as secular parties, including the National Front umbrella, were 
destroyed. Second, and in part contributing to the downfall of the traditional opposition, 
Iranian guerrilla groups emerged as a consequence of the shah‟s new, more forceful 
approach to handling political dissenters. In the minds of the guerrilla leaders, the 
government‟s reaction to the Muharram protests suggested a new turn in Iranian history: 
the shah‟s increased willingness to brutally repress political opponents caused them to 
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conclude that institutionalized responses to despotism had been rendered futile. From 
now on, they reasoned, government violence would have to be met with opposition 
violence.
73
 Third, the Muharram uprising of 1963 served as a “dress rehearsal” for the 
Iranian Revolution. In fact, this function of the uprising might be one of its most 
significant outcomes, and has duly been noted by several commentators (Abrahamian 
1982: M. Fischer 2003: Milani 1988: Sick 1985: Stempel 1981). Just as it can be argued 
that the nonviolent, but ultimately failed, Czechoslovakian resistance to the Soviet 
invasion of 1968 was a dress rehearsal for the 1989 “Velvet Revolution,” these scholars 
have suggested that the Iranian opposition movement learned important lessons from its 
1963 bout with the state, most importantly the potentially decisive role of the military 
(Stempel 1981).
74
 Finally, the Muharram uprising helped establish Khomeini as the de 
facto leader of the opposition. His cause probably benefitted from his imprisonment on 
the eve of the uprising, his subsequent sentencing to house arrest, and finally from the 
shah‟s decision to exile the Ayatollah to first Najaf, Iraq, and later to Paris. Khomeini had 
been an outspoken opponent of the shah for quite some time before the 1963 protests, but 
it was this particular incident that irrevocably put him on Iran‟s political map. 
 To summarize, the rise of the revolutionary ulama can be seen as a historically 
contingent development. As long as the state was treating the clergy with the reverence it 
felt it deserved, religious leaders were content to support the state regardless of almost 
any other consideration. It was only when the shah, following the 1953 coup, and 
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 Amuzegar (1991) has noted that the 1963 Muharram uprising is unique in 20
th
 century Iranian 
contentious politics as it marks the only instance in which “the military actively engaged in successfully 
defending the crown against insurgents” (301).  
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especially after his fateful decision to enact the White Revolution in the early 1960s, 
alienated the ulama that the group decisively rose up against him. However, the 
alienation of the clerics, a direct result then of the shah‟s westernization/secularization 
policies, became detrimental only when the same policies estranged Iranian society‟s 




Bazaaris is the collective term used to describe the various participants of the 
traditional Middle Eastern market, the bazaar. As Milani (1988) explains, the internal 
structure of the bazaar consisted of three different groups. The smallest and most 
powerful group was made up of the merchants and money lenders. Because of their 
substantive wealth these individuals, as a group, wielded significant political influence. 
The second level of the bazaar was constituted of “small commodity producers and 
shopkeepers” (Milani 1988:116). Finally, the bottom strata consisted of all the remaining 
workers tied to the bazaars, such as salesmen, store assistants, and street vendors. 
Combined, these three groups totaled 481,026 individuals in 1966, and in 1976, at the eve 
of the revolution, their numbers had grown to 561, 583. Milani further reports that sixty-
seven percent of all bazaaris were self-employed, a fact that likely contributed to their 
independence from the state (Milani 1988:116). 
   Similarly to the ulama, the bazaaris‟ relationship with the state in the twentieth 
century was rarely uncomplicated. Scholars have shown that just like the clergy‟s 
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political outlook, that of the bazaaris simply reflected the core interests of the group. 
Thus, the merchants were rarely motivated by ideology or solidarity with other groups, 
but rather moved to action based on their economic interests (Parsa 1988). As noted 
above, the merchants played important roles in many of the social movements, 




 centuries. For example, they partnered 
with the clerics in the early 1890s to defeat the monarchy‟s plan to concede the rights to 
Iranian tobacco to a foreigner (Bakhash 1991; Keddie 1983), and while partaking in the 
Constitutional Revolution, the merchants threw their support behind the popular 
movement in order to reduce the influence and access of Russian and British traders. 
However, in perhaps the broadest movement preceding the revolution of the late 1970s, 
the bazaaris parted ways with most members of the clergy and sided with Mossadeq and 
his liberal-nationalist coalition. As in all previous instances of the politicization of the 
merchants, the motivation for backing Mossadeq was simply the prime minister‟s 
“nationalist economic policies designed to halt growing international penetration of 
Iranian markets” (Parsa 1988:59). Protectionist as his policies were, they found 
passionate support among the trading classes. 
 Despite at times breaking with the clergy on political issues, the shared 
conservative values that bound the bazaaris to the ulama were never in question. The 
relationship between the two groups was however based on a stronger foundation than 
just common values. The bazaaris depended on the clergy for religious and ideological 
guidance. The ulama, on the other hand, was economically dependent on the merchants 
as the latter paid religious taxes and shouldered the economic burden of maintaining and 
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managing Iran‟s religious shrines (Amjad 1989). The strength of the bond is nicely 
captured by Halliday (1979) who suggests that “the bazaar merchants who sustain the 
mollahs are reckoned to pay the latter more in zakat, religious tax, than they do in secular 
taxes to the state” (19). While this mutually beneficial arrangement provided both the 
bazaaris and the ulama with ample incentives for collaboration, each group‟s respective 
interests seem to historically have trumped their potential affinities for one another. 
Consequently, when one group benefitted from certain state policies that group would 
generally support the state, even if such support resulted in hardship for the other group.  
 Not surprisingly then, Parsa (1988) has noted that the potentially powerful 
alliance between the mosque and the bazaar has historically only been activated at those 
points in time when the two groups‟ interests have coincided, as they did in response to 
the tobacco concession of 1891. The most crucial of such instances, however, emerged in 
the aftermath of the White Revolution in the mid-1960s when the shah‟s regime 
embarked upon a program of westernization and industrialization. The westernization 
program was implicitly, if not explicitly, an attempt to drastically reduce the influence of 
the ulama, a group the shah condescendingly referred to as the “black reactionaries,” 
referencing their conservative values and black robes.
75
 By westernizing his kingdom, the 
shah hoped to bury the opinion of Iran as backwards and ascend the nation into the 
community of developed countries. Part of such a transformation would by necessity 
have to include the industrialization of Iran. Therefore, an important component of the 
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White Revolution was to modernize Iran‟s means of production. Since this was 
admittedly an expensive affair, the shah‟s government invited the active participation of 
foreign corporations, which were perceived, correctly, by the traditional merchants as a 
threat to their leadership role in Iranian manufacture (Foran 1993a). Stempel (1981) 
succinctly summarizes the situation by stating that “before the Shah‟s industrialization 
program gained headway, the bazaaris were the most influential businessmen in the 
country. Since the mid-1960s they had been eclipsed by the new entrepreneurs - bankers, 
manufacturers, and export-importers” (45), many of whom were either foreigners 
themselves or collaborated with non-Iranians.             
 The bazaaris‟ contentious relationship with the state suffered another blow in the 
mid-1970s when the shah decided to replace the country‟s two-party scheme with a one-
party system. The irony of the creation of a one-party system by a self-defined pro-
westerner such as the shah has not been lost on commentators. For example, Foran 
(1993a) explains that  
In 1961 the shah noted in his autobiography, “If I were a dictator rather than a 
constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant 
party such as Hitler organized or such as you find today in Communist countries.” 
The façade of democracy and constitutionalism came down completely with the 
formation of just such a single party system in 1975. The new Rastakhiz-i Milli 
(National Resurgence) Party was set up under Prime Minister Huvaida and all 
loyal Iranians were ordered to participate. (315) 
 
Amjad (1989) has suggested that the shah‟s main motivation for establishing the 
Rastakhiz party was to limit the power of the bazaaris and the ulama. By demanding that 
all loyal Iranians join the party, the shah hoped to funnel popular support his way. This 
expectation would eventually prove disastrously optimistic, as the new party with time 
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became more likely to alienate potential supporters than bring them into the ranks of the 
monarchic loyalists (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994; Stempel 1981). 
The most concrete attempt by the shah to limit the bazaaris‟ political power was 
the anti-profiteering campaign that was launched in 1975 and designed to be carried out 
by the Rastakhiz party.
76
 Due to mindless government spending the Iranian economy was 
at the time overheated and experiencing catastrophic levels of inflation. The shah, 
unwilling to either admit or believe that his policies were the sources of the economic 
crisis, found himself in urgent need of scapegoats. By blaming “profiteering” bazaaris for 
the poor economy the shah sought to kill two birds with one stone: not only would he not 
have to assume responsibility for the failing economy, but he would deal some of his 
most potent rivals a powerful blow. Accordingly, “some 20,000 [Rastakhiz] party 
members were mobilized to carry out this campaign. Between 1975 and 1977, more than 
250,000 shops were closed down, and 31,000 bazaaris were imprisoned or exiled.” 
(Amjad 1989:100). While Amjad‟s numbers might be exaggerated or perhaps even 
incorrect,
77
 the salient point remains: the shah‟s anti-profiteering campaign amounted to a 
declaration of war against the bazaaris, whose support of Khomeini and the radical 
faction of the ulama was in turn solidified. 
The radicalization of the bazaaris that followed as a consequence of the shah‟s 
anti-profiteering campaign firmly placed most merchants in the revolutionary camp. 
During the revolution they participated directly by resurrecting a traditional response to 
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dissatisfaction with state policy, namely by shutting down the bazaars. While many 
bazaaris whole-heartedly supported the revolutionary movement, some merchants had to 
be “convinced” to participate by Islamic radicals through the threat of property 
destruction should they refuse to close their shops. Although temporary market 
shutdowns might have put some pressure on the state as such actions amounted to an 
assault on the economy, the main role of the bazaar during the revolution was the same 
role it had played in social movements historically, that is, to finance it (Amjad 1989; 
Amuzegar 1991; Skocpol 1982; Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994). As 
Skocpol (1982) explains, 
The traditional urban communities of Iran were to play an indispensable role in 
mobilizing and sustaining the core of popular resistance. Modern industrial 
workers who struck depended on economic aid from the bazaar, and secular, 
professional middle class opponents to the Shah depended on alliances with the 
clerical and lay leaders of the bazaar, who could mobilize massive followings 
through established economic and social networks. (272)       
 
In other words, the most important role played by the bazaaris as a group in the 
revolution of 1977-79 was that of financiers. The job of mobilizing and motivating the 
masses they largely left in the hands of the Khomeini-faithful ulama. Like the clerics, the 
merchants only became revolutionary and assumed leadership positions in the 
revolutionary movement when pushed in that direction by the Westernizing state. By 
alienating the country‟s two autonomous groups through the intertwined processes of 
secularization and industrialization, the shah inadvertently helped created the foundations 




A Religious Revolution? 
 
 The converging discontents of the clergy and the merchants were a crucial 
component of the revolution. However, such convergence of interests would not have 
been enough to overthrow one of the militarily most powerful states in the world. 
Furthermore, while the emergence of an ulama-bazaar coalition in the absence of other 
viable opposition groups helps explain why this alliance was able to assume leadership of 
the revolution, it does not explain why the coalition opted for nonviolent methods of 
struggle. To solve the puzzle of repertoire selection we must take into consideration both 
culture and strategy, and, most importantly, come to the realization that the Iranian 
Revolution was nonviolent by design. The purpose of this section is therefore to examine 
how Khomeini and his followers created a nonviolent revolutionary movement to oppose 
the shah. 
 
A Tradition of Nonviolent Action  
 
 Iran‟s past is abundant with examples of nonviolent opposition to both the state 
and foreign exploiters. From the Tobacco Movement of the early 1890, to the 
Constitutional Revolution, Mossadeq‟s oil nationalization movement, and the 1963 
Muharram uprising, Iranians have repeatedly resorted to nonviolent tactics as ways to 
channel their discontent. Reflecting on the plethora of Iranian social movements in the 90 
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years leading up to the 1977-79 revolution, Foran (1994a) has expressed his amazement 
with  
the tactics employed, which have consistently been far more peaceful than their 
revolutionary counterparts outside Iran… Sit-ins in the form of basts go far back 
in Iranian history, and have religious roots in the institution of the sanctuary that 
could be found from governments or private parties in mosques, shrines, and 
sometimes the homes of religious leaders. (230-1) 
 
Although cultural explanations of the Iranian preference for nonviolent methods over 
violent ones are useful, they are arguable unable to fully explain the emergence of this 
preference. Culture and tradition might explain the ideological preference for nonviolent 
methods of resistance, but they do not bring much clarity into the question of movement 
dynamics. In other words, why and how were Iranians able to mobilize large masses as 
early as the late 19
th
 century? In order to answer those questions, it is useful to amend 
cultural perspectives with structural points of view. 
 One powerful such structural argument for why organized nonviolent methods of 
political struggle, rather than violent and chaotic riots, have dominated Iran‟s past has 
been made by Abrahamian (1985a). His theoretical proposition is worth quoting at 
length. 
Riots are the product of spontaneity; strikes, rallies and demonstrations that of 
organisational premeditation. In Europe, through the long duration between the 
decay of the traditional guilds and the rise of modern trade unionism, there were 
few organs that could represent popular interests and mobilise the working man 
into effective pressure-groups. Thus, public dissatisfaction was expressed often 
through outbursts of unplanned rioting, rarely through organised protests. In Iran, 
the transitional period between the decay of the guilds and the birth of unionism 
did not take centuries, but a mere 15 years. As a result, the crowd in Iran, even 





If Abrahamian is correct, the lack of nonviolent challenges in world history has as much 
to do with political challengers‟ ability to organize as anything else. In the case of Iran, 
the ulama‟s coalition with the bazaaris emerged as a unifying force with real leadership 
potential. As a consequence, Iranian collective action early on established itself as orderly 
manifestations rather than spontaneous riots.  
 Although approaching the historical trajectories that have steered Iranian activism 
in the direction of nonviolent struggle in a somewhat different manner, Amuzegar (1991) 
favors a similarly structural argument. Describing Iran‟s past as one characterized by 
frequent foreign occupations that “created an almost unbridgeable gap between the 
population and the governing class,” he argues that Iranians in response to this reality 
“not only withheld their support from the state, but considered noncooperation with 
public agencies morally right and socially justified” (Amuzegar 1991: 296). The term 
“noncooperation” is particularly important here as it suggests opposition to the state 
through means other than violence. Although Amuzegar leaves the reader to speculate as 
to why Iranians have historically preferred nonviolence over violence, his point validates 
Abrahamian‟s assertion that nonviolent action has traditionally been the Iranian repertoire 
of choice. Abrahamian and Amuzegar‟s structural theories can be used to fortify a more 
cultural explanation of Iranian nonviolent action. Structure and culture constantly finds 
itself in interaction with each other, and Iranian preference for nonviolence is a case in 
point. By combining structural elements, such as organizational capabilities, with 
religious-cultural leanings, we may be able to construct a credible theory of Iranian 
preference for nonviolence. 
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         At the center of a cultural explanation of Iranian nonviolence must be placed the 
story of Imam Hussein‟s martyrdom at Karbala in 680 AD, a religious myth that carries 
significant weight for Shi‟i Muslims. At Karbala, Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet 
Muhammad, willingly chose death over submission to the Sunni caliph, Yazid, and was 
joined in his martyrdom by 72 followers, consisting of friends and family. Hussein‟s 
decision to die for his faith and in opposition to the corrupt secular rule of the villain-
caliph set a powerful example for Shi‟ites to live by (Algar 1983; Heikal 1982). Utilizing 
the Karbala myth throughout the revolution, Khomeini would compare the shah to the 
caliph, and himself, albeit only implicitly, to Hussein (Amjad 1989).
78
  
The precise role of the Karbala myth and the notion of martyrdom in the Iranian 
Revolution have been subject to much scholarly attention.
79
 Some researchers have 
argued that Iran‟s Shi‟i Islamic heritage almost by necessity makes the nation more prone 
to revolutionary activities than its Sunni neighbors. For example, Algar (1983) has 
suggested that the religion‟s  
rejection of de facto authority and the belief in the virtue of martyrdom, has given 
Shi‟ism, particularly at certain points in its history, an attitude of militancy that 
has been sadly lacking in a large number of Sunni segments of the Muslim 
Ummah.” (12) 
 
Similarly, Zonis and Brumberg (1987) explain that the notion of dying for one‟s faith 
through martyrdom “is by no means absent in Sunni thought, but it is not central, in part 
because Sunni Islam does not derive inspiration from the example of a religious figure 
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who dies for his faith” (55). The assumption here is that Shi‟i Muslims, because of their 
religion‟s heavy emphasis on martyrdom, have historically been more likely to engage in 
revolutionary activity directed at the state than their Sunni counterparts. However, 
suggestions such as these tend to be made either by supporters of the revolution or 
enemies of it, arguing respectively that Shi‟i Muslims are either firmly on the side of 
justice and morality or inherently prone to violence.
80
  
Furthermore, the suggestion that Imam Hussein‟s martyrdom has historically been 
the source of revolutionary inspiration has been challenged by researchers. According to 
Hegland (1983), Hussein was traditionally not a source of activism, but rather a source of 
pity that moved devout Shi‟ites to self-flagellation and weeping. The image of Hussein as 
a revolutionary, she argues, was conveniently developed in the course of the Iranian 
Revolution. Supporting this argument, Kurzman (2004) found in his interviews with 
revolution participants that the presumed existence of a “Kerbala complex – which 
ensured that the revolution would triumph” (Heikal 1982:176), or a powerful “Karbala 
paradigm [that] helped unite disparate interest groups into a mass movement against an 
entrenched tyranny” (M. Fischer 2003) overstates the facts of the matter. He concludes 
from his interviews that “the language of martyrdom did not necessarily match behavior 
in the Iranian revolution” (Kurzman 2004:71).     
 The counterevidence presented here is not meant to suggest that the Karbala 
myth, Imam Hussein, and the general concept of martyrdom were inconsequential in the 
Iranian Revolution, because they were not. Instead it should be noted that since these 
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concepts had not been utilized in previous assaults on the Iranian state, they cannot be 
considered inherent parts of the Iranian opposition‟s repertoire. As Foran (1993a), Keddie 
(1983; 1994), Moaddel (1992; 1994), Skocpol (1982) and others have explained, these 
notions had to be woven into a revolutionary religious-ideological narrative in order to 
assume political significance. It was in this role of master weaver that Khomeini emerged 
as leader of the revolution. The type of cultural explanation proposed in the following 
pages does therefore not suggest that Shi‟i Islam by definition is a revolutionary 
ideology, but simply argues that tenets from Shi‟ism were appropriated by the religious 
opposition and transformed into a religious ideology.
81
 This newly fashioned ideology, I 
argue, deliberately helped reinforce the compatibility between Shi‟ism and nonviolent 
action.    
  
Khomeini, Shi’ism, and Nonviolent Strategy 
 
 A common approach to understanding Khomeini in the West has been to paint the 
ayatollah as an Islamic fundamentalist. However, Abrahamian (1993) has skillfully 
pointed out that “populism is a more apt term for describing Khomeini, his ideas, and his 
movement because the term is associated with ideological adaptability and intellectual 
flexibility” (2).
82
 He then proceeds to explain that contrary to the familiar image of 
Khomeini, the ayatollah “succeeded in gaining power mainly because his public 
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pronouncements carefully avoided esoteric doctrinal issues. Instead, they hammered 
away at the regime on its most visible political, social, and economic shortcomings” 
(Abrahamian 1993:16-7). The fact that Khomeini‟s clandestine vision for Iran, including 
political domination by the clergy, was radical rather than fundamentalist is evidenced by 
the fact that 
The idea of revolutionary overthrow of the state and the establishment of an 
Islamic government was Khomeini‟s invention – there was no ideological 
precedent to justify the ulama‟s direct rule in society. Indeed, many grand 
ayatollahs disagreed with Khomeini's political views. (Moaddel 1992:366) 
 
Succinctly put, there was nothing fundamentalist about Khomeini‟s grand plan for Iran. 
Part of the western confusion regarding Khomeini‟s alleged fundamentalism can 
possibly be traced precisely to his incessant use of the term “Islamic.” In response to 
these misconceptions, scholars have shown that “Shi‟ism” and “Islam” in the context of 
the Iranian Revolution came to hold extra-religious meanings. In Khomeini‟s rhetoric, 
Shi‟ism became near-synonymous with both democracy and nationalism,
83
 and through 
this coalescence of terms Khomeini “managed to be all things to all people” (Bakhash 
1990:19).
84
 For example, he once explained that “an Islamic government cannot be 
totalitarian or despotic, but is constitutional and democratic,” only to add that “in this 
democracy, however, the laws are not made by the will of the people, but only by the 
Koran and the Sunna [Traditions] of the Prophet” (Khomeini 1980:15). No wonder many 
Iranians failed to grasp the ayatollah‟s true intentions.  
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Perhaps Khomeini‟s populist use of religion is best summarized by Amuzegar 
(1991) as he states that “the ayatollah‟s „religious‟ appeal was attractive and effective 
because everything that [Iranians] rightly or wrongly resented about the Pahlavi‟s rule 
was portrayed to them as un-Islamic” (294).
85
 In this sense, the revolutionary use of 
religion had in fact little to do with religious sentiments. In fact, the eventual first 
president of the Islamic Republic, Mehdi Bazargan, later “argued that the term „Islamic‟ 
was used in order to emphasize the social and moral values, and the concept of justice, 
for which they fought” (M. Bayat 1987:79). Hence, for many Iranians revolutionary 
religiosity had little to do with religion. Rather,  
Iranians could join together even beyond the ranks of the religiously devout, 
because Shi‟a Islam and Khomeini‟s visibly uncompromising moral leadership 
provided a nationally indigenous way to express common opposition to an aloof 
monarch too closely identified with foreigners. Even secular Iranian could 
participate under these rubrics. (Skocpol 1982:274) 
 
 So how exactly did Khomeini manage to convince his secular followers to 
“nevertheless [turn] to the traditional value system represented by Shi‟ism as a means of 
expressing their profound rejection of the shah‟s repression and mindless pursuit of 
things Western” (Dorman & Farhang 1987:174)? Mansoor Moaddel, who has alluded to 
the central role of ideology by suggesting that “the distinctive feature of the Iranian 
revolution was the all-encompassing role played by the imageries and symbolism of Shi‟i 
Islam in initiating and sustaining the revolutionary movement” (Moaddel 1992:353), has 
developed the concept of “ideology as episodic discourse” (Moaddel 1992; 1994).
86
 The 
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term episodic discourse refers to the process in which Khomeini and other revolutionary 
leaders constructed a novel, temporary, and non-fundamentalist Shi‟i ideology based on 
the “imageries and symbols” traditionally present in Shi‟i Islam. This strategy of 
modifying Shi‟i Islam had been used before, as Bazargan‟s secular Liberation Movement 
in the early 1960s had “aimed at formulating a lay-dominated religion that would be 
acceptable both to the Anti-Shah clergy, especially to the junior clergy, and to the 
modern-educated middle class, particularly the discontented intelligentsia” (Abrahamian 
1985b:161). Similarly unsuccessfully, the Islamic guerrillas had attempted to merge 
Marxism and Islam into a religious revolutionary ideology (Abrahamian 1989; Amuzegar 
1991). However, it was not until Khomeini successfully mastered the craft in the late 
1970s that Shi‟i Islam became revolutionary. 
  In the West it is often presumed that Khomeini was the lone ideological leader of 
the Iranian Revolution, but such assumptions are inaccurate. In fact, it has been argued 
that Khomeini was not even the most important ideologue of the revolution, with that 
epithet instead befalling Ali Shari‟ati,
87
 a tremendously popular Paris-educated 
sociologist who managed to rather successfully merge Islamic doctrine with radical 
revolutionary ideologies (Foran 1994b). Keddie (2003) has emphatically emphasized 
Shari‟ati‟s importance for the Iranian Revolution: 
It was he, more than all the poets and writers who made such brave attempts to 
employ the simple language of the masses in order to change their consciousness, 
who most touched their sensitive nerve. Once dependence on the West was 
associated with Western culture, and Western culture with moral decay, it was 
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natural to seek Iran‟s salvation not in the Westernization pushed by the shah‟s 
regime but in a return to an idealized indigenous Islam. (188) 
 
Although not a close collaborator of Khomeini‟s, it seems clear that Shari‟ati‟s (1979; 
1980; 1981) message helped justify Khomeini‟s Islamic ideology, and the ayatollah was 
indeed careful to often and publicly praise the sociologist.  
 Perhaps Shari‟ati‟s most important ideological contribution was to emphasize the 
historic role of martyrdom in Shi‟i Islam. “He distinguished revolutionary Shi‟ism (the 
religion of Imam „Ali in the seventh century) from official state Shi‟ism (what he called 
„Safavid Shi‟ism‟), thereby clearly differentiating the few oppositional clerics from the 
many quietest ulama who accepted the monarchy” (Foran 1993a:370), thus implicitly 
endorsing Khomeini. Furthermore, Shari‟ati argued that “Islam‟s most basic tradition is 
martyrdom, and human activity, mixed with a struggle against oppression and 
establishment of justice and protection of human rights” (Foran 1994b:174). The fact that 
the concept of human rights clearly is much too recent to be part of “Islam‟s most basic 
tradition,” only adds to the perception of Shari‟ati as a powerful and innovative 
communicator. As we shall see in the next chapter, Shari‟ati‟s reference to human rights 
as central to Islam may not have been coincidental. 
 Although most Iranians were probably not sufficiently opposed to the shah‟s 
regime to assume the role of revolutionary martyrs (Kurzman 2004), a significant portion 
of the population was prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice. This segment of the 
population was composed of devout men, who “could find inspiration in the Husayn 
myth for martyrdom in the face of repression” (Skocpol 1982:275). Consequently, during 
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the revolution “young men willing to die formed lines at the front of the demonstrations 
between the soldiers and the people” (M. Fischer 2003:214). These men came mainly 
from the ranks of the “urban marginal classes… suffering many of the 10,000 casualties 
of the revolution” (Foran 1993a:388).    
 These willing martyrs were of course helpful to Khomeini‟s cause, and his 
rhetoric was  consistently framed so as to appeal to their sentiments: 
Isn‟t it true that martyrdom is inherited by our martyr-nourishing nation from our 
Imams who regarded life as the manifestation of “belief and Jihad”, [sic] who 
safeguarded the degnified [sic] school of Islam with their blood and the blood of 
their youngsters? Are dignity, honor and humanistic values not invaluable virtues 
for safekeeping of which our virtuous forefathers and their comrades devoted 
entire lives? (Khomeini 1982:123)   
 
But Khomeini‟s revolutionary ideology was not simply directed at those willing to die for 
the revolution. He knew that martyrs were available, but he needed the masses to capture 
the streets. For the revolution to succeed, he argued, “the people with all their forces must 
be taken as a firm base on which to rely and depend” (Khomeini 1979:94). Therefore, in 
addition to his populist message of social, political, and economic improvement, 
Khomeini needed to move the population to action. He did so by artfully combining his 
populist appeals with shrewd nonviolent strategizing. 
 It is not for naught that Khomeini has often been referred to as Iran‟s Gandhi.
88
 
Rather, and probably contrary to popular Western belief, Khomeini acquired this 
reputation due to his many nonviolent statements. For example, Khomeini once noted 
that “it is my wish that the national movement should not assume the form of an armed 
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struggle” (Ansari 2003:208-9), a comment that resonates well with his reprimanding of 
the guerrillas in the early 1970s as mentioned in Chapter 3. He encouraged his followers 
to “talk to the soldiers, have a dialogue with them. Bare your breasts, but do not fire. Do 
not throw so much as a brick against the soldiers” (Heikal 1982:155). Furthermore, the 
protesters should “not attack the army in its breast, but in its heart” (Heikal 1982:145). 
Statements such as these, of which there are many recorded, differ sharply with the 
Western view of Khomeini as the face of the 1979 hostage crisis at the American 
embassy in Tehran. However, at the time leading up to the revolution even the U.S. 
Ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, sent a cable back to the State Department warning 
that “Khomeini could become Iran‟s Gandhi” (Cottam 1988:164). 
 For readers familiar with Gandhi‟s writings, Khomeini quite obviously displays 
several similarities with the Indian independence leader. First, the ayatollah was able to 
strike a special chord with the “urban and rural marginal populations whom he extolled as 
the mustazafin (the dispossessed masses)” (Foran 1993a:369). Gandhi had in an almost 
identical fashion embraced the cause of India‟s lowest social strata, the Untouchables, 
whom he referred to as the harijans (children of God). Second, Khomeini urged his 
followers to “appeal to the wujdan of the army” (Heikal 1982:146). Wujdan is a term 
often used in Sufism and refers to “the inner consciousness, the conscious that is deep in 
a man‟s heart (Heikal 1982:146). Gandhi, on the other hand, often talked about the “still 
small voice within,” which he argued was the voice of God that we could all hear if we 
just listened carefully enough. Finally, Shivers (1980) has compared the role of 
martyrdom in Khomeini‟s rhetoric to Gandhi‟s concept of self-sacrifice. All of these 
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similarities could obviously be coincidental, and Khomeini exhibits much dissimilarity 
from Gandhi, such as his refusal to compromise with his opponents. What is particularly 
interesting, however, is the fact that Khomeini possessed “detailed knowledge of modern 
India” (Abrahamian 1982:525). It seems near impossible that anyone could possess such 
knowledge without being intimately familiar with the unquestionably most important 
Indian of the century and the nonviolent movement he commandeered. This conclusion is 
not simply deductive, but a close look at the strategic decisions made by Khomeini and 
his followers suggest that the Iranian Revolution was indeed nonviolent by design. 
  Stempel (1981) has asserted that “at no time did opposition leaders fear the 
Shah‟s political efforts, but until the revolutionary takeover in February they were 
apprehensive about the potential of the military to destroy them” (136). In other words, 
Khomeini and his lieutenants had a clear understanding of who the central adversary was. 
To use a terms often employed by nonviolent action scholars, Khomeini had successfully 
identified one of the crucial “pillars of support” upon which the shah‟s power rested.
89
 It 
therefore followed naturally that the army became the main target of Khomeini‟s actions.  
 Remembering the failure of 1963 and having recently witnessed the demise of the 
guerrillas, Khomeini determined that the military could only be defeated through a 
nonviolent struggle. Drawing partly from Shari‟ati‟s popular rhetoric, “Khomeini‟s 
tactics for dealing with the army was martyrdom for his followers in whatever numbers 
were required to break its links with the shah” (Sick 1985:85). In one of his taped 
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messages to the nation, illegally smuggled into Iran by his collaborators, Khomeini 
revealed his tactic to the Iranian people: 
It is sometimes said that the hero is the essence of history. But those who say it 
are wrong. It is the martyr who is the essence of history, the motivating spirit of 
history. So bare your breasts to the army, for the Shah is going to make use of the 
army and the army is going to obey him. We know that the soldiers are confused, 
not knowing how to act, but they will be obliged to obey their orders. How can 
they refuse to obey orders when they are bound by army discipline? But one day 
they will liberate themselves from the discipline of the devil and come to the 
discipline of God. If the order is given to them to fire on you, bare your breasts. 
Your blood, and the love which you show them as you are dying, will convince 
them. The blood of each martyr is a bell which will awaken a thousand of the 
living. (Heikal 1982:146) 
 
The seemingly loving and nonviolent nature of the message is contrasted with 
what appears to be a disturbing lack of concern for the people who would actually “bare 
their breasts” for the cause. In this aspect Khomeini is quite unlike Gandhi who saw 
extreme voluntary suffering, such as dying, as something that should be avoided if at all 
possible. Khomeini‟s lack of apprehension could be rooted in Shi‟i culture and religion 
where, as Shari‟ati informs us, “martyrdom is not an unpleasant and bloody accident,” 
but rather “death by choice, chosen by the strugglers with complete consciousness, logic, 
and awareness” (Milani 1988:129). This would of course be a generous interpretation of 
Khomeini‟s apparent indifference. However, a more realistic reading of Khomeini‟s 
approach is based on an understanding of his strategic shrewdness. As far back as March 
1963, as the unrest of that year was still in its infant stage, Khomeini had reacted to the 
massacre at the Faiziyyeh seminary where one student was killed and many others 
injured by explaining to his colleagues that the attack was “„no cause for anxiety, and 
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even beneficial‟ because it sharply galvanized feeling against the authorities” (Bakhash, 
1990: 28). 
 Further evidence of Khomeini‟s shrewd calculations are evidenced by his 
instructions for how to conduct demonstrations:  
Whenever there was a chance of confrontation with the security forces, the crowd 
would organize itself into a peaceful procession, at the head of which were school 
children followed by women and old people. The idea, suggested by Khomeini 
himself, was that security forces should be faced with a choice between firing on 
children and women or doing nothing. “The death of a child is especially 
important,” the Ayatollah said in one of his taped instructions. “When a child dies 
the true nature of this Zionist regime becomes clear.” (Taheri 1985:215) 
 
While this approach to protesting against a government might seem horrendous, it is but 
an extreme example of what nonviolent action scholars refer to as “political jiu-jitsu” 
(Sharp 1973:657). By giving the army the choice of killing women and children “or 
doing nothing,” Khomeini exhibits a very thorough understanding of the dynamics of 
nonviolent action. If the soldiers opted to kill women and children they would attract 
tremendous outrage from the population and possibly radicalize individuals who had not 
yet decided which side to support. As in jiu-jitsu, the physical might of the opponent is 
thus used to serve the protagonist‟s objectives. 
 Additional proof that Khomeini seemingly instinctively understood how to utilize 
nonviolent resistance against the regime can be found in his book Velayat-e Faqih, a 
work otherwise most famous for being the place where Khomeini outlines his idea of 
“government of the Islamic jurists,” that is, the rule of the ayatollahs. However, 
This book also lays down the steps for which the Pahlavis are to be overthrown. It 
is thus a manual for revolution – but not violent revolution. Khomeini urged 
religious students and clerics, teachers, university professors, and all Iranians to 
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work for the realization of the Islamic state by speaking out, teaching, and 
actively organizing. „When they oppress you,‟ he stated, „cry out, protest, deny, 




Specifically, Khomeini (1979:114) outlined four ways of “destroying unjust 
governments:” 
1. Boycotting agencies of the unjust government. 
2. Abandoning cooperation with them. 
3. Steering clear from any action that is of benefit to them. 
4. Setting up new judiciary, financial, economic, cultural and political agencies. 
 
While Khomeini‟s understanding of nonviolent social change thus appears to have been 
quite sophisticated, he sometimes flirted with the idea of using violence. Nonetheless, 
throughout the revolution “Khomeini and his followers refrained from mobilizing 
paramilitary institutions” such as the guerrilla leftovers (Kurzman 2004:155-6).  
 The ayatollah was the undisputed leader of the revolution, but his cause was 
helped by other high-ranking clerics, who, like Khomeini, comprehended the advantage 
of rejecting violence. As the revolutionary movement gathered momentum in the spring, 
summer, and fall of 1978, prominent members of the ulama, such as Ayatollahs 
Shariatmadari, Madani, and Montazeri, as well as Hojjat al-Islam Rafsanjani, some of 
whom had in the past been open to the use of revolutionary violence, all followed suit 
and publicly endorsed nonviolent methods of struggle (M. Fischer 2003:196; Kurzman 
2004:156). 
 In sum, the predominantly nonviolent nature of the Iranian revolutionary 
movement can be traced back to the interaction between cultural and strategic factors. 
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First, Shi‟i culture provided the backdrop against which a nonviolent challenge became a 
credible option. The tactics proposed by Khomeini and others made sense to Iranians, 
that is, Shi‟i culture and the Iranian tradition of resistance were ideologically compatible 
with nonviolent action. Second, Khomeini and other revolutionary leaders managed to 
successfully weave together various cultural elements into a viable strategy to oppose the 
government. Although these two elements – culture and strategy – are conceptually 
independent of one another, the two had to be invoked at the same time for a nonviolent 
revolution to become a possibility.  
Culture and strategy go a long way to explain why nonviolent action achieved 
movement hegemony, but they do not explain why such a movement succeeded. The 
question of success can only be explained when consideration is given to structural 
factors as well, which will be the task of the next chapter. Already at this point, however, 
we can begin to identify one important structural element of the revolution, namely the 
organizational potential inherent in Iran‟s vast web of mosques.     
 
The Mosque Network    
 
 Khomeini, Shari‟ati and others‟ politicization of Shi‟i Islamic ideology served as 
a powerful motivator for large segments of the Iranian population, including those who 
were not willing to themselves become martyrs. While religion played an important role 





 it also played a more concrete, organizational role. Specifically, the 
infrastructural organization of Shi‟ism provided Khomeini with an extensive network of 
mosques through which revolutionary leaders could communicate with each other and 
organize anti-government actions (Amuzegar 1991; Foran 1993a; Kurzman 2004; 
Stempel 1981; Parsa 1989). 
 Scholars have estimated that at the time of the revolution the ulama consisted of 
at least 90,000 clerics, although numbers number fluctuate depending on whether one 
includes “low ranking preachers, teachers, prayer leaders and religious procession 
leaders” (Foran 1993a:336).
92
 Regardless of how the ulama is defined, it seems clear that 
“despite government attempts at repression it was impossible to effectively surveil and 
control 90,000 ulama (as opposed to only a few hundred left-wing guerrillas)” (Foran, 
1993: 337). In addition to the tens of thousands of clerics, Iran housed thousands of 
mosques. Milani (1988) reports that in 1975, there were 8,439 mosques in the country, 
with 983 mosques in Tehran alone. To that number can be added tens of thousands of 
other religious meeting places such as hey‟ats (religious associations for debates or 
reading of the Koran), of which there were 12,300 in Tehran in 1974 (193). Based on 
these impressive numbers, and perhaps after totaling all religiously related meeting places 
in Iran, Amjad (1989) concludes that “in the absence of a nationwide political 
organization, the network of 80,000 mosques run by 180,000 mollahs played a crucial 
role in mobilizing the masses against the regime” (Amjad, 1989: 117). 
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 The mosques themselves were used in two principal ways. First, they served as 
“an unparalleled communications network” through which religious leaders were able to 
pass along messages to one another and coordinate actions (Amuzegar 1991:25). Even 
before being forced into exile in the mid-1960s Khomeini had begun to create a small 
network of trusted clerics (Seliktar 2000), but it was not until the movement started to 
gain momentum that a greater number of them joined in. Suggesting that this was one of 
the unique dimensions of the Iranian Revolution, one scholar has explained how the 
mosque network became the central vehicle of revolutionary communication: 
Tapes of Khomeini‟s sermons and speeches passed through the mosque network 
from his residence in Iraq to Qom… From there, they were taken to other cities, 
where enterprising and friendly bazaar merchants duplicated tapes and sold them 
to the faithful. Beginning in 1976 the mosque network eliminated the middleman 
and delivered the cassettes and pamphlets which spread revolutionary doctrine 
directly to the sympathetic mullahs. They in turn passed it to the people in the 
mosques. (Stempel 1981:45). 
 
 The second function filled by the mosques was to serve as the physical centers of 
the protest movement. “Mosques were ideal places to gather because they were relatively 
safe from violent attacks” (Parsa 1989:190), and at those rare occasions when security 
forces followed demonstrators into mosques, such occurrences would generally serve to 
radicalize moderate clerics and the general population (Seliktar 2000).
93
 This 
radicalization of political moderates, especially within the clergy, was a necessity for 
Khomeini and his already radicalized followers. The latter group was originally 
comparatively small, but as an increasing number of ulama were alienated by the 
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regime‟s response to the opposition‟s activities the mosque network grew exponentially 
(Parsa 1989). Kurzman (2004) has summarized this reality succinctly, arguing that 
“before the revolutionary movement, the mosque network was not a particularly valuable 
resource. It was a potentially valuable resource that had to be commandeered before it 
could be mobilized [emphasis in original]” (49). Once commandeered and mobilized, 
“the traditional system of mobilizing the faithful from the mosques, takiyes [places for 
commemorating the death of Imam Hussein], hey‟ats and the bazaar proved efficacious 
and extremely difficult to contain by the authorities” (Milani 1988:193). At the height of 
the revolution, “virtually the entire mosque network was mobilized… organizing 
demonstrations, coordinating general strikes, distributing scarce food, ensuring 
neighborhood security, and handing out arms in the two final days of the upheaval” 
(Kurzman 2004:49). According to Moaddel (1986), this period might very well mark “the 
first time in their history” that the ulama “unanimously turned against the state” (542). In 
short, not only had religion provided the revolutionaries with a way to motivate the 
masses to nonviolently oppose the government, but it also offered them a means of 
mobilizing the population in the shape of physical revolutionary centers. 
   
Summary 
  
 This chapter sought to answer two questions: First, how did the ulama under 
Khomeini‟s leadership and supported by the bazaaris gain control of the revolutionary 
movement, and, second, why did Khomeini and his collaborators opt for a nonviolent 
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struggle? In part the first question received its answer in the previous chapter as I argued 
that the shah‟s relentless repression of alternative sources of opposition, including the 
destruction of his and the ulama‟s common enemies, left the playing field wide open for 
the clergy and the merchants. This explanation was amended in the current chapter as I 
contended that the tremendous size and relative autonomy of both the ulama and the 
bazaaris left these groups with some leverage over the monarchy and made it difficult for 
the shah to apply the same repressive mechanisms that had destroyed the secular 
opposition and the guerrillas without validating charges against him of being anti-
religious. Also, the ulama-bazaar alliance did not reemerge until both groups 
simultaneously, and as a direct result of the U.S.-favored White Revolution, found 
themselves under attack from the monarchy, a situation that I have referred to as one of 
converging discontents. In the case of the clergy, it was the shah‟s attempts to Westernize 
Iran and thus marginalize the clerics that attracted their wrath. For the traditional 
merchants, it was the regime‟s policy of privileging foreign investors coupled with the 
anti-profiteering campaign that irrevocably turned them against this state. To this 
explanation must be added more contingent factors, such as Khomeini‟s leadership 
qualities, his uncompromising stance against the state, and the regime‟s oftentimes 
dreadful decision making. All of these factors combined to place the leadership of the 
revolution firmly in the hands of the ayatollah. 
 The second question, asking why nonviolent action became the predominant 
method of the revolution was answered in part by alluding to Iran‟s cultural heritage, and 
in part by examining the strategic shrewdness of Khomeini himself. As I have shown 
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above, Khomeini‟s approach to disarming the military was to “appeal to the soldiers‟ 
hearts,” that is, oppose them with nonviolent means and offer them martyrs (Sick 
1985:85). Khomeini was able to motivate his countrymen by appealing to a populist 
version of Shi‟i Islam which not only cast the shah as an enemy of Iran, but also made 
nonviolent action the appropriate response in dealing with the king.  
Here it might be helpful to think of Shi‟i Islam as compatible with nonviolent 
action “as certain specific features of Shi‟ite Islam are highly suitable for the 
mobilization of the masses” (Arjomand, 1988:99-100). Khomeini skillfully highlighted 
those features, as Amjad (1989), citing Keddie, explains: 
Moreover, Shiism, with its emphasis on martyrdom and resistance against 
oppression and tyranny (zolm), provided the ideological basis for the revolution. It 
was very easy for people to understand and follow the antiregime slogans in 
familiar Islamic terms, hence the effectiveness of the Islamic ideology for the 
mobilization of the masses against the regime. (121) 
 
Shi‟ism‟s compatibility with the principles and dynamics of nonviolent action, such as 
the need to maintain nonviolent discipline, helped Khomeini‟s movement remain resilient 
in the face of, albeit relatively limited, repression. As Skocpol (1982) elegantly explains,   
It did matter that the Iranian crowds were willing to face the army again and again 
– accepting casualties much more consistently than European crowds have 
historically done – until sections of the military rank-and-file began to hesitate or 
balk at shooting into the crowds [emphasis in original]. Over time, the crowds 
would therefore grow while the army became less and less active and reliable as 
an instrument of repression. (274-5) 
 
 Finally, this chapter highlighted the organizational role played by religion in the 
shape of the mosque network. The revolutionaries benefitted greatly from the presence of 
an existing infrastructure that could be used to mobilize the masses. “In sum, Shi‟a Islam 
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was both organizationally and culturally crucial to the making of the Iranian revolution 
against the Shah” (Skocpol 1982:275). 
 One crucial point that must be made before moving on is that the religious nature 
of the revolution was never predetermined as other groups also experimented with 
nonviolent resistance. The fact of the matter is that until the publication in January, 1978, 
of an article slandering Khomeini, most of the clergy was not ready to support his 
uncompromising position against the shah. Furthermore, the revolutionary movement had 
up to this point been led by intellectuals and employed such nonviolent tactics as letter-
writing campaigns and poetry readings (Bakhash 1990). One particular reading in the fall 
of 1977, featuring popular poet Saeed Soltanpour, attracted a large crowd that 
spontaneously staged an overnight sit-in, leading to government repression. After this 
event the organizing group, The Writers‟ Association, was blocked from staging any 
future events and thus became unable to successfully position itself in the revolution 
(Parsa 1989). In a sense then, the momentum of Khomeini‟s movement had been initiated 
by secular oppositionists. The religious opposition simply benefitted from that 
momentum, and, in connection to the slandering article, hijacked the entire movement. In 
short, the Islamic Revolution was only Islamic in its last year, that is, “the pre-
revolutionary opposition neither was led by the „ulama, nor was it inspired by a revival of 
traditional values of Shi‟i Islam” (Matin-asgari 2002:4). Instead, the revolution was 
initially inspired by Western liberal values, such as human rights and the superiority of 
democratic and constitutional government. It will be the task of Chapter 5 to show how 
Western liberalism was able to accomplish what various Iranian ideologies had been 
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unable to do for decades, namely spark a successful revolutionary challenge against a 
highly militarized state – a spark that would eventually be turned into a nonviolent 





5. AN INTERNATIONALIZED REVOLUTION: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE IRON 
CAGE OF LIBERALISM 
 
This chapter is to identify the structural factors that allowed nonviolent action to 
become a viable weapon against the Iranian regime and to explore how the 
revolutionaries exploited those conditions. As we have seen in previous chapters, Iran‟s 
relationship with the United States partially explains why certain groups, particularly the 
secular opposition and the guerrillas, failed to assume leadership of the revolutionary 
movement, why the expatriate student movement could lobby against the regime abroad, 
and how the state‟s elimination of rival revolutionaries cleared the way for the ulama-
bazaar coalition. In Chapter 4 I argued that this coalition strategically selected nonviolent 
methods as its principal avenue to social change by utilizing the cultural and 
organizational capacities inherent in Shi‟i Islam. However, a group‟s opting for 
nonviolent methods does not alone equate nonviolent success. Therefore, the central 
question to be answered in this chapter can be formulated as follows: What structural 
factors made Iran conducive to a successful nonviolent revolution in the late 1970s? 
 The central structural factor to be examined is the development of the relationship 
between the United States and Iran over the course of four decades. Ever since Skocpol 
(1979) “brought the state back in,” scholars of revolution have noted the importance of 





 However, most theorists have remained faithful to Skocpol‟s notion 
that it is competition, rivalry, and war between nations that may have revolutionary 
consequences by contributing to state breakdown. In contrast, I argue that it is not hostile 
international contexts that lead to revolutions in the late 20
th
 century and beyond, but 
rather specific types of amicable international relations. We may ask ourselves why 
nonviolent revolutions have occurred mainly in authoritarian semi-periphery nations such 
as Iran, the Philippines, Chile, the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe, South 
Africa,
95
 Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, all of which lived in relative peace with their 
neighbors at the time of their respective revolutions. The answer, I contend, can be found 
in these nations‟ relationships with powerful core nations that embrace some form of 
democratic rhetoric. Specifically, it is the implicit obligations surrounding a public 
commitment to human rights and other liberal principles inherent in such relationships 
that constitute what I refer to as the Iron Cage of Liberalism (ICL).  
Borrowing from Max Weber‟s (1978; 1992; 1999) notion of an iron cage of 
bureaucracy, the ICL posits that friendly relations between a democracy and a 
dictatorship can constitute a rhetorical trap for both regimes if the ideological 
inconsistencies of such relationships can be exploited by revolutionary groups and/or 
their sympathizers. For an authoritarian leader, the support and friendship of a powerful 
democratic ally becomes a liability when he is expected to behave in a manner befitting a 
friend of the Western world. For the democratic ally in turn, cognitive dissonance occurs 
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historically been included among the cases of nonviolent resistance. 
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when an authoritarian regime‟s hypocritical public commitment to democratic ideals is 
exposed and problematized by opposition groups. This was exactly what happened in 
Iran when foreign-based students and exiles deliberately and strategically emphasized 
the obvious dissonance between American rhetoric surrounding liberal values in general, 
and human rights in particular, and its support of the shah. 
Having established conceptually what an ICL is, it becomes the task of this 
chapter to explain how and why one emerged in Iran in the late 1970s. To do so it is 
imperative to analyze the development of a “special relationship” between Iran and the 
United States over the course of a near half-century. The first part of the chapter explores 
how the relationship between Iran and the United States with time was transformed from 
a dependent to a more interdependent one. This is critical, because as long as Iran found 
itself unequivocally inferior to the United States it was not obligated to adhere to 
democratic principles. Correspondingly, the U.S.‟s reputation as a defender of democracy 
and human rights was not seriously threatened by the shah‟s record as long as its 
relationship with Iran was of minor interest to the general public. Only when the shah‟s 
regime became internationally recognized as an important ally and friend of the United 
States did its lack of democratic commitments become a problem for both parties. The 
second part of the chapter therefore examines the political factors that caused the U.S.-
Iranian special relationship to result in the emergence of an ICL in the late 1970s. 
Specifically, I explain how the opposition contributed to, and exploited the creation of an 
ICL. This feat was accomplished through deliberate actions taken by the revolutionaries, 
who emphasized America‟s commitment to liberalism and, later, President Carter‟s 
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human rights rhetoric in order to internationalize the movement. In the concluding 
section I discuss how structural conditions and activist strategy must interact for an ICL 
to be created. 
 
Iran and the United States: The Anatomy of a Special Relationship 
 
A History of Foreign Domination 
 
 “External pressure,” one scholar has noted, “has always been an historic fact of 
life in Iran” (Stempel 1981:1), and although “Iran was never directly colonized by any 
single colonial power… its history is a history of colonial interventions and external 
powers vying for influence” (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi 1994:11). While the 
U.S. became the hegemonic power in Iran by the mid-1900s, Western intrusions can be 
dated back much further than that (Elton 2001; Ghods 1989). This section sets the stage 
for a discussion of the U.S. role in Iranian politics in the 20
th
 century by briefly outlining 
Iran‟s history as a target of imperialist attacks.  
The early 19
th
 century arrival of first imperial Russia, and later the equally 
imperial British, marks the advent of Western interference and exploitation. By the 
middle of the century, foreign intrusion was having a significant impact on Iranian 
politics (Abrahamian 1982:50-1). For Britain, Iran was an important component in the 
safeguarding of its Indian and Persian Gulf interests. Russia, on the other hand, used its 
control of northern Iran as a buffer from which it could protect its southern border. Also, 
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Russia‟s interest in gaining increased control of Iran at the expense of the British was 
fueled by the promise of ready access to warm water ports courtesy of the Persian Gulf. 
Although officially hostile to one another, the British and the Russians were able to co-
exploit Iran for decades, oftentimes finding themselves united in their shared desire to 
keep the Iranian monarchy sufficiently weak (Keddie 2003: Stempel 1981).  
In an effort to combat Anglo-Russian dominance “Iran‟s rulers tried to protect the 
country by balancing between the influences of the two great powers, but they were never 
very successful” (Stempel 1981:1). Instead, the Russians and the British would when 
necessary look past their differences, as they did during the Constitutional Revolution 
when their dominance was threatened by nationalist Iranian constitutionalists who sought 
to limit foreign influence over the country. In response to this potentially damaging 
outlook, “the Anglo-Russian Entente settling the two governments‟ differences in Tibet, 
Afghanistan, and Iran was signed” in 1907 (Keddie 2003:69-70). This development 
negatively affected the revolutionaries‟ prospects of success, and in 1911 the two 
imperial countries, by issuing an agreed upon ultimatum to the Iranian government, 
effectively ended the Constitutional Revolution (Keddie 2003:71).  
The defeat of the constitutional movement resulted in continued Russo-British 
hegemony in Iran until Reza Khan seized power through a coup in 1921, and crowned 
king in 1925 he ended the 130-year Qajar dynasty. Under Reza Shah Iran
96
 set out on a 
new, more independent path to national development. However, while 
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No Western power re-shaped the economy to the degree that Britain and Russia 
had during the Qajar era… Iran remained dependent despite Reza Shah‟s avowed 
nationalism, self-reliance, and strong state, due chiefly to three interrelated 
mechanisms: control of oil by the British, unequal trade with the Soviet Union 
and Germany, and the vicissitudes of trade as a peripheral supplier of raw 
materials. (Foran 1993a:249) 
 
Each of these three mechanisms had enduring consequences for Iran‟s economic and 
political development: British control of oil eventually led to Mosaddeq‟s oil 
nationalization movement in the early 1950‟s while continued Russian influence helped 
usher in the birth of the Iranian communist movement. For Reza Shah personally 
however, as we shall see next, it was his country‟s close relationship with Germany that 
eventually spelled his personal doom. 
 “At the outbreak of the war, in September 1939,” Keddie (2003) writes, “German 
influence in Iran was paramount. German agents were active, and the shah‟s sympathy 
for the Germans was no secret” (105). Reza Shah‟s friendly stance toward the Germans 
quickly became a cause of concern for the Allies. The Soviet Union and Great Britain 
therefore joined forces with the United States and demanded that the shah expel all 
German forces from Iran. The fear among the Allies was that Germany would use Iran as 
a base from which to attack the Soviet Union, while the Allies themselves wanted to use 
Iran as a supply route to the Soviets. Faced with this ultimatum the king stalled, causing 
Russian and British forces to enter Iran on August 25, 1941. Within a month Reza Shah 
had been forced to abdicate, gone into exile, and been succeeded by his son, Mohammad 
Reza Shah. The British and the Russians once again divided Iran into spheres of 
influence, albeit this time with Iranian approval, and in early 1942 the two occupying 
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forces and Iran signed an alliance committing the former to help protect the Iranian 
economy from the negative effects of the war. Also, the agreement mandated that the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain withdraw their troops within six months of the end of the 
war (Keddie 2003). Despite publicly assuring Iranians that the allied forces would indeed 
leave at the end of the war, the new king secretly confided to an American official, partly 
in an attempt to foster friendly relations with the U.S., that “he would prefer that Allied 
forces remain in Iran to prevent a revolution against the monarchy, at least until he could 
rebuild his army and gain an upper hand in the domestic power struggle.” The shah also 
hoped that closeness to the U.S. would prevent “British and Russian interference” in 
domestic affairs (Foran 1993:271). Few would probably have predicted that the king‟s 
request would inadvertently usher in the era of U.S. hegemony in Iran. 
 
American Hegemony and Iranian Dependency: Aid, Grants, and Loans in the Early 
Cold War Era 
 
At the conclusion of the war, as the British departed Iran on schedule in March 
1946 while the Soviets lingered, the shah urged “the United States to expand its role in 
Iran and force the termination of the allied occupation” (Stempel 1981:4). In response to 
the U.S.S.R outlasting its welcome, Iran also appealed to the Security Council of the 
recently established United Nations and received the support of Harry Truman, who took 
an uncompromising stance in support of Iran‟s sovereignty. American diplomacy soon 
caused Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Union‟s Security Council delegate, to announce that 
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all Russian troops would be withdrawn within five weeks, and so they were (Stempel 
1981; Zonis 1991). Unbeknownst to most observers, “this act signaled the beginning of 
extremely close ties between Iran and the United States, which were to last until the 
expulsion of the Shah in January 1979” (Stempel 1981:4). While highly beneficial to both 
the shah and the United States in the short term, the lasting consequences of this special 
relationship would eventually spell disaster for both parties. 
 The emergence of American dominance on the Iranian stage represented a 
distinctly new era for Iranian international relations. The role of the U.S. differed 
markedly from that of Russia and Great Britain, particularly the manner in which the 
relationship with the Iranian monarchy was initiated. Russia and Great Britain had 
descended on Iranian soil as colonizers in disguise while the United States was invited 
and welcomed by virtually all Iranians as a liberator and benefactor, “a disinterested 
protector of Iranian freedom and dignity” (Cottam 1988:8). The shah hoped that the U.S. 
would shield him from Russian and British advances, whereas “the Iranian nationalists 
counted heavily on U.S. support to build a democratic and independent Iran” (Moaddel 
1993:141-2). Unfortunately, Iranians were as united in their welcoming of the United 
States as they were naïve about its true intentions. 
 The altruistic motivations that many Iranians expected would fuel U.S. 
involvement in Iran were indeed mostly wishful thinking. However, as Cottam (1988) has 
argued, a benevolent, if not altogether altruistic, mindset appears to have at least 
influenced U.S. policy towards Iran in the 1940s, resulting in something similar to the 
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colonialists‟ “white man‟s burden,” as the  perceived “task of the United States was to 
help Iranians in the process of „modernizing‟ and „nation-building‟” (Cottam 1988:4). 
 A more important set of motivations for U.S. involvement was, rather 
unexpectedly, strategic and economic in nature. In the 1930s, the U.S. ranked only fourth 
among Iran‟s trade partner, “providing 7-8 percent of the imports, mostly motor vehicles 
and agricultural machinery, and taking 12-13 percent of exports, mainly carpets” (Foran 
1993a:248). In the period 1940-44, the U.S. doubled its trade with Iran. As Foran (1993a) 
explains, 
The context for this growing involvement was an emerging American policy goal 
of achieving a new international economic order to avert a relapse into the 1930s 
depression by taking measures to ensure the free international movement of 
capital – both raw materials and finished manufacturers – rather than returning to 
exclusive trading blocks that had existed prior to the war. (271) 
 
In order to accomplish the goals set forth, and per Tehran‟s request, the U.S. dispatched 
financial advisor A.C. Millspaugh to Iran. Accepting the mission, Millspaugh, who had 
already served one stint in Iran in the early 1920s, was informed by the State Department 
“that the United States after the war was to play a large role in that region with respect to 
oil, commerce, and air transport, and that a big program was under way.” Under Dr. 
Millspaugh‟s stewardship Americans were put in charge of all “key economic 
departments” (Keddie 2003:10-7). Clearly, the U.S. was involving itself with Iran for 
American, not Iranian, reasons.  
 Although the U.S. stepped up its involvement in Iran even before the war had 
ended, it was the conclusion of the 1951-3 oil nationalization movement that established 
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a “special relationship” between the countries.
97
 As noted in Chapter 3, in an attempt to 
destroy the British monopoly on Iranian oil, the U.S. initially sided with Mossadeq‟s 
popular movement. However, as it became clear that it was not in America‟s best 
interests to have any country nationalize its natural resources, “President Eisenhower and 
Secretary of State Dulles claimed that Mosaddegh was ready to open the door to 
communist influence” (Parsa 1989:44), with the result of the U.S. instead supporting the 
shah and Britain‟s boycott of Iranian oil. The situation was settled in August 1953 when a 
CIA-devised coup overthrew Mossadeq and allowed the shah to return to the throne. The 
American decision to directly intervene in Iranian domestic politics had far-reaching 
consequences:    
If the 1946 crisis [involving the Soviet refusal to leave Iran as agreed] had been 
the turning point in American-Iranian relations, the 1951-53 period marked the 
point of no return, during which the United States eventually committed itself to 
bolster the shah on his throne and took over from Great Britain the role of 
hegemonic power in Iran. (Foran, 1993a:292) 
 
 Following the coup the shah decided to restructure Iran‟s oil arrangements. The 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) that to this point had monopolized Iranian oil, was 
given a 40 percent share, and renamed British Petroleum (BP). An equal 40 percent share 
was given to five American oil companies (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of 
California, Texaco, Socony-Mobil, and Gulf Oil) in return for technical assistance and 
development of the oil fields. Although the Iranian state according to this agreement 
would keep 50 percent of the profits, this marked a significant improvement for the 
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United States compared to the pre-coup situation (Keddie 2003; Stempel 1981). The new 
arrangement also marked the beginning of a quite cynical understanding between the U.S. 
and the shah as actions taken by the Iranian state benefitting the U.S. or its interests were 
rewarded, rather rapidly, through economic aid or other favors. Hence, immediately 
following the new oil deal Iran received $127 million in aid, which must be added to the 
$68.4 million the shah‟s new government obtained within three weeks of the coup (Foran 
1993:344).    
 The new oil arrangement allowed the U.S. to complete its journey towards 
political hegemony in Iran, and during the period of 1954-1960 it provided Iran with over 
$1 billion in economic, technical, and military aid, an amount of U.S. aid surpassed by 
only Turkey among Third World countries (Amjad 1989; Bill 1988a; Daneshvar 1996; 
Foran 1993a). In this period, military aid accounted for approximately half of all support 
given to Iran by the U.S. It should not be assumed that the U.S. had no interest in seeing 
Iran improve its infrastructure and become a useful trade partner, but “beyond these 
purely economic ties lurked perhaps even greater political and strategic bonds. Richard 
Helms, one-time CIA director and ambassador to Iran, even went as far as referring to 
Iran as „in political terms, the center of the world‟” (Foran 1993a:344). 
 The political and strategic bonds Foran refers to have also been discussed by other 
scholars. Gasiorowski (1990) explains that with the beginning of the Cold War, U.S. 





 The fruit of their labor was the creation of the Perimeter Defense 
strategy, which advocated that large sums of military aid be given to “countries located 
on the borders of the emerging Sino-Soviet sphere of influence” (Gasiorowski 1990:146). 
Because of its strategic location, including a 1,200 mile long border with the Soviet 
Union, Iran was considered “a prime target for Soviet subversion in peacetime and a 
likely Soviet military objective in the event of general war” (Gasiorowski 1990:147). In 
addition to these defensive concerns, Iran‟s proximity to the U.S.S.R. made it an ideal 
location from which to launch “cross-border espionage operations” and for setting up 
“electronic intelligence-gathering devices aimed at the Soviet Union” (Gasiorowski 
1990:147-8). Thus, in order to contain Soviet expansionism and gain a strategic base in 
the Soviet sphere,  
the United States established a strong cliency relationship with Iran in the years 
after the 1953 coup. Under this relationship, Iran was given large amounts of U.S. 
military, economic, and intelligence assistance and was encouraged to join the 
Baghdad Pact. These measures were intended both to reduce political unrest in 
Iran and to strengthen it against foreign threats. (Gasiorowski 1990:148) 
 
In sum, U.S. paranoia helped the shah both improve his army and set forth on an 
ambitious industrialization agenda which I will address shortly. 
 While the king benefitted greatly from U.S. obsession with Soviet expansionism, 
such support came at a price. For example, when Kennedy in the early 1960s temporarily 
changed U.S. policy so as to promote social over military development in the Third 
World, the shah was forced to not only embrace a land reform program, but also to select 
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a prime minister favored by the Americans (Amjad 1989; Daneshvar 1996; Foran 1993a; 
Keddie 2003; Milani 1988; Parsa 1989). While such displays of dependency probably 
hurt the shah‟s image in Iran, even more damaging in the long term was the signing of the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Iran on October 13, 
1964. 
 SOFA was approved by the Majles, although Keddie (2003) reports that the 
measure only passed “with an unusual number of negative votes and speeches” (148). 
The agreement stated that Americans living in Iran fell under U.S. rather than Iranian 
jurisdiction, thus for all practical purposes providing them with diplomatic immunity. 
The measure was received with great discontent by critics such as Khomeini, who argued 
that Iran had capitulated to the United States. Twelve days later the Majles passed 
another bill, this time authorizing the government to accept a $200 million loan from 
private American banks, guaranteed by the U.S. government, to be used toward military 
purchases from the United States. To most Iranians the link between the two bills was 
obvious and Khomeini again took the opportunity to criticize the government (Bakhash 
1990; Bill 1988a; Keddie 2003). 
 The U.S. policy of rewarding Iran for specific actions continued in the 1950s and 
1960s. For example, the U.S., in return for promised social reform, granted Iran an $845 
million loan in the face of the economic and social turmoil of 1960 (Amjad 1989), and 
following the shah‟s commitment to a program of land reform he received another $35 
million (Parsa 1989). In time the shah was able to use American aid to commence his 
ambitious industrialization program and upgrade his military. 
166 
 
 Early U.S. intervention in Iran can be described as anticipatory charity work. 
Hoping that Iran would play an important role in the future, American policy makers 
showered the shah with economic and military assistance while receiving little in return. 
However, this would prove to be prudent policy as the Iranian economy began to grow, at 
least in part as a result of U.S. aid. By the late 1950s American government assistance 
had prepared the ground for private investments. Consequently, the American 
government was to a significant extent replaced by American corporations. The shift 
from aid to investments can be described as the turn from dependent to interdependent 
relations between Iran and the United States. No longer would relations between the 
countries be characterized by one-way streams of reliance.       
 
U.S.-Iranian Interdependency: Investment and Trade 1960-1978 
 
 Foran (1993a; 1994b) has built his theory of the Iranian Revolution, and 
subsequently a more general theory of revolutions (Foran 2005), around the type of 
development experienced by Iran in the period following World War II. Drawing from 
world systems analysis and dependency theory,
99
 he has argued that although Third 
World countries have experienced economic development and industrialization as a result 
of aid from core nations, such development is  
generally accompanied by significant negative consequences, such as inflation, 
unemployment, health problems, inadequate housing and education, and the like. 
It is thus a dependent development, meaning growth within limits, advances for a 
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minority of the population, and suffering for the majority [emphasis in original]. 
(Foran 1993a:5) 
        
According to this framework, the temporary benefits for a specific periphery 
nation of aligning itself with one or more core powers are eventually replaced by 
disastrous consequences. Although this understanding of international relations can 
perhaps be successfully incorporated into a general theory of revolutions, it seems that 
the concept of dependent development would apply to virtually all Third World 
countries. To be sure, Foran‟s theory of revolution is multi-causal, with dependent 
development being just one of several necessary causes. Still, by categorizing Iran‟s 
development as similar to most nations in the Third World, Foran appears to abandon his 
own description of Iran‟s relationship with the U.S. as both “unique” and “special” 
(Foran 1993a:170-1; 343-4). Rather than grouping Iran with most Third World countries, 
I argue that Iran‟s relationships with the U.S. was indeed special and unique, and that it 
was this particular relationship that in part permitted a nonviolent revolution to succeed. 
To make that argument it is necessary to unfold the process through which the U.S.-
Iranian relationship transformed from dependency to interdependency in the 1960s.        
 Perhaps realizing that foreign aid alone would not allow him to accomplish his 
goal of rapidly industrializing Iran, the shah in 1958 met with more than forty leading 
American businessmen during one of his many visits to the United States. At their 
meeting, the shah “strongly urged them to make major investments in Iran, maintaining 
that the only industries that the Iranian state would continue to own were petroleum and 
steel” (Bill 1988a:118-9). In order to further entice foreign investors, among which 
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Americans were the largest and most important group, the shah‟s regime provided large 
corporations with compelling incentives. For example, 
private investors were given tax exemptions and were allowed to repatriate their 
profits whenever they wished. The return of profit was estimated to be as high as 
30 to 40 percent. Large Iranian and foreign entrepreneurs were eligible for a 
subsidized [interest] rate that was below 12%. The small businesses (and 
bazaaris), on the other hand, had to borrow at much higher rates, between 25 and 
100 percent. This policy allowed the large and capital-intensive factories to grow 
at the expense of small and labor-intensive factories. (Amjad 1989:88) 
 
Favorable conditions such as these naturally motivated American and other 
foreign corporations to invest in Iran, and their investments helped kick-start the Iranian 
economy and the shah‟s modernization program.
100
 Foran (1993a) has described the 
focus of American investments in the period: 
In the course of the 1960s and 1970s a considerable amount of direct foreign 
investment by American-based multinationals was added to [U.S. oil 
investments], in the agribusiness ventures, in the most advanced industrial sectors, 
such as petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and aluminum, and in the 
growing banking sector, where American banks played a major role. The United 
States overtook the British as the major foreign investor in the 1950s and held this 
position until the 1970s when the Japanese surpassed them. (344) 
 
The fact that American corporations invested in the industries identified by Foran is 
hardly a coincidence. Most of those industries were capital-intensive and therefore 
required foreign assistance. While Iranian factories and workers were not as productive 
as their European counterparts, the lower costs and generous conditions allowed 
multinationals to profit from their investments (Graham 1980). Also, foreign investments 
resulted in impressive growth figures for the Iranian economy, which led the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (AID) to close its Tehran office in 1967, one year 
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after President Johnson‟s Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments had declared Iran a 
developed country (Bill 1988a:177-8). In short, in a matter of a decade and a half, Iran 
had moved from being one of the foremost recipients of U.S. aid to be considered a 
nation with little need for economic support. Henceforth the relationship between the 
U.S. and Iran would be characterized by trade and military-strategic collaboration.    
 Foreign investments helped build the Iranian economy, but the central driving 
force was its oil sales.
101
 In the period 1954-1977 “Iran‟s oil revenues leaped almost a 
thousand times from $22.5 million in 1954 to $20 billion in 1977 [emphasis in original]” 
(Foran 1993a:312). Foran (1993a) has also pointed out that although the state was 
exploited by the foreign oil companies it still received “considerable income” from its oil, 
especially after the 1960 formation of OPEC (312). Since the shah was not overly 
interested in spending his country‟s oil wealth on its people, he looked for other avenues 
of investment and found them in his armed forces. 
 The king‟s preferential treatment of the armed forces had been a rather lengthy 
obsession, and due to this fascination the shah, “himself a product of his father‟s military 
academy, had taken good care to reorganize [the military] and update its armaments. In 
the 1970s, he made it into one of the dozen best equipped armies in the world” 
(Arjomand, 1988: 120).
102
 Ever since the U.S. had adopted the Perimeter Defense 
strategy, Iran had enjoyed steady access to American arms, but in the late 1960s, with the 
U.S. heavily involved in a disastrous war in Vietnam, which left it with “fewer resources 
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to commit worldwide and more need for support from its allies” (Stempel 1981:68), 
Richard Nixon and his administration transformed the Perimeter Defense into the Nixon 
Doctrine, stipulating that the United States become even more indirectly involved in its 
defense around the globe. Gone were the days of serving as the world‟s police officer 
backed by regional allies. From now on, “American troops would be used abroad only in 
special cases,” and the U.S. would instead “rely on other nations to defend Western 
interests by encouraging them to defend themselves” (Stempel 1981:72). However, in 
order for the proxies to do so successfully they needed access to the best arms and 
training available, goods and services that would be purchased from the U.S. 
 In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, Iran was identified as the most important 
among a group of nations that were friendly towards the United States. Other regional 
powers in this group included Israel, Indonesia, and Brazil. Nonetheless, Iran was 
foremost among them based on two factors. First, the shah had over the previous 25 years 
taken great care to develop a solid relationship with the United States which caused his 
loyalty to be beyond doubt. Second, thanks to its ever-growing oil incomes, Iran had the 
funds necessary to buy America‟s most sophisticated weapons. Thus, in a secret 
agreement signed in May 1972, the U.S. consented to provide Iran with any non-nuclear 
weapons it wanted. This agreement was beneficial for both parties. The shah‟s obsessive 
desire to sport one of the world‟s finest armed forces was significantly promoted, 
whereas the U.S., which found itself in dire economic times, discovered a way to improve 
its worsening balance of payments position by selling expensive weapons to Iran (Amjad 
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1989; Foran 1993a; Moaddel 1993; Sick 1985; Stempel 1981).
103
 Thus, while the Nixon 
Doctrine applied to many other nations, Iran‟s relationship with the U.S. in the late 1960s 
became truly “special” and “unique.” If the U.S. was now the world‟s sheriff, rather than 
its police officer, Iran would become its best equipped deputy.     
As Iran‟s oil output rose from 1.6 million barrels per day in 1965 to 3.5 million 
barrels in 1970 the government‟s revenues steadily rose. However, when OPEC decided 
to drastically increase the price of oil in 1973-74 Iran multiplied its income over night. 
The carte blanche arms purchase Nixon had granted the shah in 1972 was already fueling 
his compulsion with the army, but now that obsession was taken to a new level. As table 
4.1 shows, the increase in U.S. arms sales to Iran corresponded with the OPEC price hike 
in 1973 and Nixon‟s decision to arm Iran to its teeth. Between 1955 and 1978 Iran 
purchased almost $21 billion worth of U.S. arms, $20 billions of which were  bought in 
the 1970s. Of that sum, over $19 billion were spent after the oil price hike of 1973.
104
   
Thanks to this spending spree, the Iranian government was “more than once 
responsible for bailing out an American arms manufacturer” facing difficult times, and 
U.S. arms producers consequently “spent vast sums, often illegally, lobbying Iran for 
business” (Keddie 2003:165). While the arms manufacturers made some of the largest 
profits, other industries also benefitted from Iran‟s recent wealth increase. For example, 
and lthough the U.S. government complained about the new high oil prices, the American 
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companies included in the Iranian oil consortium naturally welcomed them. Furthermore, 
American “producers of high technology, grain and agricultural equipment, and 
consumer goods also had large sales in Iran” (Keddie 2003:165). 




Year Foreign Military  
Sales Agreements 
Foreign Military  
Sales Deliveries 
1955-68 505,414 145,874 
1969 235,821 94,881 
1970 134,929 127,717 
1971 363,844 75,566 
1972 472,611 214,807 
1973 2,171,355 248,391 
1974 4,325,357 648,641 
1975 2,447,140 1,006,131 
1976 1,794,487 1,927,860 
1977 5,713,769 2,433,050 
1978 2,586,890 1,792,892 
Total 20,751,656 8,715,810 
 
By the mid-1970s, the economic and strategic relationship between Iran and the 
United States reached its peak and began to transform the formerly dependent 
relationship. In 1973 the two nations signed an agreement to establish a “joint economic 
commission to accelerate further commercial relations,” and in the following year 
American companies signed joint venture contracts with Iran valued at $11.9 billion (Bill 
1988a:204). By 1975, U.S. officials privately anticipated that nonmilitary and nonoil 
trade over the next six years could amount to $23-26 billion. At that time, thirty-nine 
major American arms, telecommunication, and electronics companies were represented 
and had contracts in Iran, including such giants as General Electric, 
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Lockheed, Westinghouse, Bell Helicopter International, Grumman Aerospace, 
McDonnell-Douglas, International Telephone and Telegraph, and Sylvania (Bill 
1988a:204-9). A concrete example of the huge business deals American companies had 
with the Iranian state is “American Bell International‟s $10 billion project to revitalize 
Iran's telephone system” (Stempel 1981:72).
106
 Clearly, Iran was emerging as an 
important and profitable trade partner for American corporations. 
 One dimension of the increasingly interdependent economic relationship between 
the two countries was thus constituted by direct trade and American investments in the 
Iranian economy. The other dimension concerned oil and represents the realm in which 
the shah first realized that he had significant leverage in his relationship with Washington 
and “felt strong enough to break with the United States” (Stempel 1981:8). Realizing his 
position of strength, the shah responded to subtle U.S. threats of consequences if he 
proved unable to have a moderating influence on OPEC policies by replying that “we can 
hurt you as badly if not more so than you can hurt us” (Milani 1988:162). Using his 
leverage again a few years later in 1977, the shah changed his stance on the upcoming 
OPEC meeting in Caracas during a visit to the U.S. Before his arrival he had announced 
that Iran would be a passive spectator at the meeting, but after consulting with U.S. 
officials, the shah proclaimed that “Iran would try to keep oil prices down in order „to 
show sympathy and comprehension‟ of American views” (Menashri 1990:48). Clearly 
the shah was using his OPEC influence to solidify his relationship with Washington. 
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 Notwithstanding the importance of trade and oil, the U.S.-Iranian relationship, at 
least in the eyes of the U.S., was still based mainly on military-strategic considerations. 
Following the Vietnam War and the Nixon Doctrine, this aspect of the relationship 
became increasingly important, especially since all alternative U.S. “policy bridges had 
been burned years before” (Sick 1985:22): 
Richard Nixon‟s decision to rely exclusively on the shah for the protection of U.S. 
interests in the Persian Gulf had been so thoroughly institutionalized in U.S. 
policy and practice that the United States now lay strategically naked beneath the 
thin blanket of Iranian security. (Sick 1985:18) 
 
The severity of U.S. strategic dependence is illustrated by the conclusion of a May 1972 
meeting between the shah and Nixon. At the end of their meeting, “Nixon looked across 
the table to the shah and said simply, „Protect me‟” (Sick 1985:14). Clearly, U.S. policy 
had made the country militarily dependent on Iran. 
 American policy makers began to realize that the days when Washington could 
tell the shah what to do and expect obedience were gone. Although still dependent on 
U.S. support, the shah had come to realize that the U.S. needed him as well, “and the vast 
oil wealth pouring into his treasury liberated him from the usual array of persuasive 
leverage that a superpower might exercise in its relation with a „client‟ state” (Sick 
1985:36). This fact had indeed become evident to members of the American political 
elite. When journalists in 1976 suggested to Richard Helms, then U.S. Ambassador to 
Iran, that the U.S. should tell the shah to liberalize Iran, he replied that “the first time I try 
to tell the Shah what to do on such matters will be the last time I see him” (Stempel 
1981:21). While Helms might have exaggerated the shah‟s independence, the general 
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point is well taken: The shah was not simply a helpless puppet without leverage of his 
own. Thanks in part to his oil wealth, the relationship he had taken such care to build was 
now paying off as the U.S. relationship with Iran was for all practical purposes a 
relationship with the shah personally, and the U.S. needed the shah. 
 Although Iran‟s relationship with the U.S. might be called “dependent 
development” or a host of other terms, what made this relationship “unique” and 
“special” was not the cliency relationship between the two countries. Instead, the shah‟s 
relationship with Washington was unique because “after the OPEC price rise, major 
United States business interests became more closely tied to, and even dependent on, the 
Shah‟s regime than ever. This was especially true of three key sectors of American 
business: armaments, oil, and banking [emphasis added]” (Keddie 2003:160), but, as 
suggested above, it was also a consequence of the exclusive military-strategic 
understanding between the two nations. That the U.S. officially recognized this 
transformation from Iranian dependence to U.S.-Iranian interdependence
107
 is suggested 
by a 1976 U.S. Foreign Service report released just months before the election of Jimmy 
Carter.  
After four months of interviews and policy examinations in Washington and in 
Iran, the report concluded that “The government of Iran exerts the determining 
influence” in the relationship with United States. Iran, the inspectors noted, 
contributed far more in financial terms than did the United States, and “He who 
pays the piper calls the tune” [emphasis added]. (Sick 1985:20) 
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In other words, a fundamental shift had taken place. No longer was Iran 
dependent on U.S. aid, but rather it exerted significant influence of its own in the 
relationship.
108
 Thanks to the immense revenues generated by higher oil prices, the shah 
had made himself, and Iran, an important contributor to the American economy. If we 
add the continuing strategic importance of Iran in the Cold War era to this newfound 
economic relevance, it seems clear that Iran had taken significant steps towards becoming 
an equal of the United States in the sense that the two nation‟s relationship was no longer 
as uneven as it had been in the 1940s and 1950s. Although this must have been a great 
source of pride for the shah, he would soon discover that the new equalized relationship 
also came with obligations in the form of increased scrutiny from pro-democracy 
organizations and the international media. 
 
The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Soviet Acquiescence to U.S. Hegemony     
 
 As we shall see, the shah‟s new status as U.S. ally put increased pressure on him 
to uphold the democratic and liberal values embraced by the United States and the West. 
However, the shah‟s relative autonomy also helps solve another major puzzle of the 
Iranian Revolution, namely the role, or lack thereof, played by the Soviet Union. Why did 
Moscow not object to U.S. hegemony south of its border? Two main explanations can be 
offered. First, beginning in the early 1960s the U.S.S.R. not only tolerated the shah, but 
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supported and even preferred him to any other plausible Iranian option.
109
 The Soviet 
Union had maintained its trade with Iran since the days of Russia, but the relationship 
between the countries declined rapidly following the U.S.-led 1953 coup (Herrman 
1990). In 1959 Iran signed a mutual defense agreement with the U.S. which permitted the 
creation of American bases on Iranian soil (Golan 1990). The Soviets not surprisingly 
opposed this development and chastised both Washington and Tehran for entering into 
the agreement. However, in 1962, in the face of the Cuban missile crisis, the shah 
announced that the U.S. would not be allowed to establish bases in Iran, and that no 
country would be permitted to place missiles on its soil (Afkhami 1985; Bill 1988a). 
Concurrently with these promises Iran and the Soviet Union entered into several high 
profile trade agreements. For example, in 1966 the Soviets agreed to build a steel mill in 
Isfahan and provide Iran with other industrial aid in exchange for $600 million worth of 
natural gas, and the following year the shah spent $110 million
110
 on Russian arms 
(Ansari 2003). This marked the beginning of heavy trade between the two countries, and 
in the period before the revolution “the Soviet Union was the largest market for the 
export of Iranian manufactured goods. At the same time, Iran had become the largest 
market for Soviet nonmilitary goods in the Middle East” (Herrmann 1990:70). In addition 
to economic trade, the Soviet Union dispatched about 3,000 scientific and technical 
advisers to Iran, which at the time was the largest contingent of Soviet advisers in any 
                                                 
109
 Golan (1990) and Behrooz (1999) have both suggested that Moscow fairly early realized that the odds of 
a socialist revolution in Iran were slim. The only real alternative to the shah were reactionaries, and such a 
regime would likely be more hostile to the Soviet Union than the shah was. 
110
 Herrman (1990) reports that between 1966 and 1970 Iran purchased a total of $344 million worth of 
Soviet arms.  
178 
 
Third World country (Herrmann 1990). Finally, the two countries agreed to build a 700-
mile pipeline that would provide both the U.S.S.R. and Western Europe with natural gas 
intended for tripartite deals (Golan 1990).   
 Second, and in addition to beneficial trade relations, Moscow did not oppose U.S. 
hegemony in Iran for a very simple reason: It was not perceived to be a threat. While U.S. 
policymakers allocated international aid based on the “anticommunism” of a candidate 
regime, their Soviet counterparts seem to have been more level-headed and flexible 
(Atkin 1990; Bill 1988a). Cottam (1988) has provocatively suggested that “the perception 
of Iran as a U.S. surrogate was an American, but not necessarily a Soviet, image,” and 
that “there was little in Soviet rhetoric regarding Iran to indicate that the Soviets viewed 
the American presence in Iran as a matter of serious alarm” (182). Phrased differently, 
Iran did not have the same geostrategic utility to the Soviet Union as it did to the U.S., 
and consequently Moscow was willing to live with American hegemony on its southern 
border as long as the shah displayed a sufficient amount of autonomy and anti-
imperialism. Prudently enough, ideological preferences gave way to geo-strategic utility 
(Cottam 1988; Golan 1990; Herrmann 1990). 
 To sum up, Soviet officials were content with the shah‟s leadership as long as 
they received their fair share of Iranian trade,
111
 provided that the shah appeared 
independent enough to refrain from turning Iran into an American military base (Foran 
1993a; Golan 1990; Milani 1988; Stempel 1981). The fact that Moscow perceived the 
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shah to be sufficiently independent of the U.S. supports the interdependency argument 
advanced above. Foran (1993a) succinctly captures the U.S.-Iranian-Soviet situation by 
suggesting that “a de facto bargain was struck: the U.S.S.R. accepted the shah‟s rule and 
American hegemony in Iran, while receiving a number of economic agreements of its 
own and a stable monarchy on its borders” (347).
112
   
 
Internationalizing the Revolution: The Consequences of a Special Relationship 
  
It is tempting to assume that Soviet contentment left the close U.S.-Iranian 
relationship without many hurdles to overcome. However, U.S. hegemony eventually 
became a tremendous burden for both the shah and the United States. Once American 
companies had been unleashed on the Iranian market in the 1960s and 1970s, “the rush to 
make money was on” and there was little Washington or Tehran could do to stem the tide 
(Stempel 1981:75).  
 While beneficial to the Iranian economy in the short term, Iranians soon came to 
despise the growing foreign presence. Since U.S. citizens constituted the largest and most 
disliked group of foreigners, Iranians eventually began to consider all Westerners living 
in Iran to be Americans. In fact, the 53,000 military and civilian U.S. nationals living in 
Iran in 1978 made up slightly more than half the total number of foreigners residing in 
Iran, and in Tehran Americans accounted for 85 percent of all foreign nationals (Stempel 
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 Many of the Americans working in Iran had their wages paid by the Iranian 
government. The government also paid for their housing costs, causing Americans to 
worry little about how much they paid for their apartments and houses. As a 
consequence, Americans often accepted outrageous rental agreements, thereby 
contributing to the skyrocketing Iranian costs of living (Beeman 1983).    
 The presence of tens of thousands of foreigners coincided with the Iranian 
sentiment that the shah was simply running America‟s errands instead of promoting the 
best interests of Iran (Keddie 1983b; Stempel 1981). Such an interpretation of events in 
the late 1970s was consistent with long held perceptions of foreigners‟ activities in Iran 
as “the usurpation of the rights of believers” (Keddie 1983b:585). Meanwhile American 
officials had done little to reduce these impressions. For example, Kissinger proclaimed 
that “on all major international issues, the policies of the United States and the policies of 
Iran have been parallel and therefore mutually reinforcing” (Bill 1988a:203). The shah 
might have enjoyed this type of glowing endorsement from his main ally, but to most 
Iranians the coalescing interests must have seemed somewhat absurd. After all, how 
could a developing Middle Eastern nation share foreign policy interest with the world‟s 
most powerful nation engaged in a Cold War with Iran‟s mighty neighbor?  
 In addition to promoting discontent with the shah, the close U.S.-Iranian 
relationship had an even more important structural effect on Iranian society. When “Third 
World governments rely heavily on external resources, especially Western technology 
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and arms, [they reduce] their dependence on internal allies and supporters,” thus placing 
all their proverbial eggs in their ally‟s basket (Parsa 1989:189). The process the shah had 
begun after the 1953 coup of alienating every social group potentially capable of 
supporting him, including the landlords, the ulama, the secular politicians, and the 
intellectuals, came to its fruition in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
114
 Comfortable with 
the categorical American support he enjoyed during Nixon and Ford‟s stints in the Oval 
Office, the shah enjoyed almost complete autonomy from Iranian society. This seemingly 
ideal situation for a Third World dictator can however have catastrophic consequences 
for both the dictator and his patron: 
Because highly autonomous states lack societal constraint, the policies of client 
states increasingly diverge from the interests and needs of society. Serious unrest 
and instability may eventually result and even lead to revolution. A relationship 
initially designed to promote political stability in the client country may therefore 
promote instability in the long run, threatening the patron’s strategic interests 




When the shah‟s autonomy from Iranian society and his close collaboration with the U.S. 
eventually became a commonly recognized reality, “the Pahlavi state and its chief 
supporter, the United States, came to be widely perceived as the cause of Iran‟s 
problems” (Foran, 1993a:363). 
 This burden of friendship, created by the close relationship between the U.S. and 
Iran in the economic and military-strategic spheres, has by some been perceived as a 
fundamental cause of the revolution (Arjomand 1988). However, the relationship 
simultaneously makes the revolution‟s success all the more puzzling and does nothing to 
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explain relative U.S. indifference to the course of the revolution. If American support of 
Iran was so entrenched, and if Iran was considered one of America‟s most important 
allies, then why did U.S. officials not do more to help the shah cling to power? To answer 
that question we must keep in mind the extent of U.S. investments in the Iranian 
economy which most likely limited the range of options available to the American 
government. More importantly, however, we must take into account and analyze the 
shifts in U.S. and world sentiments taking place at the time.  
 
Iran, the U.S., and Human Rights 
 
 During his first 25 years on the throne, the shah had grown accustomed to dealing 
with U.S. administrations more than willing to turn a blind eye to his handling of the 
political opposition, as long as such actions did not interfere with U.S. interests. As we 
have seen, President Kennedy tried to steer the shah towards liberalization of Iran‟s 
political climate in the early 1960s, but this initiative by the White House was aimed 
primarily at reducing the likelihood of a peasant-based uprising, and not necessarily 
founded on concerns about political openness. Although Kennedy‟s policies did result in 
a temporary relaxation of political repression, this brief period certainly represents the 
exception to the rule of American collaboration with the shah‟s autocratic system 
(Daneshvar 1996; Foran 1993a; Keddie 2003; Milani 1988; Moaddel 1993; Parsa 1989; 
Sick 1985; Stempel 1981). This state of affairs changed with the election of Jimmy Carter 
to the presidency in 1976. 
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 Carter‟s foreign policy platform during the election emphasized heavily the issue 
of human rights throughout the world. Arguing that a solid U.S. commitment to the 
spread of human rights would “remove the reason for revolutions that often erupt among 
those who suffer from persecution” (Milani 1988:182), Carter‟s perspective represented a 
drastic break with the foreign policy outlooks of the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford 
administrations. American core values, such as freedom, democracy, and human rights, 
would be allowed to once again guide U.S. interactions with the rest of the world.
116
 
While this dramatic policy shift must have seemed idealistic to even some of the most 
liberal voters, Milani (1988) suggests that Carter‟s “campaign theme was balm to the soul 
of the Americans bitter about the insanity of their bloody adventure in Vietnam, and the 
immorality of the Watergate episode” (182). 
 Carter did of course win the 1976 election and returned to the emphasis of human 
rights in his inaugural address delivered on January 20, 1977, proclaiming that America‟s 
“moral sense dictates a clear preference for those societies which share with us an abiding 
respect for individual human rights” (Bill 1988a:16). However, once in office Carter had 
to balance his personal moralistic inclinations with the best interests of the United States. 
The White House thus determined that attention to the former would have to remain a 
secondary priority, as evidenced by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance‟s later admission that 
the administration “decided early on that it was in our national interest to support the 
shah so he could continue to play a constructive role in regional affairs” (Bill 1988a:227). 
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Consequently, President Carter‟s active commitment to human rights turned out to be 
little more than an election promise. Nonetheless, that promise had a tremendous impact 
on Iranian politics as Carter‟s human rights rhetoric constituted a “perceived political 
opening” for the Iranian revolutionaries to exploit (Kurzman 1996).  
 Numerous scholars of the Iranian Revolution have incorporated Carter‟s 
commitment to human rights into their discussions of its causes (Abrahamian 1982; 
Amjad 1989; Amuzegar 1991, Arjomand 1988; Bakhash 1984; Baktiari 1996; Bill 1988a; 
Cottam 1988; Daneshvar 1996; Falk 1980; Foran 1993a; Gasiorowski 1990; Grayson 
1981; Heikal 1982; Kamrava 1990; Keddie 2003; Matin-asgari 2002; Menashri 1990; 
Milani 1988; Moaddel 1993; Parsa 1988; 1989; Seliktar 2000; Sick 1985; Sreberny-
Mohammadi & Mohammadi 1994; Stempel 1981; Strong 2000; Wright 2001). Kurzman 
(1996; 2004) is one of the main critics of this perspective (as well as of all other 
explanations of revolutions). Besides suggesting that no scholar has provided any 
evidence of Carter ever pressuring the shah on the human rights issue, Kurzman (1996) 
also argues that “the shah received no international complaints about his handling of 
Iranian protests, even when his troops shot hundreds, perhaps thousands, of unarmed 
demonstrators in Tehran on September 8 [1978]” (158). Kurzman‟s reasonable charge is 
that if the shah did not feel pressured by the rest of the world, particularly the United 
States, then it would be incorrect to speak of a human rights effect. Somewhat 
surprisingly, Foran (1993a), while in the process of disproving Skocpol‟s structural 
model, seems to agree with Kurzman, stating that “there was no external pressure on the 
Iranian state” and “no major shift in world economic and geopolitical conditions” (360). 
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 Although Foran and Kurzman may have a point, it is arguably a rather week one, 
as the charge that President Carter never pressured the shah on human rights may itself be 
tenuous at best. According to one scholar, the president, in a response “to a question from 
European journalists on May 2, 1977, declared that his administration had been putting 
pressure on Iran both privately and publicly to improve its [human rights] performance” 
(Grayson 1981:154).
117
 Also, the critique overlooks the implicit pressure Carter‟s human 
rights policy constituted. As Brzezinski (1988), Carter‟s National Security Adviser, put it 
in a December 1978 speech at the height of the revolution: “There is today not a 
government in the world that does not know that its human rights record will affect its 
relationship with us” (108). However, the larger problem with Kurzman and Foran‟s 
critiques of the human rights explanations of the Iranian Revolution is that they demand 
concrete evidence of U.S. pressure on the shah, when it may in fact be more informative 
to evaluate the former‟s relative lack of support of the latter.
118
  
This reversal of reasoning can be found in Algar‟s (1983) rather antagonistic 
evaluation of the role played by Carter and his human rights framework, and his insights 
warrant a lengthy citation: 
We find, for example, that as one consequence of President Jimmy Carter‟s 
hypocritical election propaganda concerning human rights, people decided that 
this was a useful instrument to employ against the Iranian regime. It is sometimes 
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 Stuckey (2008) has argued that Carter did indeed criticize the shah and “may have been one of the first 
world leaders to broach the subject of human rights with him” (122). Carter (1982:436) himself reports that 
he discussed the issue with the shah on November 4, 1977, telling the king that “Iran‟s reputation in the 
world is being damaged” and asked if there was “anything that can be done to alleviate this problem by 
closer consultation with the dissident groups and by easing off on some of the strict police policies?” This 
may not be the type of direct pressure that would satisfy Kurzman, but it certainly suggests that the shah 
knew where Carter stood, and the President reports that the “shah listened carefully and paused for a few 
moments before he replied somewhat sadly” (Carter 1982:436).  
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 See Kurtz‟s (1994) discussion on the “geometry of deterrence.”  
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said in America in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution that Carter somehow 
undermined the Iranian regime by promising people human rights and that people, 
encouraged by President Carter, therefore took to the streets. This is an absurdity. 
A more accurate version of the situation is that it was seen as a useful tactic to 
demand human rights, not that the regime was deemed capable by its nature of 
giving human rights, but simply that given this apparent verbal change in 
American policy, the slogan of human rights was a useful one to be used for 




Carter‟s human rights agenda did not cause the revolution, but it did provide the 
opposition with the strategic opening it had been searching for. The president‟s 
articulation of support for individual freedoms resembled Kennedy‟s call for social and 
political reform in the early 1960s, but his call for change had dramatically different 
consequences. By publicly articulating a human rights policy in the course of his 
presidential campaign, Carter trapped himself in an ICL since his rhetoric about liberal 
values and human rights became a virtual policy prison.
120
 “All” Iranian protesters now 
had to do in order to neutralize American support was to hold Carter accountable for his 
own words, which is exactly the strategy Algar describes above. However, to understand 
why Carter‟s human rights agenda became so detrimental to the shah while it had limited 
effects in other parts of the world it is necessary to historically trace the development of 
the Iranian human rights debate.  
 
                                                 
119
 See Chapter 6 for details about how the opposition exploited Carter‟s human rights policy and how it 
resulted in limited American support for the shah. 
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 For example, in a September 8, 1976, campaign speech dedicated to the issue of human rights, Carter 
suggested that the United States “can support the principle of self-determination by refraining from military 
intervention in the domestic politics of other countries” (Carter 1977:170). Needless to say, policy 
articulations like these made it difficult for him to justify a coup that might have saved the shah‟s throne.  
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The Iranian Opposition, Human Rights Organizations, and the International Media  
 
Carter‟s human rights framework represented the political opening Iranian 
activists had been waiting for, and it would be quite reasonable to assume that this 
political opening constitutes a structural explanation of the timing of the Iranian 
Revolution. However, such an assumption would be overly simplistic. True, Carter‟s 
human rights emphasis eventually spelled disaster for the shah, but the president‟s stance 
on the issue was not specific to Iran. Why then did the ICL created by Carter‟s human 
rights framework affect Iran‟s regime so severely while it resulted in very limited 
advances for human rights activists in other countries? To answer that question it is 
useful to return to the Iranian student organizations based in the U.S. and Europe that 
were discussed in chapter two. 
 What appears to be a structural opening was in fact the result of a deliberate and 
strategic process through which student actors in effect lobbied the world for its attention. 
Iranian students living abroad, Matin-asgari (2002) explains,  
played the most important role in portraying the shah‟s regime as a repressive 
dictatorship, thereby undermining its international legitimacy and support. 
Through vocal demonstrations and publicity campaigns, it was instrumental in 
drawing the attention of the international media, human rights organizations, 
political groups, and foreign governments to repression in Iran, thus restraining 
the government‟s otherwise arbitrary treatment of its political victims [emphasis 
added]. (1) 
 
Throughout the 1960s, Iranian students living abroad protested the regime and its 
treatment of its political opponents whenever given an opportunity to do so, whether in 
Europe or in the United States. Most of the student protests occurred on a relatively small 
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scale, but beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the European mass media had 
begun to notice the students‟ activities (Matin-asgari 2002).  
 Arguably, the decisive breakthrough for the opposition occurred in 1972 when 
Amnesty International and a United Nations panel published the first human rights 
reports on Iran (Matin-asgari 2002; Milani 1988; Abrahamian 2009).
121
 The Amnesty 
report noted, among other things, “that Iran had been a signatory to the 1948 U.N. 
International Charter of Human Rights and the 1966 International Pact on Political and 
Civil Rights,” a fact that increased the perceived severity of the allegations directed at the 
shah‟s regime (Matin-asgari 2002:134). Iranian students and exiled members of the 
opposition had for years provided the international media and human rights organizations 
with “exaggerated and sometimes fallacious information about the so-called political 
holocaust in Iran, a country alleged to have more than 100,000 political prisoners” 
(Milani 1988:180-1), and in 1972 their efforts were rewarded.  
Evidence that these numbers had been significantly inflated by the opposition can 
be gathered by analyzing the number of political prisoners released from prison in the 
period immediately preceding the revolution. Abrahamian (1989) reports that between 
early 1977 and early 1979 the shah ordered the release of 2,298 political prisoners, 
including “the last batch of political prisoners” (170-1). It is certainly possible that 
Abrahamian‟s count is incomplete and that many prisoners were released before 1977, 
but it seems somewhat unlikely. The shah only began to liberalize, and releasing political 
prisoners was a part of the liberalization process, when he came under perceived pressure 
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from the Carter administration. It thus appears far-fetched that the Iranian government 
would have held more than 100,000 dissenters imprisoned, a claim that was even made at 
an academic meeting at Columbia University in 1976 (Grayson 1981:151). Exaggeration 
or not, the commonly accepted number of political prisoners in Iran at the time was 
somewhere between 25,000 and 100,000 individuals, a range popularized by Amnesty 
International in a 1975 report. In the previous year Martin Ennals, the organization‟s 
secretary general, had forestalled the report by proclaiming that “no country in the world 
has a worse record in human rights than Iran” (Bill 1988a:187).  
Regardless of their veracity, the shah was forced to deal with the atrocious human 
rights numbers attributed to him and his regime. Although no longer the insecure ruler of 
his youth, he still displayed an obsession with the world‟s opinion of him. This fixation 
resulted in a bizarre scenario in which “a major and continuous assignment of [the Iranian 
ambassadors to London, Washington, and the United Nations] was to review Western 
press coverage of Iran and to do whatever they could to prevent or minimize negative 
publicity about Iran and its supreme leader” (Dorman & Farhang 1987:24). Yet despite 
the severe allegations from Amnesty International, the International Commission of 
Jurists, the International Red Cross, and other human rights organizations, “the 
humanitarian efforts of these organizations were by and large inconsequential,” as they 
were “devoid of effective leverage within the Iranian regime” (Milani 1988:180-1). This 
absence of leverage would soon be remedied by the independent emergence of two new 
actors on the Iranian human rights stage: the international media and President Carter. 
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 As noted in chapter two, the European media had been paying some attention to 
its Iranian student populations‟ activities aimed at the shah‟s regime since the 1960s, and 
its curiosity now increased thanks to the human rights organizations‟ reports. In the early 
1970s, encouraged by visiting Iranian students, publications such as Germany‟s Der 
Spiegel and Frankfurter Rundschau, France‟s Le Monde and Le Nouvel Observateur, and 
England‟s Times, The Economist, and The Guardian, all began to report on alleged 
torture and political repression in Iran (Matin-asgari 2002:122). These journalistic efforts 
culminated in a special report published by the Sunday Times of London on January 19, 
1975, that confirmed “the systematic use of torture in Iranian prisons,” including “the 
worst allegations, such as the burning of victims on an electrically-heated metal table” 
(Matin-asgari 2002:151). 
 Perhaps motivated by its European counterpart, the American media eventually 
began to address Iran‟s human rights situation in the mid-1970s. In the previous decades, 
American news outlets had been content to simply echo the sentiments of the aligned 
American and Iranian governments without paying closer attention to conditions on the 
ground. As Sick (1985) points out, a useful example of the American media‟s 
complacency before the 1970s is the fact that the violent Muharram uprising of 1963, 
“which had so many parallels with the 1978 revolution, went almost entirely unreported 
in the United States” (11). Nonetheless, the mid-1970s represented a renaissance for 
American journalistic interest in Iran, as “the mainstream press for the first time began to 
raise troubling questions about the shah‟s regime, especially concerning his quest for 
military power, method of rule, and repression of human rights” (Dorman & Farhang 
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1987:131). Iran‟s human rights situation was still at this point only one of several factors 
deemed problematic by American journalists and politicians. The latter group was 
particularly concerned with the shah‟s rapid military buildup, which was made possible 
by U.S. arms sales. The shah‟s repression of human rights was “finally” addressed when 
the New York Times published an article on the topic in September 1974, and the king‟s 
reliance on the secret police was the target of a report in Newsweek that same year 
(Dorman & Farhang 1987:108; Halliday 1979). Washington Post‟s Jack Anderson 
devoted a May 1976 column to “the shah‟s „rule by torture and terror‟ and [the reality] of 
SAVAK spying on Iranians in the United States.” Three months later, in August 1976, 
“Time magazine published a special report on torture as government policy, naming Iran 
and Chile is the most frequently cited examples.” Also in that same month, the New York 
Times criticized the close U.S.-Iranian relationship, lambasting the shah‟s method of rule 
as “militaristic and dictatorial” (Matin-asgari 2002:154). 
 The mid-1970s thus represent a brief period of time in which the U.S. media 
began to seriously examine the shah‟s regime, with the result that “by 1976 references to 
human rights abuses had become routine in press coverage” (Dorman & Farhang 
1987:108). Matin-asgari (2002) elegantly captures the monumental shift that took place 
in the second half of the 1970s by arguing that  
a definite publicity breakthrough had occurred, with the international news media 
viewing Iran as having one of the world‟s most repressive governments. Years of 
adverse publicity by the CISNU (Confederation of Iranian Students, National 




While the students deserve significant credit for bringing the Iranian political 
situation to the media‟s attention, they did so indirectly, with international human rights 
organizations serving as midwives. Far from a fortuitous fluke, this development was the 
result of deliberate strategy choices made by Iranian students and exiles (Matin-asgari 
2002; Zonis 1991). The fact that American media outlets were oblivious to Iran in 1963, 
while increasingly active in reporting on the nation a decade later is perhaps best 
explained as a reflection of the world‟s newfound interest in Iran due to the nation‟s 
human rights reputation. It is difficult to imagine that such interest would have been 
awakened without the contributions of Iranians living abroad. 
 
The Final Straw: The Election of Jimmy Carter 
 
 Although the media and human rights reports represented a “nuisance” for the 
shah, “who sought to depict himself as a modern progressive statesman of world stature,” 
they did not significantly improve Iran‟s political conditions (Behrooz 1999:94). Quite on 
the contrary, the shah‟s regime became even more repressive and autocratic in the early 
and mid 1970s, culminating in the 1975 merger of the country‟s two permitted political 
parties into one, the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party (Foran 1993a). While complaining 
about “the treachery of the American Press,” the shah did little to improve his standing in 
the West, arguably because there appeared to be little reason to change (Zonis 1991:235-
6; Dorman & Farhang 1987). This would change dramatically with Jimmy Carter‟s 
ascension to the American presidency in 1977. 
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 Familiar with Carter‟s human rights agenda, the shah viewed the Democrat‟s 
1976 victory as a personal catastrophe, reportedly suggesting to one of his aides on the 
eve of the election that “it looks like we are not going to be around much longer” (Foran 
1993a:394). However, once the immediate disappointment of Carter‟s victory had 
subsided, the shah set upon a liberalization project that most commentators agree was 
designed to appease not the domestic opposition, but rather the new American president. 
The human rights organizations that had been criticizing the regime‟s treatment of its 
opponents suddenly found a ruler willing to listen and work with them to improve Iran‟s 
human rights conditions. William J. Butler, the chairman of the executive committee of 
the International Commission of Jurists, had been studying Iran‟s political conditions 
since 1975, and, as Bill (1988a) reports,  
was able to develop an impressive rapport with the shah during personal meetings 
in Tehran on May 30, 1977, and in Shiraz on May 2, 1978. During these sessions, 
the shah and Butler discussed in detail various reforms of Iran‟s Penal Code and 
overall system of justice. Although Butler‟s efforts did not result in any 
substantive changes, they did reinforce a process of procedural reform from which 
there was to be no return. (227) 
 
It is of course possible that the shah suddenly became interested in liberalizing his 
country for reasons other than his concern with American support. The two most popular 
alternatives suggested by scholars have been that either the shah‟s mind had taken a hit 
from his battle with cancer (Zonis 1991), or that the shah realized that his son would not 
be able to succeed him in the current political climate, and that liberalization was 





 While these are plausible explanations of the shah‟s liberalization efforts, the 
dominant perspective, focusing on the shah‟s insecurity about continued American 
support, appears a more fruitful avenue to travel (Abrahamian 1982; Amjad 1989; 
Arjomand 1988; Bill 1988a; Cottam 1988; Foran 1993a; Milani 1988; Moaddel 1993; 
Parsa 1988).  
Although disconcerting, the election of Carter was not an altogether new 
experience for the shah. Sixteen years earlier he had been shocked by the unexpected 
victory of another liberal, John F. Kennedy, who had forced the king to liberalize and 
even selected a prime minister for him. Having learned from the Kennedy experience, the 
shah did not wait for Carter to dictate policy for him, instead preferring to preempt the 
Americans and thus be able to take personal credit for the liberalization measures that he 
assumed would eventually be forced upon him at any rate. “For example, he introduced 
new regulations that permitted civilian defendants brought before military tribunals to be 
represented by civilian lawyers and to enjoy open trials. The Shah also slightly eased 
press controls” (Bakhash 1990:9). By enacting policies such as these the king not only 
hoped to appease the Carter administration, but also to gain approval from the human 
rights organizations that had focused their criticisms on Iran‟s legal system. 
Iranians on both sides of the political spectrum carefully watched Carter‟s every 
move. After 25 years of American dominance in Iranian politics both sides believed that 
the shah remained untouchable as long as he enjoyed support from Washington. In what 
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195 
 
appears to be an effort to guarantee American backing, Iran‟s ambassador to the United 
Nations, Fereydoun Hoveyda, wrote an open letter published by the New York Times on 
May 18, 1977, in which he “declared that his country was committed to the human rights 
ideals of the United Nations and had made more progress toward the realization of human 
rights than had the United States in a similar time frame” (Grayson 1981:155). This 
might seem like an insignificant gesture, but I contend that Hoveyda‟s public 
commitment to human rights on the Iranian government‟s behalf sealed the shah‟s 




In the age of an efficient and omnipresent mass media, world leaders are held 
accountable for their and their proxies‟ words in a manner that is unprecedented in human 
history. Carter‟s campaign theme of human rights was a shrewd political move that 
helped him get elected, but once in office his campaign rhetoric now limited the policy 
options at his disposal (Milani 1988). Being the candidate of human rights made it almost 
impossible to turn a blind eye to the fact that a close ally was considered by many pro-
democracy organizations and media outlets to be one of the world‟s worst offenders of 
human rights. When the shah, via Ambassador Hoveyda‟s letter to the New York Times in 
1977, joined Carter in the ICL, the two regimes were effectively trapped by their own 
rhetoric. For the king this meant that unless his regime came under armed attack he could 
not repress protesters without appearing hypocritical. Similarly, Carter could not offer the 
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shah the type of wholehearted support that his predecessors had provided as long as the 
human rights question hovered above the Iranian government. This lack of support, 
which I return to in the next chapter, caused both the shah and the Iranian opposition to 
assume that the tide in U.S.-Iranian relations had turned and that the American 
government was no longer backing the shah. The fact that such an evaluation of the 
situation was at best only partially accurate is irrelevant since most Iranians assumed it to 
be true.  
For the ICL to come into effect, Iranian history had to progress through three 
distinctive steps. First, Iran and the U.S. had to become entwined in more than just a 
dependent relationship. As described earlier in this chapter, that transformation occurred 
over the course of four decades as Iran, by encouraging private American investment, 
made itself an important partner of the American economy. In addition to corporate 
investments, Iran became America‟s most important ally in the struggle to keep oil prices 
down, and when the American economy struggled at the time of the Vietnam War, 
Iranian purchases of U.S. arms helped many companies stay afloat. To all of this must of 
course be added the military-strategic importance Iran played in American Cold War 
calculations. As the relationship between the U.S. and Iran matured, the latter became 
globally recognized as an important ally of the U.S., and was therefore expected to 
embrace the liberal/democratic values so highly cherished by the West in the Cold War 
era. Perhaps nobody understood these expectations better than the shah himself, who 
writes that “as an ally, I was expected to live up to the West‟s idea of democracy 
regardless of its unfeasibility in a country like mine” (Pahlavi 1980:21).   
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Second, this relationship and all its components had to become high-profile. The 
world had to be informed about the discrepancy between the shah‟s international image 
and the political conditions of Iranian society. While revolutionaries can perhaps do little 
to foster the type of special relationship identified and discussed in this chapter, they can 
contribute significantly to the promulgation of that relationship. Ironically, this task was 
made easier by the special relationship as Iranian students, thanks to the political 
amicability between the two countries, migrated to the U.S. in greater numbers than 
students from any other country (Matin-asgari 2002). Once outside of the repressive 
context of their home country, the students were confronted with the political benefits of 
an open society, and thus both motivated and free to publicly criticize their own 
government. Their critiques were eventually appropriated by human rights organizations 
and the international mass media that helped portray the shah‟s regime as a brutal 
dictatorship, a fairly new image of the government for the international audience to 
absorb.  
Finally, Carter‟s campaign rhetoric guaranteed that the discrepancies pointed out 
by the media and human rights organizations became problematic for the shah (Milani 
1988:183). The human rights issue, which previously had been little more than a source 
of annoyance, now became a potentially disastrous situation that the shah had to deal 
with in order to retain the U.S. support his regime depended upon after having alienated 
virtually every social group in Iran.
123
 But the shah‟s public commitment to human rights 
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and his liberalization efforts only served to encourage potential revolutionaries.
124
 As 
Abrahamian (1982) eloquently puts it, “liberalization, which had been introduced as a 
political tranquilizer, was proving to be a potent stimulant” (505), and liberalization was 
a direct effect of Carter‟s human rights rhetoric and the ICL it had helped erect.  
The emergence of the Iranian-American ICL inevitably forced the U.S. to become 
more than an anxious spectator of the revolution. Instead, the U.S. found itself an 
unwilling partner of the Iranian opposition in its effort against the shah‟s regime. Chapter 
6 thus explores how the Iranian opposition went about exploiting the opportunity it had 
played a major role in crafting for itself. By contributing to the construction of the 
world‟s first iron cage of liberalism, Iranian revolutionaries helped create a structural 
context conducive to a nonviolent assault on the Iranian state. As we will see, this 
overwhelming reliance on nonviolent methods served to further internationalize the 
revolution as it dragged the U.S. and the world into the struggle.       
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 Anthony Parsons (1984), Britain‟s ambassador to Iran, has speculated whether Iran‟s human rights 
situation was “any worse” than that of other countries in the developing world “or did it simply appear to 
be so because [the shah] insisted on Iran being judged by Westerns standards as part of the Western world” 
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6. A DELIBERATE REVOLUTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGY 
 
The iron cage of liberalism (ICL) introduced in Chapter 5 constitutes the 
structural context in which a nonviolent challenge to the shah‟s regime became viable. 
However important, the establishment of the ICL only begins to explain how the 
revolutionaries were able to defeat the government. To fully understand the revolution‟s 
success it is necessary to more closely examine its final phase, namely the popular 
struggle of 1977-79. How did the nonviolent revolutionaries overthrow a state in control 
of one of the planet‟s most powerful militaries, and why did the state fail to repress the 
movement? In order to answer these questions this chapter explores the strategies chosen 
by the revolutionary leadership and seeks to place them within the larger structural 
context of the ICL. I show that Iranian revolutionaries strategically chose to target not 
simply the shah‟s regime and army, but also the world in general and the U.S. in 
particular.    
In order to defeat its opponent, the anti-shah movement had to ensure that the 
military was not allowed to derail its efforts the way it had in 1963. As we saw in Chapter 
4, Khomeini and other leaders knew from experience that the armed forces had the 
capacity to crush a popular uprising, and in 1978 the military was even better organized 
and equipped than it had been fifteen years earlier. One of the opposition‟s main concerns 
was therefore to minimize the role the army would be permitted to play this time around. 
The movement leadership was also concerned about the potential effect the U.S. could 
have on the struggle as Operation Ajax and the ousting of Mossadeq were still relatively 
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fresh in the collective Iranian memory. Consequently, in addition to the military the U.S. 
had to be neutralized as well.  
 The good news for the opposition was that it knew what the movement needed to 
accomplish. The bad news was that neutralizing a well equipped army consisting of 
400,000 members, as well as the world‟s most powerful nation, was no easy task. Hence, 
the revolutionaries had to approach the struggle in a strategic manner where its tactics 
and actions were rationally calculated. As I showed in Chapter 4, Khomeini appears to 
have had a solid comprehension of the dynamics of nonviolent action, but he was not the 
only revolutionary leader with good instincts. Mehdi Bazargan and other leaders of the 
liberal-nationalist movement understood that Carter‟s human rights rhetoric was the 
political opening they had been waiting for, and they proceeded to exploit it as soon as 
the shah began to liberalize Iran in early 1977. Although enjoying some limited success, 
the liberal movement eventually lost out to Khomeini‟s hard-liners and had to accept that 
the revolution would be fought under the banner of Islam. The type of tactics the 
secularists had employed was, like the revolution itself, appropriated by the religious 
movement that successfully guided the struggle to its conclusion.        
The chapter‟s focus on strategy – defined as structurally situated agency – is 
unusual compared to existing revolution research. However, Iran‟s nonviolent revolution 
did not come, but was at least in part made, a fact that has been acknowledged even by 
some of the staunchest proponents of structural explanations of revolutions.
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 The 
chapter shows that the revolutionaries opted for strategies that were appropriate 
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considering the structural context of Carter‟s human rights rhetoric and the ICL. By 
relying on nonviolent tactics that internationalized the revolution, the opposition 
managed to sequentially break down the Iranian state and its repressive capacities while 
simultaneously neutralizing the United States. Ironically, the fashion in which the United 
States was neutralized was through the movement‟s strategy of involving Washington in 
the conflict.     
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section briefly summarizes 
the key events of the long revolutionary year of 1978 and outlines some of the concrete 
tactics employed by the opposition in its quest to break down the state. The success of 
any revolutionary movement depends on its ability to withstand government effort to 
crush it (Schock 2005). The second section therefore concerns itself with the question of 
government repression and identifies the structural and strategic factors that explain the 
government‟s failure to repress the movement. The section demonstrates how the 
movement intentionally sought to internationalize itself by strategically dragging the 
world into the conflict. Finally, I take a brief look at the comparative roles of violent and 
nonviolent opposition strategies in the Iranian Revolution.    
 
Preamble to a Revolution: The Year of Liberalization (1977) 
 
The shah began to liberalize Iran in early 1977, that is, at almost the exact of time 
of Carter‟s entry into the Oval Office, and even went as far as to publicly call 1977 “the 
year of liberalization” (Bill 1988a:219). Beginning in April, the shah allowed 
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international human rights organization to inspect prisons and observe trials against his 
political opponents, and the use of torture was “significantly reduced” (Keddie 2003:216-
7). In August the shah announced that parliamentary elections “that would grant the 
electorate a free choice” would be held in the following year (Cottam 1988:172). Up to 
this point this was the king‟s most concrete expression of a willingness to share power.  
Although these liberalization measures, as well as many others, certainly had real 
consequences for those individuals who had been constrained by the absence of political 
freedoms in the past, the most important effect of the liberalization process was largely 
symbolic in the message it sent to the shah‟s opponents. If Carter‟s human rights agenda 
had an anomic effect on the shah, it served the opposite role for the opposition, which 
“attributed the Shah‟s liberalization measures to President Carter's human rights policy 
and was becoming increasingly convinced that the Americans did not mind seeing the 
Shah replaced” (Arjomand, 1988: 130). As Bazargan put it after the revolution, “Carter's 
election made it possible for Iran to breathe again” (Abrahamian, 1982: 500). Khomeini‟s 
hard line faction of the opposition interpreted Carter‟s election victory in a similar 
manner. Ibrahim Yazdi, the coordinator of the Muslim Students Association in the U.S. 
and a collaborator of Khomeini‟s alerted the ayatollah to the fact that “the shah‟s friends 
in Washington are out” (Seliktar 2000:63). 
Some scholars have argued that Carter‟s election was a minimally important 
“factor in generating opposition” to the shah (Parsa 1989:116). Others, however, have 
been much more sympathetic to the argument that the Iranian opposition tailored its 
resistance to fit Carter‟s new paradigm, and that ”the opposition was greatly encouraged 
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by the „Carter revolution‟ and hoped to use the human rights issue to maximize its 
advantage” (Seliktar 2000:62). As Algar explains, “it was a question of tactically 
harassing the regime in a fashion which might be thought to coincide with the new 
emphasis in American policy abroad” (Algar 1983:100). This point is echoed by Keddie 
(2003), who explains that  
interviews and statements do indicate… that professionals and intellectuals were 
determined to utilize the American human rights policy to wedge an opening by 
publishing their grievances, hoping to widen the crack in order to change 
government policies. In the spring and summer of 1977 several petitions and open 
letters were circulated. (215) 
 
Thus, beginning in March moderate oppositionists commenced “an effort to test the 
limits of liberalization,” which included the circulation of essays and letters that criticized 
the shah for his despotic style of rule, and “urged application of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights” (Seliktar 2000:62; Foran 1993a; Keddie 1983b). 
 Over the course of the next few months Iranian activists continued to test the 
waters of the shah‟s liberalization process. During this period, groups such as the 
National Front and the Freedom Movement of Iran reemerged from their involuntary 
hiatus, and by summer these organization were joined by “professional associations and 
pressure groups,” such as the Iranian Writers‟ Association and the Association of Iranian 
Jurists. These groups‟ “very existence implied an enormous change in the political 
environment, and they provided important foci for the articulation of grievances and the 




Perhaps even more telling was the sudden creation of new political groups 
focusing specifically on human rights (Amjad 1989).  
The most important of these organizations was the committee for the Defense of 
Human Rights and Freedom, often called simply, „The Committee for Human 
Rights.‟ It included among its leaders representatives from the Liberation 
Movement (Mehdi Bazargan) and the National Front (Karim Sanjabi)… Formally 
organized in December 1977, the Committee for Human Rights coordinated the 
documentation of civil rights violations… By midsummer 1978 the committee 
had compiled over 200 case histories of human and civil rights violations during 
the Shah‟s regime. It also worked with organizations abroad, including the 
International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International. (Stempel 
1981:56) 
 
More than simply a “leader,” Bazargan was a founding member of the group. 
Recognizing the political opportunity represented by Carter‟s policies,  
he made every effort to tie opposition activities in Iran to the human rights banner 
and in so doing to explore fully any potential there still might be in showing some 
attempts to adhere to Carter‟s human rights program as a means of gaining 
American political encouragement. The Iranian Committee for Human Rights and 
Liberty was formed and affiliated itself with the International League for Human 
Rights. Effectively it was the central committee of the revolutionary leadership, 
and Bazargan was its functional, though not formal, leader [emphasis added]. 
(Cottam 1988:167-8). 
  
The fact that Bazargan and his associates early on set the pace for a revolution that was 
later hijacked by Khomeini‟s faction of the opposition becomes important when we 
consider that the tactics and strategies that would eventually characterize the religious 
opposition were indeed the same methods of struggle that the political movement had 
adopted at the beginning of the revolution. 
 On December 29, 1977, twenty-nine prominent activists wrote an open letter to 
the U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. A copy of the letter was also sent to 
President Carter who was scheduled to visit the shah at the end of the month and 
205 
 
celebrate New Year‟s Eve with him. In what Stempel (1981), refers to as a “planned 
campaign,” the Iranian opposition kept pushing the human rights agenda back onto 
Carter. Collaborating with its homeland counterparts, “opposition supporters in the 
United States encouraged the President to recognize that the Iranian dissidents were 
seeking the same human rights goals the President had been proclaiming” (89). It 
therefore seems to be beyond doubt that the Iranian revolutionaries deliberately sought to 
involve the United States in their conflict with the shah. At the same time, the 
revolutionaries realized that the U.S. had enough invested in the shah to prevent a 
complete abandonment of its trusted ally. Thus, as one scholar puts it, “by 1978 efforts 
were directed more toward producing American neutrality rather than enlisting positive 
American support for fundamental reform” (Cottam 1988:162). The opposition realized 
that U.S. neutrality was a sufficient and infinitely more achievable goal, as it would 
prevent the shah from receiving the American backing he had relied on in the past. 
Emphasizing the human rights context turned out to be a most fruitful way of 






 Because of Carter‟s campaign rhetoric and the efforts of the abroad-based 
opposition‟s efforts, the Iranian Revolution occurred against the backdrop of a global 
human rights discussion on Iran. Following the letter writing campaigns of early and mid-
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1977, the revolution advanced through four somewhat distinct phases: the secular 
challenge against the regime in the fall of 1977, the mourning processions of the first six 
months of 1978, a brief interlude of relative calm followed by a few crucial events in the 
summer of that year, and finally the enormous strikes and massive demonstrations that 
brought down the regime in the fall and early winter of 1978-1979. In the next four 
sections I briefly discuss each phase of the revolution and the strategies and tactics used 
to challenge the shah‟s government.  
 
The Secular Challenge: Responses to Liberalization (Fall 1977) 
 
The letter writing campaigns that resulted from the shah‟s liberalization measures 
in response to Carter‟s human rights agenda were eventually transformed into a more 
concrete confrontation between the secular opposition and the shah‟s regime in the fall of 
that year. The most significant event of this period was organized by the Writers‟ 
Association, one of many new or reemerging groups pressing the regime for human rights 
concessions, which arranged a series of sixteen nights of poetry readings. At these events, 
poets sympathetic to the opposition delivered their poems in front of large crowds that 
would memorize and subsequently share them with friends and family. On the tenth night 
of the series, famous poet Saeed Soltanpour was scheduled to give a lecture and recite 
some of his work. The organizers had reportedly sent out 2,000 invitations, but a crowd 
in excess of 10,000 showed up for the event. Tehran police prevented the vast majority 
from entering the amphitheater where Soltanpour was to perform, resulting in unrest at 
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the entrances to the theater and the arrest of 50 student activists. When the poet was 
informed of the situation “he refused to give his scheduled speech on art and its influence 
on society and instead read one of his most revolutionary poems, written while he was 
incarcerated in a Savak jail” (Parsa 1989:178). The audacity of Soltanpour‟s act of 
defiance inspired those gathered, both in the theater and outside, and a spontaneous sit-in 
was organized to last throughout the night. When the activists left the theater in the 
morning and formed a street demonstration, they clashed with security forces which cost 
several students their lives. In response to the killings, students called for a national day 
of mourning three days after the clashes, with new demonstrations resulting in more 
deaths and the shutdown of the Tehran bazaar, “an event unheard of in more than a 
decade” (Parsa 1989:179). A few months later the religious opposition would mimic the 
students‟ “mourning day strategy” and organize mourning processions of their own. As 
for the Writers‟ Association, the tenth poetry night marked its last significant contribution 
to the revolution. Although the organization survived with a more radical leadership and 
continued to issue anti-government statements, it was unable to organize events similar to 
its 1977 poetry nights. Thus, while ineffective during the remainder of the revolution, 
“the Writers Association played a crucial role by attacking the government in the initial 






Hijacking the Revolution: The Religious Turn (Winter and Spring 1978) 
 
Following the poetry nights, the regime once again shrunk the political space 
available to the opposition. The shah himself had recently visited Carter in Washington, 
and despite clashes between anti- and pro-shah demonstrators in Washington DC he had 
left America feeling confident of U.S. support.
127
 The shah‟s sense that his relationship 
with the United States was not in doubt was reinforced on the last day of 1977 when the 
President and Mrs. Carter rang in the New Year in Tehran as the king‟s guests. On this 
occasion Carter delivered a toast, proclaiming that  
Iran under the great leadership of the Shah is an island of stability in one of the 
most troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, your majesty, and 
to your leadership, and to the respect, admiration, and love which your people 
give to you. (Amjad, 1989:119)  
           
Although Carter may have intended to flatter the shah, it seems more likely that the 
President and his staff actually believed the shah to be popular among Iranians. I will 
return to the U.S. role in the revolution below. 
 Perhaps as a result of Carter‟s words, his own newly rejuvenated confidence, and 
the apparent success of the liberalization program, the shah seemingly decided to test the 
opposition the way it had tested him in the previous months. Thus, on January 7, 1978, 
the Ittila’at, one of Iran‟s largest newspapers, slandered Khomeini as both a British agent 
and a homosexual of Indian origins. The article was written by the government, although 
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 The regime had reportedly paid airfare, expenses, and $300 to anyone willing to come to the U.S. capital 
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demonstrate against [the shah]. To hell with him” (158-9).  
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the identity of its author has remained somewhat of a mystery. What was not a mystery, 
however, was Khomeini‟s supporters‟ response to the article: On the following day, 
4,000 radical Islamic teachers and students demonstrated in Qom and the city‟s bazaar 
shut down in solidarity with the demonstrators. Government forces clashed with the 
demonstrators and 70 activists lost their lives while 400 were injured (Amjad 
1989:120).
128
 This incident marked the beginning of the 40-day mourning cycles that 
would become a central element of the opposition‟s resistance to the regime in the first 
half of 1978.  
The martyrs of the January 8 demonstrations were commemorated at mourning 
processions on February 18 in sixteen cities around Iran. The demonstrations were 
peaceful in all but one of the cities, the exception being Tabriz in the northwestern part of 
the country, where demonstrators clashed with security forces. Some commentators 
suggest that the protests turned into riots when a radical student activist, twenty-year old 
Mohammad Tajala, threw the first stone at the police and was in turn shot dead (Kurzman 
2004:46). Others, however, point to police attacks on protesters outside a mosque where 
one man was shot in the leg by the security forces as the incident that sparked 36 hours of 
rioting in the city (Parsa 1989:111-2).  
Regardless of who initiated the violence, the Tabriz riots constitutes the exception 
to the rule of peaceful protesting during the first six months of 1978, although Keddie 
(2003) has argued that “this protest-to-riot pattern was to be repeated later in Iran‟s main 
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cities” (229). Thirteen people died in the Tabriz unrest, almost all of whom were 
opposition activists. It is important to note that although demonstrators in Tabriz rioted, 
the riots were deliberate and in fact largely nonviolent. Banks, liquor stores, and cinemas 
playing Western and pornographic films were all attacked, but “human life was spared, 
even of those considered enemies” (Keddie 2003:226). Furthermore, the banks attacked, 
symbols of Iran‟s westernization, were vandalized, but none of them were raided for 
money. In other words, opposition violence targeted symbols of the shah‟s unpopular 
regime, and was thus used to make “a political point,” rather than economically enrich 
the movement or its participants (Abrahamian 1982:506-7). To illustrate that violence 
was not a crucial element of even the most violent episode of the early revolutionary 
period, Parsa (1989) describes an alternative tactic used “in the heat of the 
demonstration,” as  
it was reported that some twenty dogs, each wrapped in a white cloth, were turned 
loose in the central city. On each was affixed the name of one of the members of 
the royal family. The dogs ran widely about, evading capture, making mockery of 
the royal family. The significance of this event was unmistakable. In a single 
dramatic act, the people of Tabriz symbolically eliminated the entire royal family. 
(112) 
 
The 40-day protest cycle was repeated twice more, on March 28-30 and May 8-
10. In the late March edition, protests occurred in 55 cities and towns. Among them was 
Yazd in the central part of the country, where up to a hundred people were killed. The 
Yazd clashes were tape-recorded, and the opposition quickly spread copies of the tape 
around the country in an apparent PR-coup against the government (Foran 1994b:176). 
Following the May 10 mourning processions the revolutionary leadership cancelled plans 
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for a fourth round of protests that would have taken place on June 17. According to 
Kurzman (2004), the decision to halt the 40-day mourning cycles was made as a result of 
pragmatic considerations of the government‟s suspected plans to violently repress the 
next round of protests that would have coincided with the 15
th
 anniversary of the 1963 
Muharram uprising. Unwilling to face the regime in an all-out confrontation, the 
opposition instead called for a one-day strike to take place on June 17.  
Thus, after six months of sustained and regular opposition to the shah‟s 
government, the protest movement came to a temporary end in mid-June. Although it had 
not overthrown the government, which at this point in time was only the objective of 
Khomeini‟s faction of the opposition, the movement had reaped the benefits of the 
protest-cycles and undergone at least one fundamental transformation: The protest 
activities during the first six months of 1978 helped establish the radical Islamists, and 
Khomeini in particular, as the de facto leaders of the movement. Before the unfortunate 
publication of the Khomeini-slandering article, opposition protests “were led by the 
intelligentsia and the middle classes, took the form of written declarations, and were 
organized around professional groups and universities,” but once the government had 
made its most significant blunder in decades, demonstrations were now led by the ulama, 
“organized around mosques and religious events, and drew for support on the urban 
masses” (Bakhash 1990:15). By virtue of its own actions then, the government had 
helped the revolutionary ulama hijack the leadership of the movement at the expense of 
the liberal, reform-minded secular opposition.  
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Beside this elemental shift in the movement‟s character away from moderate 
secularism towards populist Islam, the hundred or so demonstrations that made up the 
mourning processions gave both movement leaders and participants valuable training and 
practical experience in how to confront the government‟s forces (M. Fischer 1987; 
Keddie 2003; Seliktar 2000; Stempel 1981). Furthermore, Parsa (1989) has argued that 
the combination of  
the forty-day cycles of mourning ceremonies and the existence of mosque 
networks enabled bazaaris to broadcast and confront each successive brutality by 
the government. Without the means of publicizing the regime‟s repressive nature, 
the opposition movement would soon have been snuffed out. (113) 
 
In short then, the religiously camouflaged protest activities of early 1978 represent the 
instrumental second phase of the Iranian Revolution. Most importantly perhaps, it was 
during the long spring of 1978 that Khomeini and his lieutenants secured a firm grip of 
the revolutionary leadership.  
  
Interlude and Government Blunders (Summer 1978) 
 
The summer of 1978 passed surprisingly quietly until another insane decision by 
the government once again galvanized the population. On August 19, exactly 25 years 
after the CIA‟s Operation Ajax ousted Mossadeq, the Rex Cinema in Abadan, an oil city 
in the southwestern part of the country, was set ablaze. The fire, the responsibility for 
which the government placed on the religious opposition, claimed the lives of about 400 
individuals and was surrounded by suspicious details. For example, it has been reported 
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that the entrance doors to the cinema were locked from the outside, and that police 
prevented bystanders from helping those inside the theatre. Furthermore, it took the fire 
brigades an exceptionally long time to arrive at the scene (Amjad 1989; Kurzman 2004).  
 The opposition used these facts to blame the government and the SAVAK for the 
arson. Oppositionists pointed out that the cinema had been attacked during the day and 
without prior warning, both of which violated the opposition‟s normal code of conduct 
(Algar 1983; Amjad 1989). Also, the Rex was not a pornographic theater, and at the time 
of the incident was playing an anti-government film called Deers. Finally, the shah had 
delivered a speech just the previous night warning the nation of the opposition‟s desire to 
invoke “great terror” (Amjad, 1989: 123-4). Although the identity of the arsonists may 
never be known, the people of Iran definitely favored the logic of the opposition‟s theory 
and condemned the government for its barbaric actions. Thus, the accuracy of some 
commentators‟ allegation that the opposition did indeed sacrifice 400 of its own followers 
to score a propaganda victory against the SAVAK is inconsequential. The Rex Cinema 
fire restarted the anti-government movement and was further fueled by events 3 weeks 
later on September 8. 
   The sudden escalation in anti-regime sentiment that followed the Rex Cinema 
fire shook the very foundations of the shah‟s world. A week after the incident Prime 
Minister Amouzegar was dismissed and replaced by Ja‟afar Sharif Emami, a politician 
known to be more acceptable to the religious opposition. Sharif-Emami immediately 
resumed liberalization by restoring the traditional Muslim calendar (the shah, to the 
ulama‟s outrage, had replaced it with a Persian one), closing all casinos and gambling 
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houses, banning all publications deemed to be “contrary to Islamic belief,” including 
pornography, releasing religious leaders in external exile, and removed most press 
restrictions (Menashri 1990:39-41). Sharif-Emami also granted all political organization, 
except communist ones, the right to organize, reinstated expelled students, and promised 
to prosecute those responsible for violence against protesters (Parsa 1989:55).The shah‟s 
opponents, on the other hand, took advantage of the regime‟s vacillating strategy and on 
the final day of Ramadan, Eid-e Fetr, organized a massive “religious” gathering in 
Tehran that eventually turned into an anti-shah demonstration. Similar demonstrations 
were arranged in the following days until the government finally had enough and 
declared martial law in the early morning of Friday, September 8 (Kurzman 2004). 
Unaware that martial law had been announced just hours earlier, thus prohibiting 
public gatherings, activist congregated as planned in Tehran‟s Jaleh Square later that 
morning. Protesters went about their business, continuing the streak of peaceful 
demonstrations that had been permitted in the previous days, but this time the 
government‟s response would be different. Foran (1993a) vividly captures the horrific 
course of events: 
When ordered to disperse people sat down and bared their chests. Soldiers fired 
first into the air, then directly into the crowd in a massacre. Shooting continued 
during the day, including aerial attacks from helicopters on the southern slums. 
Officially, eighty-six people were killed; bodies in the Tehran morgue were 
assigned numbers which reached over 3,000. The event came to be known as 
Black Friday, and it marked the declaration of open war between the government 
and the population. (381) 
 
In contrast to the government‟s already high official death toll, Stempel (1981) suggests 
that “estimates of 300 to 400 dead are reasonable” (117), while Keddie (2003) suspects 
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that the Black Friday casualties “probably numbered from 500 to 900” (232). A French 
journalist at the scene of the massacre interpreted the government‟s actions in the 
following way: “[The regime] aim[s] to frighten them, dissuade them, have to hit hard. 
Once as a lesson” (Kurzman 2004:74). Worded differently, it appears the government 
hoped to end the challenge to its rule by striking hard at the opposition once and for all. 
Instead, as so often in the history of government attempts at repression throughout the 
world, the Black Friday massacre marked the Iranian Revolution‟s point of no return, as 
“compromise with the Shah became extremely difficult if not impossible after this date” 
(Bakhash 1990:17). In part due to the massacre, then, the few remaining moderates of the 
revolutionary coalition‟s leadership were forced to irrevocably concede their positions of 
prominence in favor of the hardliners who argued that revolutionary overthrow of the 
shah‟s government was now the only option. This dynamic, which has been referred to by 
scholars of nonviolent social change as either “the paradox of repression” (Kurtz & 
Smithey 1999; Schock 2005) or “political jiu-jitsu” (Sharp 1973; 2005), suggests that 
government repression often lead to the radicalization of a movement, which is indeed 
what happened in Iran. By repressing the opposition the shah only contributed to the 
marginalization of the moderates, which in turn made his position a lot more difficult. 






Making the Revolution: Strikes and Demonstration (Fall and Winter 1978-79) 
 
 Following Black Friday the demonstrations continued and were combined with an 
ever-growing number of strikes in every part of the economy. As Kurzman (2004) points 
out, “strikes were not unknown in Pahlavi Iran,” as every year between 1973 and 1977 
saw between fifteen and twenty-seven strikes take place (77). Furthermore, strikes had 
been used successfully during the Constitutional Revolution and were commonplace in 
the time period immediately following the coup against Mossadeq (Afary 1994; Amjad 
1989). Nonetheless, strikes had never been used on such a massive scale as would be the 
case in the fall of 1978.  
In September 1978, bazaaris and private sector workers were the first to strike, 
and by October Iran witnessed its first strikes in the public sector.
129
 While private sector 
strikes were economically disruptive, the strikes in the public sector caused even severer 
problems for the regime as they coupled economic demands with political ones. The 
heavy emphasis on political demands set by Iranian workers have been duly noted by 
many commentators (Kurzman 2004; Parsa 1989; Parsons 1984; Stempel 1981).
130
 For 
example, strikers demanded “the unconditional release of all political prisoners, 
dissolution of martial law, and expulsion of foreigners of the respective sectors” (Parsa 
1989:151), the “Iranianization of the oil industry” (Kurzman 2004:78), and “the return of 
Khomeini” (Amjad, 1989: 125). 
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suggested that political demands only materialized later in the striking process. 
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Partly because of their political nature and partly due to their large size, “it was 
the public sector strikes that paralyzed the economy” (Bakhash 1984:189). Also, most 
workers were employed by the state, “which increased the potential for politicization of 
conflicts” (Parsa 1989:151) Amuzegar (1991) has succinctly traced the development of 
isolated public sector strikes into what eventually became a debilitating general strike the 
government proved unable to cope with. 
With meticulous and methodical organization and direction, rarely if ever seen in 
Iran‟s public administration, the first critical strike began in the oil fields, causing 
both a drastic drop in oil exports and exchange earnings and a shortage of 
domestic fuel. Thereafter, one by one, the other strategic centers of the economy – 
the ministry of water and power, the customs administration, the treasury, the 
central bank, and Iran Air – joined the antigovernment protesters. While the final 
cause of the regime‟s downfall may still be a matter of speculation, there is no 
doubt that the economic paralysis caused by the public employees‟ strikes was a 





As workers from a wide variety of industries and sectors struck simultaneously the 
government was at a loss for meaningful responses. Total repression was not an option as 
the shah knew that he could ill afford to further infuriate the nation‟s skilled workers, 
especially those in the oilfields who literally provided his regime with the fuel it needed 
to operate. In addition to the apparent economic damage, imprisoning these workers 
could potentially expose them to “the subversive ideas of the political prisoners,” which 
would likely only serve to amplify their alienation from the state (Amjad 1989:113). 
 As the shah refused to confront the strikers head on, and instead preferred to 
remain faithful to his tactic of mixing repression with concessions, the number of strikes 
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increased drastically throughout the fall. On October 7, almost 30 new groups joined the 
strikes and the next day another 65 new work stops were reported. On October 9 another 
110 strikes were added to the list and on the 12
th
 yet another 125 new strikes went into 
effect. At this point employees at several of the government‟s news outlets joined the 
striking nation in what can only be described as a general strike (Parsa 1989:146). 
 The sheer number of strikes overwhelmed the state‟s repressive machinery which 
simply could not coerce the entire nation back to work simultaneously, or, as the shah 
himself noted in October 1978, “You can‟t crack down on one block and make the people 
on the next block behave” (Kurzman 2004:113-4). An additional problem for the 
government surrounding the strikes was that even though some industries of the economy 
did not strike, many such workplaces remained idle because of strikes in other sectors. 
For example, when custom officials struck and ink could not be delivered to the central 
bank, the Iranian economy experienced a physical shortage of money as no new bills 
were being printed, resulting in industries closing down since the lack of money meant 
they could no longer pay their workers (Kurzman 2004). In addition to the overwhelming 
nature of the general strike, the government lacked a meaningful institutional protocol for 
dealing with public sector strikers as “there was no provision in law for withholding pay 
from rebellious workers. Thus, for example, when Iran Air pilots or the Central Bank 
tellers refused to show up, they continued to be paid” (Stempel 1981:121). For those 
Iranians who nevertheless had their salaries withheld (which mainly occurred in the 





    
 Throughout the general strikes, the shah, under indirect pressure from the United 
States and international human rights organizations, continued his process of 
liberalization. As media restrictions had been eased, workers could now learn about 
strikes in other parts of the country which increased their sense of solidarity with others. 
Perhaps even more importantly, “by knowing that other large groups were on strike at the 
same time, strikers realized that the regime was vulnerable and that the cost of repression 
could not be very high, for pressure on any single group was reduced” (Parsa 1989:151). 
In summary, the Iranian state, like most states, was for structural reasons poorly equipped 
to handle the type of massive general strike that swept the country in October. Although 
the strikes do not seem to have been initially coordinated by the revolutionary leadership, 
Khomeini, who by now thanks to his longstanding uncompromising stance towards the 
shah was firmly in control of the movement, soon realized the strikes‟ utility. Thus, in 
late November, while still in Parisian exile, he called upon the Iranian people “to go on 
perpetual strike until the criminal Shah was deposed” (Stempel 1981:143). When 
opposition politician Shapour Bakhtiar was named prime minister by the shah in a last 
desperate attempt to save his throne, Khomeini responded by once again calling “for 
more strikes and demonstrations” (Abrahamian 1982:525). The effectiveness of the 
strikes had not been lost on Iranians, and Khomeini was certainly no exception to that 
rule. 
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  Unlike mindless rioting that have accompanied revolutions in the past, the Iranian 
Revolution, despite witnessing some instances of seemingly irrational collective 
behavior, was on the whole a highly deliberate and strategic manifestation. Foran (1993a) 
has captured the purposive nature of the general strike by noting that it served  
two purposes: It weakened the shah‟s regime, delegitimating it internally and 
making it difficult to repress the movement… And it convinced the West, led by 
the United States, that the shah could no longer guarantee the flow of Iranian oil, 
let alone provide a stable outlet for investment capital. It was thus absolutely 
central to the success of the revolution; Khumaini could not have taken power (or 
would have had an unimaginably more difficult task doing so) without the 
working class general strike. (387) 
 
The general strikes were indeed highly disruptive and debilitating for the regime. But 
despite the incredible pressure the strikes put on the shah he never fully released the 
might of his military against the Iranian population. To understand the success of the 
Iranian Revolution, which was never a foregone conclusion, it is necessary to explore the 
reasons why one of the most powerful militaries of the world turned out to be powerless 
in the face of the nonviolent opposition. 
 
Explaining the Lack of Repression: The Role of Structure 
 
 Strikes and demonstrations have been used by activists in many revolutionary 
struggles, as well as by Iranian activists throughout the 20
th
 century, but not always with 
the overwhelming success evidenced by events in Iran in the fall of 1978. As scholars 
have noted, a necessary factor in explaining nonviolent success is understanding the lack, 
or failure, of state repression (Nepstad forthcoming). The shah had two potential sources 
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of repression, his armed forces and U.S. intervention. This section explores the structural 
reasons that may explain the absence of military and American repression respectively.  
 
The Absence of Military Repression 
 
Some have argued that the shah was not prone to violence, and that he in fact 
“genuinely abhorred bloodshed” (Amuzegar 1991:286), but such testimonies tend to 
come from either commentators sympathetic, or even apologetic, to the shah, or from 
friends and past members of his administrations.
133
 The shah had used significant 
violence in the past, for example when suppressing the largely nonviolent upheaval of 
1963, and decisively crushing the Iranian guerrillas in the early 1970s. Although 
Amuzegar (1991) suggests that the shah did not personally order the military to attack the 
crowds in June 1963 – that order supposedly came from Prime Minister Alam – other 
commentators frequently disagree. According to Bill (1988a), “the shah approved a brutal 
military attack on unarmed demonstrating students” in January 1962 (146), and, more 
relevantly, in the face of stirring unrest in early 1978 “initially gave orders à la 1963 to 
put down the disturbances with as much as force as necessary” (236). Bill proceeds to 
paint the shah as a butcher-like statesman, arguing that in the bloody first months of the 
revolution “troops fired on funeral processions… directly into unarmed crowds of men, 
women, and children” (Bill 1988a:236).  
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While the shah almost certainly did order his troops to initially deal with 
opposition activities violently, the reality of his actions probably falls somewhere in 
between Amuzegar‟s and Bill‟s evaluations: the shah did not abhor violence, but neither 
was he willing to fully deploy his military against the Iranian people. But if this 
reluctance did not stem from the shah‟s personality we must look for other plausible 
explanations for the relative lack of violent repression of the strikes. 
Several scholars have suggested that the shah‟s indecisiveness in dealing with his 
opponents stemmed from the fact that he was dying from cancer. “Reduced repression,” 
Parsa (1988) writes, “was contrary to the Shah‟s historical policies and was due in part… 
to the Shah‟s cancer and the listlessness that resulted from his chemotherapy” (46). 
Similarly, Stempel (1981) adds that “even if the impact of the illness and treatments was 
not a factor until 1977, it severely reduced the Shah‟s ability to cope with an evolving 
problem that went to the very roots of his regime” (34). Although it is possible that the 
shah‟s struggle with cancer did have some effect on his ability to deal with the mounting 
pressure he was experiencing in 1978, it seems improbable that the cancer so 
fundamentally changed his mind set as to make him a pacifist ruler. Instead it seems 
prudent to follow Ansari‟s (2003) advice “not to exaggerate the implications of [the 
shah‟s] illness (196). 
Some of the most convincing evidence of the irrelevance of the shah‟s cancer, and 
likewise his willingness to consider violence is provided by a group of scholars that have 
argued that the shah did not seek to avoid repressive violence per se, but rather the 
responsibility for it. Amuzegar (1991), now somewhat contradicting his previous point 
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about the shah‟s natural avoidance of violence, states that the shah “preferred [violent 
repression of the opposition] to be carried out by the military forces on their own without 
his prior approval,” because the shah “was fearful of a failed attempt (and a bloodbath) 
for which he would have to bear responsibility. He wanted his generals to make the hard 
decisions” (301). This plan might have succeeded, as some generals and other military 
commanders were itching to strike down on demonstrators and strikers, had it not been 
for the organizational structure the shah had imposed on the armed forces. 
 In order to prevent his military commanders from uniting against him, and “to 
assure the loyalty of the army to his person,” the shah had organized the armed forces 
according to a “neo-patrimonial command structure” that served “to maximize rivalry 
and mutual resentment among the generals, and placed personal enemies alternately in 
the chain of command whenever possible” (Arjomand 1988:124). The consequence of 
this royal security measure was that “no one had the right to give any orders without the 
Shah‟s permission” (Afshar 1985b:188). Officers acting in ways that attracted the shah‟s 
displeasure could wave goodbye to the post-retirement incentives the king used to secure 
the support of his military commanders. For example, Stempel (1981) reports that 
“successful career officers,” that is those retiring with the shah‟s approval, could look 
forward to appointments “to a state corporation like the National Iranian Oil Company or 
to Senate, where the Shah could name 30 choices” (30). Thus, similarly to many other 
elements of the shah‟s state organization, “the armed forces were wholly dependent upon 
the leadership of the monarch in order to act effectively” (Stempel 1981:31). While this 
arrangement served the shah well in periods of political stability, it became thoroughly 
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problematic in times of uncertainty. Consequently, without an efficient chain of 
command, and with officers programmed not to act without his blessing, the king‟s hope 





Explaining the Absence of American Intervention 
 
With his generals unwilling to make the decisive calls, and knowing that “other 
countries would look with horror at mass violations of civil rights” (Stempel 1981:136), 
the only other possibility for the shah to use violence against the unarmed protesters 
would have been with the United States‟ explicit approval. As his most important ally, 
the shah hoped that the U.S. would consider him essential enough to its interests to do 
whatever necessary to keep him on the throne. Thus, throughout the unrests of 1978 the 
shah looked for signs that the U.S. would endorse an “iron fist” strategy. However, the 
Carter administration, trapped in the ICL, never provided such an endorsement. Instead, 
Carter (1982) recalls, 
Personally and through the State Department I continued to express my support 
for the Shah, but at the same time we were pressing him to act forcefully on his 
own to resolve with his political opponents as many of the disputes as possible. 
(442) 
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 This response to mounting political unrest in Iran throughout the course of the revolution 
has aptly been described as “a masterpiece of double-talk, and the epitome of the 
ignorance of the policy makers about the unfolding crisis” (Milani 1988:217).  
 Beginning with the latter, several commentators have echoed Milani‟s evaluation 
and argued that U.S. policy towards pre-revolutionary Iran was clueless at best 
(Amuzegar 1991; Arjomand 1988; Cottam 1988; Dorman & Farhang 1987). Citing a 
report from the U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which concludes that 
“we see a basic unresolvable conflict between the Shah‟s liberalization program and the 
need to limit violent opposition,” Cottam (1988) draws his own stinging conclusion:  
The mainstream of the revolution was nonviolent and expressed itself increasingly 
in public demonstrations. Long denied any access to the opposition, the U.S. 
bureaucracy concerned with Iran had no real picture of it. It follows that without 
even a rudimentary understanding of the force with which they must deal, any 
strategy and associated tactics that might have been devised would have missed 
the mark. (173) 
 
Only slightly less critical of U.S. ignorance when it came to its Middle Eastern ally, 
Arjomand (1988) posits that “in retrospect, the United States was doing better when there 
was no high-level discussion on Iran [emphasis in original]” (128).
135
 Arjomand refers to 
the fact that once the U.S. realized that the shah was in trouble, which it did not do until 
the late fall of 1978, it attempted to carefully intervene by expressing its support for the 
shah. Contrary to its intended purpose, that intervention caused some to conclude that the 
U.S. had indeed decided to abandon the shah: 
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(1981) Ledeen and Lewis (1981), and Teicher and Teicher (1993). 
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When I read all these reports I called a well-placed American friend and asked 
him, “Have you really made up your mind to get rid of the Shah?” He was taken 
aback, and asked what I meant. “You couldn‟t find a better way to overthrow him 
than stepping up your expressions of support. As far as Iranians are concerned, he 
is already an agent of yours.” In fact ever since the spring the demonstrators had 
been calling him a “puppet in the hands of the American imperialists.” (Hoveyda 
1980:169) 
 
The shah would probably have been willing to be seen as an American puppet had that 
label been accompanied by solid American support. What he received instead were 
increasingly contradictory signals from the Carter administration (Farhi 1990; Milani 
1988; Pahlavi 1980; Sick 1985; Stempel 1981; Zonis 1991). 
 Throughout 1978 the shah continued to receive confusing messages from the 
White House. It is important to keep in mind that the king as late as New Year‟s Eve of 
1977 remained confident of U.S. backing. However, in the aftermath of the tumultuous 
events of August and September of 1978, the shah‟s belief in the U.S.‟s commitment to 
him decreased rapidly. The first action by President Carter to sow seeds of anxiety in the 
shah‟s mind was the former‟s phone call of “support” two days after the Black Friday 
massacre. During a five minute phone conversation, and in a manner that was to become 
typical of the Carter administration‟s approach to the shah‟s difficult situation that fall, 
the President “wished the shah the best in resolving these problems and in his efforts to 
introduce reform” (Sick 1985:51). This type of double-talk became the standard discourse 
through which the Carter administration expressed its support for the shah‟s regime. The 
king, who religiously followed what was reported in Western media, was forced to read 
comments such as Secretary of State Vance‟s evaluation on November 3, that “the 
continuing violence and the strikes in Iran are a serious problem for the government, and 
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we fully support the efforts of the shah to restore order while continuing his program of 
liberalization [emphasis added]” (Alexander & Nanes 1980:461). Similarly, during a 
press conference on December 7, Carter responded to a question about the shah‟s chances 
of surviving the revolution in the following manner: 
I don‟t know, I hope so. This is something in the hands of the people of Iran... We 
have never had any intention of trying to intercede in the internal political affairs 
of Iran. We primarily want an absence of violence and bloodshed, and stability. 
We personally prefer the Shah maintain a major role in the government, but that is 
a decision for the Iranian people to make. (Zonis 1991:257) 
 
Needless to say this response must have come as a severe blow to the shah, and 
apparently somebody within the Carter administration realized this, because the president 
retracted his statement five days later and stated firmly that his “support for the shah 
remained unchanged” (Hoveyda 1980:84).  
 The president‟s reversal was intended to give the shah the confidence he needed 
to deal forcefully with the opposition. However, Carter‟s tacit approval of tough actions 
was never deciphered by the king. In his autobiography, published in the year after the 
revolution and shortly before his death, the shah complains that official statements of 
support were never confirmed by Ambassador Sullivan, who would repeatedly reply to 
the shah‟s desperate pleas for guidance by saying that “he had received „no instructions‟ 
and therefore could not comment” (Pahlavi 1980:161). Further blaming the U.S. for his 
downfall, the shah grumbles that “the messages I received from the United States as all 
this was going on [the mounting crisis of November 1978] continued to be confusing and 
contradictory.” Specifically, “Secretary of State Vance issued a statement endorsing my 
efforts to restore calm and encouraging the liberalization program. Such Herculean 
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fantasies left me stunned [emphasis added]” (Pahlavi 1980:164-5). Clearly, in the shah‟s 
mind the strategy of concurrent repression and liberalization was untenable, but since no 
direct instruction arrived from Washington to clamp down on the protesters, the shah did 
not dare to make such a decision on his own.  
 After several months of contradictory advise from the Americans, the shah 
eventually broke down on December 26 and directly asked the American ambassador 
“point blank whether [the administration] would support a policy of brutal repression 
(Seliktar 2000:116). Sullivan‟s response to shah‟s desperate request was probably the 
worst possibly answer he could have given the king, as the ambassador avoidingly 
concluded that “You‟re the shah,” and that the decision was the king‟s to make (Zonis 
1991:257). In the next few days the White House considered endorsing a violent response 
by the regime, but by the time the cable was sent, Secretary Vance had convinced the 
president to remove any “strong elements” from it (Seliktar 2000:116). 
 
The Shah’s Compromise: Disguised Violence and Restrained Troops 
  
The fact that the shah wanted either his generals or the United States to take 
responsibility for the use of violence suggests that he was not inherently opposed to the 
application of brutal force against his own people. Rather, the shah worried that using 
violence would alienate the United States and thus leave him with no other ally besides 
the armed forces, which by December was losing an estimated 1,000 troops each day due 
to defections (Kurzman 2004). Further evidence that the shah only refused to unleash the 
229 
 
military due to fear of international repercussions is suggested by the fact that he resorted 
to what the British Ambassador at the time, Sir Anthony Parsons, describes as “thinly 
disguised state violence,” namely hooligans and agents provocateurs (Parsons 1984:53). 
“In the last few months of its rule,” Parsa (1988) writes, “the regime added a new 
type of attack to the repertoire of repression; namely, hooligan attacks on property” 
(118). Bazaaris were the primary targets of such attacks and scholars have documented a 
long list of incidents that can be credited to government-organized bands of vandals.
136
 
According to Amjad (1989), the SAVAK in coordination with the Rastakhiz Party 
created two terrorist groups in the fall of 1977, called the “Underground Committee of 
Revenge” and the “Resistance Corps,” which “attacked several political meetings and 
demonstrations held by the National Front, students, and the Writers‟ Association” (120). 
Although its frequency increased during the last stage of the revolution, the tactic itself 
was not novel. One of the first reported hooligan attacks occurred on November 22, 1977, 
when 200 bussed in thugs beat up 100 meeting participants in Tehran (Stempel 1981:88). 
These tactics gained in popularity, and throughout the fall of 1978 they became 
central to the regime‟s efforts to combat the revolutionaries. Parsa (1989) reports that “in 
the first week of November 1978, hooligans had attacked more than forty cities, in many 
cases burning and looting shops” (116). Through the use of hooligans and agents 
provocateurs, it seems the regime sought to either provokes a violent response from the 
opposition that would justify military action against unarmed demonstrators, or 
alternatively suggests to the U.S. that these hooligans were opposition activists that had 
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to be confronted. Either way the regimes strategy failed as protesters continued to strike 
and demonstrate.  
Throughout the revolution, but especially in its last months, the shah‟s main 
problem was that it became increasingly difficult to justify the application of armed force 
against nonviolent demonstrators. The use of hooligans and agents provocateurs did not 
provide a consistent enough source of repression to cause the demise of the revolutionary 
movement. However, without being able to rely on his armed forces and American allies, 
“the shah himself determined that violent tactics were doomed to fail” (Bill 1988b:30). 
 
Explaining the Lack of Repression: The Role of Strategy 
 
 The structural composition of the armed forces and the Carter administration‟s 
incomplete understanding of the Iranian situation provide two plausible explanations of 
the relative lack of government repression in the face of the opposition‟s challenge. 
However, to these structural causes we must add the opposition‟s strategy as an 
additional source of the government‟s restraint. Since the military and the U.S. in the 
minds of the revolutionary leaders remained the most serious threats to the movement‟s 
success, this section explores how the opposition sought to further minimize the 





Defeating the Shah I: Demilitarizing the Military 
 
The fact that neither the U.S. nor the Iranian generals were willing to assume 
responsibility for repression of the movement resulted in the shah issuing his military 
“impossible orders.” Soldiers were prohibited from opening fire on civilians unless 
violently attacked. Once activists realized that the armed forces had been instructed to 
exercise restraint, they would test the waters of this restraint by seeing how far they could 
push the soldiers without drawing fire. Although this tactic of playing cat and mouse 
games with the armed forces proved somewhat successful for the opposition as it 
severely frustrated the military, its main strategy was not to antagonize the troops but 
rather to win them over.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Khomeini informed his followers “that under no 
circumstances were they to clash with the armed forces” (Heikal 1982:145). While the 
ayatollah‟s pleas sometimes fell on deaf ears, most demonstrators embraced his call to 
“talk to the soldiers, have a dialogue with them” (Heikal 1982:155). It is worth repeating 
that Khomeini‟s nonviolent approach to the military should not be confused with an 
idealist commitment to pacifist principles. Instead, Khomeini, like most of the senior 
revolutionary leadership, still recalled the army‟s successful repression of the Muharram 
uprising in 1963. As Stempel (1981) explains, 
The extensive program to propagandize the military was undertaken because the 
older mullahs remembered how the army had ended unrest in 1963 by shooting 
down the demonstrating mobs. The Liberation Movement agreed that the army, 
and labor union members and small businessmen as well, should be neutralized or 
won over. Throughout the summer and fall, the Liberation Movement and the 
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religious dissidents worked together very closely. Their goals were identical: to 
undermine the Shah through the army and thereby destroy his support. (110) 
 
In other words, the decision to “demilitarize the military” (Satha-Anand 1999:170) was 
based exclusively on strategic concerns. 
 As far I can tell, the first instance of mass appeal to the armed forces coincided 
with demonstrations marking the end of Ramadan on September 4. In an apparent effort 
to follow the revolutionary leadership‟s advice, and “far from being violent, the 
demonstrators made a special effort to establish rapport with the soldiers who lined the 
demonstration area” (Cottam 1988:175). Two French reporters vividly describe the 
events unfolding before them: 
Two trucks full of soldiers, with a machine-gun battery, are at their posts. The 
procession, which has grown, it appears, roars and dances in the sun: “Soldier, my 
brother, why do you shoot your brothers?” A spray of flowers falls on the 
machine-gun barrel, the crowd touches the tarpaulins and the poles of the trucks. 
Emboldened, it shakes the hands of the soldiers, kisses them, covers them with 
bouquets. In a whirlwind of shouts, the first guns have been conquered, the 
soldiers are in a state of shock, bewildered. Some of them cry, their machine-guns 
henceforth useless. The officers of the convoy speak up: “We belong to the 





Although the two journalists may have embellished the scene to which they 
became witnesses, their account reveals both the revolutionaries‟ strategy and its 
outcome. That presenting soldiers with flowers, which was to become a tactical mainstay 
of the revolution, was indeed a coordinated and deliberate scheme is evidenced by the 
fact that “florists gave the demonstrators bunches of flowers” (Cottam 1988:175). It is 
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 For other accounts of the same event, see Cottam (1988:175), Foran (1993a:381), and Moaddel 
(1994:160).   
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For the armed forces, the situation quickly became untenable: at the height of the 
revolution the soldiers were faced, on a near-daily basis, with demonstrators who urged 
them to join the people. Unauthorized to attack, the conscripts were forced to listen to the 
crowds‟ pleas to its “Moslem brothers” to lay down their weapons (Amuzegar 1991; 
Heikal 1982, Kurzman 2004). The eventual result of this popular pressure was that 
military morale plummeted, and “commanders began doubting the unquestioned loyalty 
of draftees and enlisted men” (Amuzegar, 1991: 286).
139
 In the face of these conditions, 
officers urged the shah to either unleash the military on the people or withdraw the 
soldiers to the barracks. The shah refused to accept either proposal, and the soldiers 
remained on the streets where they were battered with opposition propaganda (Hoveyda 
1980; Kurzman 2004).  
The combined tactics of general strikes on the one hand, which required the army 
to step in and do the work of some economic sectors (Kurzman 2004), and 
demonstrations that nonviolently propagandized the military on the other, proved too 
much for the armed forces to handle. By the time millions of Iranians, on December 9 
and 10, participated in “impressive, superbly organized, and massive” nonviolent 
demonstrations throughout Iran to celebrate the martyrdom of Imam Hussain on Tasu‟a 
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soldiers” (Abrahamian 2009:170)  
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 Part of the problem was that “more than 90 percent of the four hundred thousand army personnel  were 
conscripts who served for only eighteen months; they remained closely tied to the civilian population and 
became unreliable instruments during periods of massive conflicts” (Parsa 1989:247).  
234 
 
and „Ashura (the ninth and tenth day of Muharram) the army‟s utility had since long been 
exhausted (Milani 1988:216). In Tehran alone, the two days‟ demonstrations are 
estimated to have attracted as many as three million marchers. On „Ashura alone 
approximately five million Iranians – out of total population of less than 40 million – 
protested against the government, numbers that quite possibly represented the largest 
protest in world history at the time.
140
 Several scholars (M. Fischer 2003; Kurzman 2004; 
Stempel 1981) have expressed their amazement over the peaceful nature of the massive 
protests that “marked the end of the Shah” (Arjomand 1988:121). 
If the military had been an inefficient tool in dealing with the revolutionaries 
throughout 1978, its usefulness deteriorated even further after the Tasu‟a and „Ashura 
demonstrations. Meanwhile, the opposition continued its outreach to the soldiers, and 
desertions rates increased rapidly in December and January (Arjomand 1988; Heikal 
1982; Kurzman 2004). On January 15, one day before the shah left Iran for good, a high-
ranking commander proposed that soldiers should be kept away from the demonstrators: 
We should round up the units and send them some place where [the 
demonstrators] won‟t have any contact with the soldiers. Because yesterday they 
came and put a flower in the end of the rifle barrel, and another on the [military] 
vehicle... The soldiers‟ morale just disappears. (Kurzman 1996:164) 
 
It is difficult to imagine more concrete evidence of the success of the revolutionaries‟ 
strategy of nonviolently engaging the military. “Figures from Iranian military intelligence 
show the desertion rate rose from 3 percent per week to 8 percent in September-
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December 1978, and by February 1 the rate was up to 20 percent” (Stempel 1981:151). 
1979 would not witness a repeat of the military‟s 1963 defeat over a popular movement. 
 
Defeating the Shah II: Targeting the World and the United States 
 
 If the military was the primary target of the opposition‟s strategy, the world 
community, and the United States in particular, was its secondary objective. As we have 
seen, Iranian student groups abroad had employed this tactic for the last two decades, and 
Khomeini had clearly understood its potential. As early as the fall of 1977, the ayatollah 
urged his followers that, just like secular oppositionists, they “too should write letters” 
and “inform the world” of the situation in Iran (Khomeini qtd. in Kurzman 2004:22). It 
appears that Khomeini‟s supporters either heeded his advice or had reached a similar 
conclusion on their own, because following the unrest in Qom in January 1978, it took 
the opposition only one month to produce press kits about the three days of government 
repression that were then distributed to visiting foreign correspondents (Stempel 
1981:92).  
By October 1978, Khomeini was no longer welcome in Iraq, and moved to 
Neuphle-le-Château in the suburbs of Paris. The Iranian regime had pressured the Iraqis 
to deport the ayatollah so that he would no longer have access to large Shi‟i crowds 
(Stempel 1981:124). While this decision might have made a lot of sense at the Iranian 
government‟s security meetings, it turned out to be yet another policy blunder. Once in 
Paris, Khomeini found himself surrounded by Western media outlets itching to tell his 
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story (Ansari 2003; Foran 1993a; Milani 1988; Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 
1994; Stempel 1981). With near unlimited access to Western journalists, Khomeini and 
his aides began their campaign to convince the world that an Islamic Iran would 
constitute no threat, as it “would become a reliable oil supplier to the West, would not 
ally with the East, and would be willing to have friendly relations with the United States” 
(Abrahamian 1982:524). 
 Khomeini‟s task was made easier by the fact that “sufficient numbers of the 
Western intelligentsia were sympathetic to the revolutionary movement” and saw Iran as 
potential “model for transition from authoritarian rule that could be copied elsewhere” 
(Ansari 2003:9). Once he had overcome his initial suspicion of the Western media 
(Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi 1994), Khomeini “skillfully exploited the modern 
communication system to spread his attractive gospel of freedom, independence, and 
Islamic government in Iran and the rest of the world” (Milani 1988:202). Not wholly 
unlike Gandhi in the first half of the century, Khomeini, thanks in part to his charisma 
and asceticism, became a European media darling of sorts, and he fully exploited this 
opportunity by chastising the shah‟s regime and pacifying the West‟s concerns about an 
Islamic Iran. In his first two months of Parisian exile, Khomeini generated “458 pages 
of… messages, speeches, and interviews” (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi 
1994:134-5).
141
     
                                                 
141
 For more on this point, see Bani-Sadr (1991). For a discussion of Iran‟s actual post-revolution 
relationship with the rest of the world, consult for example Ehteshami and Varasteh (1991). 
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 In addition to utilizing the Western press for their revolutionary purposes, 
Khomeini and his colleagues directly targeted the U.S. with propaganda. To accomplish 
this objective, Ibrahim Yazdi, the coordinator of the Muslim Students Association in the 
United States and a close Khomeini collaborator, “was dispatched on a tour to reassure 
the public and the administration about the reasonableness of his boss” in the late fall of 
1978 (Seliktar 2000:63). As Sick (1985) explains, 
[Yazdi‟s] themes were simple. The revolution was peaceable, employing the 
techniques of nonviolence against the murderous assaults of the shah‟s forces. 
The objectives of an Islamic republic, once the shah was gone, were fully 
compatible with U.S. ideals of personal freedom and human rights. Iran was in no 
danger of being taken over by Communist elements, and an Islamic republic 
would not be interested in aligning itself with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, 
nothing would prevent the continuation of mutually satisfactory relations with the 
United States. Since the fall of the shah was now virtually certain, he argued, the 
United States should give up its fruitless policy of support for his regime and 
make peace with the new revolutionary leaders who were about to take over. 
(112) 
 
These carefully weighted words seemingly hit home with the many Americans 
who were concerned about their country‟s alliance with a repressive and militarily 
addicted dictator.
142
 The result of Yazdi‟s PR tour was that “many came away convinced 
that Khomeini was being unfairly maligned in the West and that the Revolution offered 
the best hope in fifty years for the triumph of human rights and free political expression 
in Iran” (Sick 1985:112). At the same time as Yazdi was convincing Americans in the 
U.S. to not fear an Islamic Iran, opposition politicians employed similar tactics in Iran by 
lobbying both the American and British ambassadors (Stempel 1981). The revolutionary 
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strategy seems clear – drag the West, and the U.S. specifically, into the revolution by 




A Nonviolent Revolution? 
 
 While most scholars tend to agree with Foran (1994b) that the Iranian state 
collapsed due to “the strategies of general strike and massive, peaceful demonstrations” 
(162), revolutionary Iran did witness plenty of violence.
144
 Zonis (1991) reports that 
estimates of the number of dead vary from 60,000-70,000 all the way down to 3,000 for 
the entire course of the revolution (fall 1977-February 1979). Interestingly enough, as the 
years have passed, the estimated number of casualties has dropped. For example, 
Kurzman (2004) found that “the Martyr Foundation, established after the revolution to 
compensate the survivors of fallen revolutionaries, could identify only 744 martyrs in 
Tehran, where the majority of the casualties were supposed to have occurred” (71). Most 
recently, Abrahamian (2009) has suggested that according to the “book of martyrs” 
published by the government right after the revolution, only 578 individuals were 
identified as having been shot in the streets during the sixteen months of the revolution. 
While there are obviously other ways to die in a revolution, this relatively low number 
seems to suggest that the military did practice considerable restraint.  
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However, based on the definition of a nonviolent revolution presented at the 
beginning of this study, the factor most important for determining nonviolent character of 
a revolution is not the number of dead, but rather who those dead were. “Aside from 
isolated instances,” two scholars explain, “Iranians did not take up arms against the 
shah‟s forces… The blood spilling was almost entirely one-sided [emphasis added]” 
(Dorman & Farhang 1987:156). Further evidence of the one-sidedness of revolutionary 
violence is offered by Stempel (1981), who suggests that in the 8 years leading up to the 
revolution, 300 “police, military, and government employees… were gunned down in the 
streets” (17). Although this figure might appear high, it would constitute merely a dent in 
the government‟s repressive machinery, as the army alone consisted of 400,000 troops. 
This can hardly be framed as the type of consistent terrorism that would frighten the 
government into submission. 
 Nevertheless, opposition violence did occur. In the spring of 1978 some militants 
“were willing to engage the regime with violence, against overwhelming odds,” by 
bringing rocks, knives, and clubs to demonstrations (Kurzman 2004:69), and in August 
“demonstrators briefly returned the gunfire of the police” in Isfahan (M. Fischer 
2003:197). Another example of opposition violence is the unfortunate fate of a retired 
colonel who ended up in the middle of a demonstration. Infuriated protesters (troops had 
opened fire and killed two men in the crowd) demanded that the colonel renounce the 
shah. When he refused to comply, the crowd blinded and killed him (M. Fischer 2003). 
But more common than violent outbursts of this kind were acts of sabotage, arson of 
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factories, and destruction of symbols representing the regime, such as government offices 
and statues of the two Pahlavi shahs (Foran 1993a; Parsa 1989). 
 Towards the end of the revolution the level of opposition violence increased 
somewhat. November 5 turned out to be one of the most chaotic days of the entire 
revolutionary process, when armed guerrillas attacked 17 police stations in Tehran, 
capturing two of them. Airline offices were trashed while banks were broken into, and 
according to some reports even looted (Stempel 1981). But these isolated instances of 
opposition violence and destruction can hardly be deemed central to the revolution‟s 
success, and they certainly “played no role in the revolutionary leadership‟s strategy or 
tactics (Shivers 1980:76). 
 The last weekend of the revolution, February 9-11, was characterized by a “mini-
civil war” (Milani 1988:231), which begun when a group of air force technicians 
(Homafaran) deserted en masse (Arjomand 1988). The Imperial Guard attempted to 
prevent the technicians from leaving their posts, resulting in armed skirmishes between 
the two factions. Soon guerrilla soldiers were rushing to the technicians‟ aid, triggering a 
brief armed conflict that ended abruptly on that Sunday afternoon, less than 48 hours 
after it had been initiated, when the army declared its neutrality (Arjomand 1988; Falk 
1980; Milani 1988; Stempel 1981). In engaging the deserting technicians and the 
guerrillas, Milani (1988) suggests that the Imperial Guard acted without the the 
knowledge or approval of the shah, who had already departed for Egypt. Assessing the 
end of the revolution, Milani (1988) acknowledges that the guerrillas did play a part in 
defeating the Imperial guard, “but the significance of their role and of the entire 
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confrontation between the Imperial guard and the homa faran should not be exaggerated” 
(231). Furthermore,  
the declaration of neutrality of the armed forces was the product of weeks of 
behind-the-scenes negotiations between the CIR (Coucil of the Islamic 
Revolution) and the armed forces. All evidence indicates that the armed forces 
would have eventually declared their neutrality. (Milani 1988:231)  
 
While the violent conclusion of the revolution might then have been unnecessary 
for its eventual success, commentators have speculated that the turn toward violence 
affected the ultimate outcome of the revolution: had the army been allowed to declare its 
neutrality without a perceived defeat at the hands of the revolutionaries, they might have 
been able to play a “moderating role in the postrevolutionary struggle” (Milani 
1988:231).
145
 In sum, the prevalence of violence in the Iranian Revolution, while real and 
at times significant, played at most a marginal part in the revolutionary strategy (Shivers 
1980), and cannot be posited as contributing to the revolution‟s success.
146
 The Iranian 




 As discussed in Chapter 5, the Iranian Revolution was made possible by an 
international context that generated a structural condition (the iron cage of liberalism) 
favorable to the emergence of a nonviolent challenge against the regime. The major 
puzzle of this chapter was to explain the absence of effective government repression of 
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 Evidence of this argument is that neither Khomeini nor any other revolutionary leader ordered or 
endorsed the violence occurring in the last days of the revolution (Stempel 1981).  
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the revolutionary movement, in other words to empirically show how the ICL prevented 
the shah from efficiently dealing with his opponents. I have suggested that the shah‟s two 
possible sources of repression – his armed forces and an American intervention – were 
both missing from Iran‟s revolutionary equation. True, the military did use force to deal 
with the movement, especially in the spring of 1978, but its actions were never firm 
enough to prevent movement participants to take part in the demonstrations and strikes. 
Because the shah had ordered the armed forces to only return violence, never to initiate it, 
the soldiers were in most cases unable to make their repressive efforts have any type of 
lasting effect on the psyches of the demonstrators. Instead, the limited nature of 
repression most likely created a “paradox of repression” (Kurtz & Smithey 1999; Schock 
2005), and in turn increased opposition to the shah. As one scholar points out, “the death 
of one family member radicalized other relatives, who then joined the active opposition; 
this extended-family phenomenon added to the cumulative nature of the revolution” (Bill 
1988b:22). As long as only a “manageable” number of people were killed in each protest 
event, government violence probably benefitted the cause of the revolutionary leadership.  
 The central explanation given here to the absence of overwhelming repression is 
quite straight forward. The shah did not want to assume responsibility for bloodshed and 
consequently hoped that either his generals or the United States would take that burden 
off his shoulders. However, neither of them did. The generals failed to act because they 
had been steeped in a military culture in which the shah was expected to make any and all 
important decisions. In addition, towards the end of the struggle the morale within the 
armed forces was so low that even if orders had been given to seriously and violently 
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engage the protesters it is unclear whether the conscripted soldiers would have obeyed 
them. The U.S., on the other hand, was rendered incapable to intervene for two reasons. 
First, the administration‟s understanding of condition on the Iranian ground was severely 
misinformed until the last few months of the revolution. By that time there was probably 
little Carter could have done, even if we assume he had the desire to save the shah‟s 
throne. More important though were the effects of the ICL. As suggested in the previous 
chapter, the shah was not liberalism‟s only prisoner. Carter‟s campaign and early 
presidential rhetoric assured that he could not, in the presence of an internationalized 
revolutionary movement covered by an efficient mass media, support a blatantly 
authoritarian ally without seriously damaging his own human rights credentials.  
The result of the ICL was disastrous for the shah. Throughout the revolutionary 
period of 1977-79, the king sought to regain a firm hold of his country while 
simultaneously advancing a liberalization agenda he felt forced to embrace as a result of 
Jimmy Carter‟s election. As Tocqueville (1955) once proclaimed, “the most perilous 
moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways” (177), and although 
the shah hoped the liberalization would reduce opposition to his government, reform was 
instead seen as evidence of weakness. But is Tocqueville‟s assertion as inalienably true as 
it sounds? After all, the shah had undertaken reforms in the past and emerged unscathed 
and, at times, more powerful than before. To understand why the result of his 
liberalization scheme of 1977 and beyond had such catastrophic consequence, we must 
take into account revolutionary strategy.  
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Strategy, as discussed above, is a concept that has generally been overlooked by 
revolution and social movement scholars.
147
 Only in the literature on nonviolent action 
has strategy been afforded a consistent place in explanations of collective action.
148
 
Strategy is a useful term because, in contrast to the more commonly applied concept of 
agency, it does not grant individuals an exaggerated (and sometimes even unlimited) 
range of possible actions. Instead, I have suggested that strategy should be thought of as 
“structurally situated agency,” thus limiting actors‟ choices to those feasible under the 
current structural conditions.    
The U.S.-Iranian ICL did indeed make a nonviolent revolution plausible. In 
Chapter 5 I showed that the strategic activities of the abroad-based student opposition 
helped bring about the ICL by lobbying the world for its attention. In this chapter I went a 
step further and explained how Khomeini, Bazargan, and others capitalized on the 
political openings presented by the presence of an ICL. By framing their challenge to the 
shah‟s regime in terms of universal appeals to liberal values and human rights, and by 
embracing nonviolent methods that resonated with those values, Khomeini and his 
collaborators justified their revolution and heightened its international appeal. This in 
turn decreased the risk of the type of overwhelming government repression that 
Khomeini knew, based on his 1963 experience, might have jeopardized the entire 
movement. The result of this form of strategic planning and farsightedness under the 
favorable social context of an ICL was the nonviolent overthrow of one of the most 
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powerful dictators of the Third World. Put succinctly, Khomeini involved the world, 
particularly the U.S., in the struggle by offering the global community a revolution it 
could live with, and, more importantly, a revolution liberal nations could not oppose 





It is hard to imagine the construction of any valid analysis of long-term structural 
change that does not connect particular alterations, directly or indirectly, to the 
two interdependent master processes of the era: the creation of a system of nation 
states and the formation of a worldwide capitalist system. (Tilly 1984:147) 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to examine why the Iranian Revolution 
turned out to be nonviolent. At the outset of the study, my assumption was that the 
revolution‟s nonviolent character was its defining and unprecedented quality. In the 
course of my research that assumption has proven to be only partially correct. At first 
sight, what made the Iranian Revolution so extraordinary was indeed the fact that a 
dictator with tremendous repressive capabilities was rendered powerless by unarmed 
protesters and forced out of his palace. However, the nonviolent nature of the revolution 
was simply a symptom, an observable fact. The truly groundbreaking aspect of the 
process, what set it apart from previous revolutions, was its international dimension. It 
thus follows that my primary conclusion, which is about as parsimonious as conclusions 
get, is that the Iranian Revolution was nonviolent because it was internationalized. 
 I am of course not the first student of revolutions to recognize the importance 
played by the international context. Skocpol‟s (1979; 1994) work has been referenced 
throughout this study and as noted above, Tilly (1984) suggests that revolutions, or any 
“long-term structural change,” must be approached from a globalized viewpoint. 
Nonetheless, my findings are novel in the way they help make sense of how the 
international context impacts contemporary revolutions. Rather than following in the 
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footsteps of existing scholarship by conceptualizing its role in terms of conflict, hostility, 
and rivalry, my theoretical framework approaches the international dimension from a 
perspective that emphasizes amicable inter-state relations. The shah‟s close relationship 
with the United States brought about the revolution, but it did not do so by contributing to 
the breakdown of the Iranian state. Rather, friendly relations with the United States 
strengthened the shah‟s government and, quite counter-intuitively, facilitated 
mobilization against his regime. This study has shown how 40 years of U.S.-Iranian 
friendship helped make way for the massive revolutionary movement that swept the king 
from his throne.  
 The amicable relationship between Iran and the United States has been an 
important dimension of each chapter of this dissertation and constitutes the central 
structural element of my analytical framework. By allowing the shah to destroy his 
political opponents, the U.S.-Iranian relationship cleared the way for the ulama-bazaar 
revolutionary coalition and provided the coalition with the means and political openings 
necessary to overthrow a dictatorial regime. In the next few pages I outline the genesis of 
a structural-strategic theory of nonviolent revolutions by highlighting how the 
international context made a revolution feasible and provided its protagonists with the 






The Consequences of a Special Relationship: An Internationalized Revolution  
 
 The first way in which the U.S.-Iranian relationship contributed to the eventual 
downfall of the shah is characterized by the effects it had on national politics. Following 
World War II, the U.S. considered Iran an attractive market on which to sell its goods. 
Moreover, the country‟s oil and strategic location made it an ideal partner in both trade 
and policy. Although American officials initially entertained the idea of promoting liberal 
values in Iran, such considerations were withdrawn when Mossadeq announced his 
intention to nationalize the country‟s oil. Washington feared that if successful, other 
resource rich nations might follow Iran‟s lead to the demise of America‟s neo-imperialist 
aspirations. Therefore, the political window of opportunity that U.S. involvement had 
provided the Iranian opposition with at the conclusion of the war now had to be closed, 
and America‟s half-hearted efforts at advancing democratic ideals in Iran were 
effectively abandoned. The U.S. had made its choice: the economic and strategic benefits 
of supporting a dictator trumped America‟s commitment to individual freedoms and 
political openness. 
 The shah initially benefited from U.S. support. Aid and trade allowed him to fill 
the state‟s coffer while his reputation as a staunch anti-communist won him many friends 
in the West. By characterizing his opponents as leftists, the king justified their state-
induced destruction and managed to turn Iran into a political wasteland. Without U.S. 
support such a development would not have been possible. Because of American 
friendship, the shah felt confident that power sharing with historically influential 
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domestic groups, such as the political elites, powerful landlords, wealthy merchants, and 
the Shi‟i clergy was unnecessary. In short, backed by Washington the king consolidated 
power and implicitly declared his autonomy from Iranian society. At first, this 
independence served him well, but when the revolution came around, autonomy had 
transformed into isolation as none of the social groups that could perhaps have helped 
him save the throne rushed to his side. In addition, and perhaps even more detrimental to 
his prospects, the elimination of the traditional opposition, including the guerrillas, left 
the opposition stage clear for the ulama-bazaar coalition. One of the factors that had 
historically prevented outright opposition against the shah from the clerics was that they 
detested the secularist movement even more than they disliked the shah. Once the shah 
had eliminated their common enemy, little prevented the clergy from opposing the king. 
In a sense then, by removing one enemy the shah invited an attack from the other. 
Without U.S. support the shah would arguably not have been able to successfully defeat 
the political opposition and would consequently not have bared himself to a challenge 
from the religious movement.     
 While most Iranians were affected negatively by the close U.S.-Iranian 
relationship, one group was able to very early take advantage of this new reality.
149
 
University students flocked to the United States, and to a lesser extent to Europe, as a 
result of their ruler‟s acceptance in the West. Seemingly ungrateful for this opportunity, 
the students, once outside the reach of the shah‟s repressive machine, began to agitate 
against their king. After almost 15 years of campaigning and propagandazing, the 
                                                 
149
 The religious opposition only exploited U.S. involvement successfully in the late 1970s. 
250 
 
students managed to make their case to the world community. Their ruler, who the world 
knew as a benign and Westernized statesman, was in fact a ruthless dictator in the process 
of inflicting a “political holocaust” on his opponents. By mixing facts with fiction, the 
students eventually managed to portray the shah as the world‟s worst offender of human 
rights, an image endorsed first by human rights groups and later by the international mass 
media. Now all of the sudden, the shah‟s close relationship with the United States had 
caught him in a bind: how does an authoritarian government deal with dissent of this sort 
if the one tool it cannot use is the repressive capabilities on which it is based? How does a 
dictator respond when the world calls his democracy bluff?  
 With Western pressure mounting as a result of the reports and articles published 
about his human rights record, the shah sought to liberalize society in an attempt to regain 
credibility and what he feared was diminished American support.
150
 However, the 
liberalization scheme incited resistance at home and with the world‟s attention fixed on 
his government, the shah could use repression only with great difficulty. By the mid-
1970s, the king had spent the past decade and a half transforming himself into an 
important ally of the United States. By becoming a dependable Cold War soldier and 
important trade partner, mainly through oil and arms, the shah had advanced from client 
to ally. While this transformation initially increased his power, it also resulted in a 
situation where the shah was expected to behave in a manner appropriate for an 
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ideological soul mate of the United States, the world‟s beacon of democracy. This 
became even more the case when Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976. Having 
accepted the West‟s commitment to liberal values, the shah was now trapped in what I 
have called an iron cage of liberalism: he could not effectively use repression against 
peaceful demonstrator without becoming guilty of the political charges pressed against 
him.       
 Once in place the ICL represented the only political opening the Iranian 
opposition would ever need, and shrewd strategic planning and execution allowed the 
revolutionaries to drag the United States and the rest of the world even deeper into the 
conflict. By relying on nonviolent tactics, the burden of the ICL was exacerbated as the 
shah struggled to find appropriate ways to deal with the opposition‟s tactics. Strikes and 
demonstrations resonated well with Carter‟s commitment to human rights, and 
consequently Washington found it difficult to condemn the revolutionaries as long as 
they acted nonviolently and professed their anti-communist sentiments. Fearing a 
negative response from Washington, the shah refused to unleash the military on the 
protesters, and once it became clear that neither his generals nor the Carter administration 
would take responsibility for violent repression, the shah resorted to the use of hooligans 
and agents provocateurs. This last ditch effort, however, proved to be an insufficient 
response, and after little over a year of popular resistance, the shah went into exile, thus 
bringing the revolution to its effective, albeit informal, conclusion. The 
internationalization of the revolution, from the creation of a special relationship to the 
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exploitation of the ICL, had contributed to its success not by breaking down the state, but 
by facilitating mobilization against it.        
 
Toward a Structural-Strategic Theory of Nonviolent Revolutions 
 
 The findings of this study, summarized in the previous paragraphs, suggest the 
appropriateness of a structural-strategic approach to nonviolent revolutionary social 
change. To fully understand how internationalization drove the Iranian Revolution, it is 
necessary to explore the relationship between structure and strategy. The close 
relationship between the United States and Iran represents the central relevant structure in 
the Iranian Revolution. Although the faltering economy, corruption, class and gender 
relations, modernization, and a host of other factors may have contributed to popular 
discontent in the period leading up to the revolution, it was the special relationship 
between the two nations that facilitated mobilization and provided the movement with its 
crucial political opportunity in the shape of an ICL. However, the presence of an ICL did 
not make a successful revolution a foregone conclusion, as the structural opportunity had 
to be strategically exploited in order for the movement to triumph. 
 The focus on the iterative relationship between structure and strategy is perhaps 
the most important sociological contribution of this study. Traditionally, sociologists 
have quarreled over which component is the driving one in the structure-agency 
relationship. Do human actions transform structures, or do structures dictate the range of 
human actions? I argue that this dichotomy is unhelpful at best and false at worst. Rather 
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than thinking of structure and agency as opposite and mutually exclusive poles, I suggest 
we appropriate the concept of strategy, which I have defined as “structurally situated 
agency,” from the nonviolent action literature.  
 An emphasis on strategy allows more flexibility in our theorizing about large-
scale social change. True, social structures limit the options available to actors, but they 
are not as confining as we might think. Instead, structures might present agents, in this 
case revolutionaries, with options previously unthinkable. Furthermore, the interaction 
between structure and strategy is often more organic than the traditional structure-agency 
divides allows for. For example, the ICL is not strictly a structural construct. Rather, it 
should be seen as the result of the Iranian students‟ shrewd exploitation of their nation‟s 
close relationship with the United States. In other words, the special relationship between 
the two nations did not automatically and inevitably result in an ICL. Instead, the ICL 
was only a potential consequence of the special relationship. It is possible that in similar 
contexts elsewhere ICLs have failed to materialize despite the existence of a special 
relationship. Only where astute strategists take advantage of structural openings may an 
ICL materialize and potentially have revolutionary consequences.           
 But strategy does not only bring about structural openings – it also allows actors 
to exploit them. Once the students had helped create an ICL by involving human rights 
groups and the media in their struggle against the state, that opportunity had to be taken 
advantage of, and this is where nonviolent tactics become essential to the explanation. 
The iron cage of liberalism is based on a certain logic of contradictions, and only regimes 
that voluntarily accept the liberal values of the West can be trapped in an ICL. Of course, 
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accepting the developed world‟s democratic ideology has certain advantages as it 
sometimes serves to legitimize an otherwise questionable regime. However, the adoption 
of the West‟s value system may eventually have some unintended consequences for a 
dictator. When the democracy bluff is called by the opposition and the international mass 
media, the authoritarian government must choose between repression, which “unmasks” 
it and jeopardizes further foreign support, and concession to the opposition, which tends 
to aggravate the crisis of the state. Either way the adoption of Western values may 
eventually backfire and create an ICL that makes a nonviolent challenge against the 
government highly effective. 
 It is this link between the structural ICL and the strategic use of nonviolent 
revolutionary tactics that best illustrates the iterative relationship between structure and 
strategy. The ICL could perhaps be exploited through an armed uprising, but the cage‟s 
constricting qualities would not be as problematic for the state to overcome. In fact, most 
Western governments have little problem with other states countering popular violence 
with repression. The reason for this is simple: democratic regimes themselves reserve the 
right to respond to violence in such a manner, and there is nothing in the liberal-
democratic ideology that gives individuals the right to violently attack the state. 
Nonviolent protest, on the other hand, could be construed as a human right, which is why 
the ICL can so effectively be exploited by strategists willing to employ peaceful methods. 
In short, liberalism and nonviolent tactics are symbiotically related which makes 
nonviolent action effective against the backdrop of an ICL.       
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 A second and more general contribution to sociology that arises out of this study 
is a reevaluation of the nature of state power. The iron cage of liberalism suggests that the 
global community might be able to impose restraints on a state‟s handling of its 
population. Of course, this type of international oversight is to a considerable extent what 
the United Nations was designed to provide, although its critics often use the 
organization‟s lack of leverage over individual states to suggest its irrelevance. On a 
philosophical level, part of the problem appears to be that the U.N. is not to the individual 
state what the state is to individual person, that is, a Leviathan (Hobbes 2002). However, 
this study indicates that under certain circumstances the global community might be able 
to force a government to show restraint in dealing with its subjects. In contrast to how we 
usually think about the role of international third parties in domestic politics, it was not 
sanctions and isolation that left the shah‟s government vulnerable to a popular movement, 
but rather the fact that Iran had been welcomed into the family of nations.
151
 
 When Iranians‟ rose up in response to Ahmedinejad‟s allegedly fraudulent re-
election in the summer of 2009, and subsequently came face to face with Iran‟s security 
forces, activists, journalists, politicians, and scholars from Iran and around the world 
called for the global community to assume its responsibility and “do something.” 
Unfortunately, with the exception of an ill-advised military intervention, there was little 
the world could do. Unlike the situation under the shah, the U.S. and the West had no 
leverage over the Islamic Republic as 30 years of sanctions and isolation had effectively 
destroyed any chance of beneficial Western involvement in the Green Revolution. Had it 
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been the West‟s intention to promote democracy and liberal rights in Iran in 2009, that 
process should have been commenced in 1979 by befriending Khomeini‟s government. 
Thirty years later there was little the world could do except watch an authoritarian state 
squash its opponents. 
 And that is the bottom line: Iran‟s nonviolent revolution occurred and succeeded 
precisely because it was an internationalized process. From the shah‟s destruction of the 
political opposition to the creation and exploitation of the iron cage of liberalism, the 
movement was viable because it operated on the global stage with the international 
community participating in the process. There were no sanctions in place and Iran was 
not an isolated country. Because of this, the world, and the U.S. in particular, had 
considerable leverage over the shah. Thirty years later a misguided and foolish policy of 
sanctions against governments that fail to meet certain liberal standards has resulted in an 
Iranian government unaffected by the concerns of the West. Why should Tehran care 
about Western opinion? With sanctions already in place the West has played most of its 
cards and the Iranian hard-liners are at freedom to handle the opposition as it pleases. 
Liberalization under the shah was not the result of U.S. pressure and hostility. Instead it 
was the logical consequence of a special relationship, which just as any relationship 
entailed certain expectations. The shah sought to meet those expectations and in doing so 
trapped himself in the ICL. Rest assured that it will be a long time before the structural 





Future Directions for Research 
 
 This dissertation is one of the first projects to examine the emergence of 
nonviolent revolutions. Not content to simply understand why the revolution succeeded, 
this study has also identified the factors that allowed a nonviolent revolution to occur in 
the first place. The internationalization of the opposition‟s struggle against the shah made 
nonviolent tactics viable and eventually resulted in a successful overthrow of a dictator. 
So where to go from here? In this section I propose a few different avenues for future 
research. 
 Since the theoretical framework proposed in this study is based solely on research 
on the Iranian Revolution the findings naturally only apply to that case. While developing 
the theory, however, I kept other nonviolent revolutions in mind with the hope that future 
research may suggest that the findings of this study are generalizable to other cases. Only 
further research can determine whether that is so, and the next logical step on my 
research agenda is therefore to undertake a comparative study of nonviolent revolutions. 
Table 7.1. lists some potential cases that could form part of such a study. 
 Of central interest would be to evaluate the explanatory power of the ICL and the 
iterative relationship between structure and strategy. Has the ICL appeared elsewhere or 
is the concept unique to the Iranian Revolution? Is it possible that Marcos of the 
Philippines and Pinochet of Chile found themselves trapped in ICLs? Did the popular 
movements that removed those two dictators from power rely on strategic shrewdness to 
nonviolently exploit structural openings? As for the Eastern European revolutions of 
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1989, did Gorbachev‟s reform rhetoric of glasnost, perestroika, and demokratizatsiya 
become the functional equivalent of Carter‟s human rights policy?
152
 Did it matter to the 
outcome in South Africa that many foreign corporations left the country at the request of 
the ongoing anti-apartheid movement? What role, if any, did Russia, the U.S., and the EU 
play in the popular removals of Milosevic, Shevardnadze, and Yanukovych? 




Country Year  
Iran  1977-79 
The Philippines 1983-86 
Chile  1983-88 
South Korea 1987-88 
Poland 1980-89 
East Germany 1989 
Czechoslovakia 1989 





 While positive cases, that is, successful nonviolent revolutions, are important to 
examine, a comparative study could also contain one or two negative cases. The currently 
failing Green Revolution in Iran would constitute a near-ideal comparison to the Iranian 
Revolution as the national context is the same, but unfortunately it may be too soon to 
accurate evaluate the dynamics of that struggle. Another potential negative case is the 
                                                 
152
 For some thoughts on the “Gorbachev factor,” see Goodwin (2001:280-1). 
153
 Adapted from Zunes (1994:405) and Goodwin (2008:1877). 
259 
 
failed Burmese movement of 1988-89.
154
 Did these two cases benefit from the existence 
of ICLs? If so, why were the movements unable to exploit them? If ICLs were not 
present, what explains their absence? By combining positive and negative cases it would 
be possible for me to employ Mill‟s indirect method of difference, which would be a 
powerful tool for better understanding nonviolent revolutions.   
There is little reason to expect the current trend of nonviolent revolutions to end, 
because as long as authoritarian regimes remain in place there will be revolutions. This 
dissertation has begun to examine the causes and dynamics of what promises to be the 
dominant type of revolution in the foreseeable future. Much research remains to be done, 
but it seems clear that the nonviolent nature of these momentous processes is closely 
correlated with their international character. Students of revolutions would be well 
advised to consider their internationalization, and future revolutionaries may want to be 
guided by Khomeini‟s (1980) advice to his followers: “If they hit you in the head, 
protest!… Argue, denounce, oppose, shout” (4), in short, “inform the world” (Kurzman 
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